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INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE
In the quiet stillness of an insignificant moment, an idea is born.
Its roots are deep within the unconscious spirit of a particular
person. Yet, the real originator of the idea is not the person
within whom it is presently encased.' Its true origin was within
the yearnings of previous generations; those who paid dearly for
being Black in America. These yearnings have taken different
shapes at various points throughout the history of this country.
However, their purpose is the same today as it was centuries
ago. They are reborn at this memorable juncture in American
history to remind us that we are still not free.2
1. The idea for this Conference was presented by Attorney Geraldine Hines at a
meeting of the Massachusetts Chapter of the National Conference of Black Lawyers. Her
vision was great, and the enormous amount of work, energy and devotion which she in-
vested into this idea made that vision a reality. The members of The National Confer-
ence of Black Lawyers are deeply appreciative of her vision and work. She is a symbol of
this organization's mission.
2. One of the critical distinctions which must be made is between "freedom in form"
and "freedom in substance." Freedom is often described as the legal determination that
one is entitled to all the rights and privileges that a political entity provides to its inhab-
itants. Clearly American law now provides this form of freedom to Black people and
other people of color. However, this description of freedom can be misleading, when by
any measure of objective value one is effectively denied those rights and privileges. The
concept of freedom must encompass one's real status within a society. It must include
the ability of a group to influence, if not control, its destiny. The value that the society
ascribes to the group, and that the group places on itself, are important indicators of
freedom. If the group is disconnected from its true history, culture and unique contribu-
tion to the development of the society and the world, then pyschologically and spiritually
the group is enslaved. If the society is responsible for this interruption in transmission,
then it is the enslaving agent. Freedom does not only correspond to a group's legal sta-
tus; it involves every aspect of life. One should not divorce the substantive issues of
economics, politics, social and spiritual values from the legal determination of freedom
and equality. When we examine some of these important factors in the United States it
is clear that Black people have not transcended the substantive barriers of enslavement.
A report published by The Center for the Study of Social Policy entitled, A Dream De-
ferred: The Economic Status of Black Americans, which was issued in July, 1983 con-
cluded that "the economic gap between blacks and whites remains wide and is not di-
minishing." Id. at i. To support this conclusion the study stated that the "median
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Throughout the history of this country it has been necessary
for those who suffer from exclusion and denial to put forth their
case to the society and to propose appropriate solutions. This
conference is part of that tradition.3 It is a continuation of the
income for black families as a percentage of median income for white families was 55%
in 1960, and ... fell again to 56% in 1981." Id. It also indicated that, "in 1981 ... 55%
of all black families had incomes under $15,000, while only 28% of all white families had
such incomes." Id. at i. In addition to the above, the study disclosed that in 1981 45% of
all Black children lived in poverty compared with only 14% for White children; 39% of
all Black senior citizens lived in poverty as compared with only 13.1% of White elderly
persons; and the unemployment rate since 1960 has been twice as high for Black people
than it has been for Whites. The social consequences of these and numerous other eco-
nomic disparities on Black People, according to this report, are higher infant and mater-
nal mortality rates; shorter life spans; higher incidences of teenage pregnancy, overrepre-
sentation in jails and prisons; and a greater likelihood of criminal victimization. Id. at ii.
This is only one of numerous studies which verify that despite the gains of some seg-
ments of the Black population, Black people as a whole have not obtained "substantive
freedom" in America.
3. There is a rich history of Black people convening conferences to protest the ine-
qualities and injustices of the American legal system. One of the earliest occurred in
Cleveland, Ohio in 1851, and was called the Ohio Convention of Colored Men. At this
convention, a young H. Ford Douglas gained public attention for his forceful advocacy
against the legitimacy of the United States Constitution. Though more reputable and
senior Black abolitionists endorsed the validity of the Constitution and the "integrity of
the founding fathers," the youthful Douglas proclaimed that "the Constitution of the
United States is pro-slavery, considered to be so by those who framed it, and construed
to that end ever since its adoption .... Now, I hold, in view of this fact, no colored man
can consistently vote under the United States Constitution." See V. HARDING, THERE Is
A RIVER, THE BLACK STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM IN AMERICA 167 (1981). In that same year,
the "self-educated black leader" and "best-known black exile[]," Henry Bibb, convened
the North American Convention of Colored Men in Toronto, Canada in order to protest
against the United States Constitution's Fugitive Slave Law. Id. at 168. This conference
is noted for the proposal by James T. Hally to create a "North American Union" of
Black people which would serve as a representative assembly for all Black people of the
United States and Canada. Id. This was the first recorded proposal for a "black govern-
ment-in-exile." Id. It was a call for Black people "to declare their independence from a
racist, persecuting American government." Id. at 168-69. The following is a list of some
of the other early Black conferences and significant quotes from those in attendance.
The National Convention of Colored Freedmen, Cleveland, Ohio (1848). The great Black
nationalist Martin R. Delaney proposed that:
Whereas we find ourselves far behind the military tactics of the civilized world,
Resolved that this Convention recommend to the colored Freemen of North
America to use every means in their power to obtain that science, so as to enable
them to measure arms with assailants without and invaders within.
Id. at 150. The Convention of Chicago Black People Protesting Fugitive Slave Laws
(1850).
We do not wish to offer violence to any person unless driven to the extreme, in
which case we are determined to defend ourselves at all hazards, even should it
be to the shedding of human blood, and in doing thus, will appeal to the Su-
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quest for understanding and action. Like many that preceded it,
preme Judge of the Social World to support us in the justness of our cause ....
We who have tasted of freedom are ready to exclaim ... "Give us liberty or give
us death."
Id. at 154. The National Black Convention of Cleveland, Ohio (1854). This convention is
remembered for the strong debates over the issue of emigration. In advancing his argu-
ments for the emigration of Black people from America, H. Ford Douglas warned that
"slavery is not a foreign element in this government ... [iut does not constitute a local or
sectional institution .. .but is just as national as the Constitution which gives it an
existence." Id. at 188. Martin R. Delaney who also supported the emigration platform
stated that "[n]o people can be free who themselves do not constitute an essential part
of the ruling element of the country in which they live." Id. at 186. The Ohio Conven-
tion of Colored Men (1857). In response to the Supreme Court's ruling in the famous
case of Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), the delegates at this conven-
tion declared "that if the Dred Scott dictum be the true exposition of the law of the
land, then are the founders of the American Republic convicted by their descendants of
base hypocrisy, and colored men absolved from all allegiance to a government which
withdraws all protection." Id. at 195. The National Equal Rights League, New Orleans,
Louisiana (1860). This conference stressed the ideal of unity.
The meeting of this convention has inaugurated a new era. It was the first politi-
cal move ever made by the colored people of the State acting in a body ....
Ministers of the Gospel, officers and privates of the U.S. Army, men who handle
the sword or the pen, merchants and clerks, all classes of society were repre-
sented, and united in a common thought: the actual liberation from social and
political bondage.
Id. at 266. The Black Convention at Charleston, South Carolina (1865). This conference,
one of the first held after emancipation, emphasized the international aspects of the
Black struggle for freedom.
[Olur cause is not alone the cause of four millions of black men in this country,
but ... it is also the cause of millions of oppressed men in other 'parts of God's
beautiful earth,' who are now struggling to be free in the fullest sense of the
word, and God and nature are pledged to their triumph.
Id. at 326. The delegates also sounded a familiar note of forgiveness and loyalty to
America.
We are American by birth, and we assure you that we are Americans in feeling;
and in spite of all the wrongs which we have so long and silently endured in
this country, we can yet exclaim, with a full heart, "0, America, with all thy
faults we love thee still."
Id. at 326 (emphasis added). During this period there was a proliferation of Black orga-
nizations and conferences. Through his travels in the South the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, Salmon Chase, commented on this phenomenon. He stated that "every-
where throughout the country colored citizens are organizing Union Leagues." He went
on to say they constituted "a power which no wise statesman will despise." Id. at 289-90.
There were various other conferences that raised some of the same issues. They included
the National Afro-American League (1887), Monroe Trotter's National Equal Rights
League, Ida B. Wells's Anti-Lynching League, and the Niagara Movement. See H. CRUSE,
PLURAL BUT EQUAL 8-9 (1987); H. SITKOFF, TiE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK EQUALITY 6-7
(1981). This legacy of protest continued into the present era with the call for a "Black
Independent Political Party" at the Black Power conferences in Gary, Indiana in 1972,
Little Rock, Arkansas in 1974, and Cincinnati, Ohio in 1976. See H. CRUSE, infra at 271.
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the conference brought together some enlightened and dedicated
scholars, practitioners and activists.4 They came together to con-
tinue a forum which has been in existence for over a century; at
different times and different places.' This on-going forum has
always grappled with the difficult legacy and consequences of
slavery, segregation, discrimination, and racial oppression.
The conference was significant because it raised serious and
poignant concerns about the flaws within the United States Con-
stitution at a time when most Americans were praising the docu-
ment in "flag waving fervor." Though many would admit that
the Constitution is not perfect, they would not concede that it
should be subjected to serious alterations as it relates to the
lives and conditions of people of color. In this bicentennial year
they would call upon all Americans to be thankful for the wis-
dom, vision and courage of the original Framers of the Constitu-
tion.7 It is this sentiment which made this conference so essen-
4. They included: Professor Derrick Bell, Harvard Law School; Professor Denise
Carty-Bennia, Northeastern University Law School; Professor John Brittain, University
of Connecticut Law School; Margaret Burnham, Attorney; Dean Haywood Burns, CUNY
Law School at Queens College; Professor Arthur Kinoy, Rutgers University Law School;
Chokwe Lumumba, Attorney and Chairman of New Afrikan Peoples Organization; Rich-
ard F. America, Economist and Social Analyst; Professor Imari Abudakari Obadele, Col-
lege of Wooster, and President of the Provisional Government of the Republic of New
Afrika; Professor Julianne Malveaux, Department of Economics, University of California
at Berkley; Professor Charles Ogletree, Harvard Law School; Tanya Cooke, Attorney,
NAACP Legal Defense Fund; Diane Rust Tierney, American Civil Liberties Union; Bob
Moses, Civil Rights Activist; Don Tamaki, Attorney and counsel in the reopened case of
Korematsu v. United States; Professor Juliet E.K. Walker, History Department, Univer-
sity of Illinois at Urbana; Dorothy Zellner, staff member at the Center for Constitutional
Rights; Senator Henry Sanders, Alabama State Senator and Attorney; Rose Mary Sand-
ers, Attorney; Barbara Arnwine, Executive Director of the Lawyers Committee for Civil
Rights Under Law of the Boston Bar Association; Wilhelm Joseph, Administrative Di-
rector of Community Action for Legal Services in New York and co-chair of the National
Conference of Black Lawyers; Adjoa Aiyetoro, Attorney for the American Civil Liberties
Union's Prison Project and Co-Chair of the National Conference of Black Lawyers; Pro-
fessor David Wilkins, Harvard Law School; Professor Winston Langley, University of
Massachusetts, Boston; Gerald Home, Attorney and Historian; Geraldine Hines, Attor-
ney; Vinie Burrows, Actress and Social Activist; Professor Larry Smith, City College Ur-
ban Studies Program, New York; Charles Roach, Attorney. In addition to the above
there were numerous other outstanding legal scholars, students and concerned individu-
als in attendance.
5. See supra note 3.
6. See Justice Thurgood Marshall's speech to the San Fransico Patent and Trade-
mark Association in Maui, Hawaii, May 6, 1987, at 9.
7. See FIRST REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BICENTENNIAL OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION (1985). This commission, headed by former Chief Justice Warren Burger,
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tial. For in America, under the "star spangled banner," there
still exists "two Americas." One which benefits from and bathes
in the strength of this country's laws, values and customs, and
another which suffers immeasurable harm and frustration from
the glaring weaknesses. This conference occurred during this bi-
centennial year to echo the sentiments and concerns of this
"other America."8 Those individuals who because of their color
"never made it into the melting pot." These celebrants sing a
different song. Their voices join in the multitude of sounds
which echo throughout the land this year, yet their rhythm is
different. They sing of the horrors of the document and its sub-
sequent interpretations. They lament that the Framers chose
compromise over freedom and human dignity. Their song serves
as a disturbing reminder that only through protest, legal and
otherwise, was this country forced to make an unjust Constitu-
tion embrace the principle of justice.1"
If we could go back in time to the writing and ratification of
the Constitution, we would find different voices. As some cele-
urged all Americans to "recall the achievements of our founders and the knowledge and
experience that inspired them, the nature of the government they established, its origins,
its characteristics and its ends, and the rights and privileges of citizenship, as well as, its
attendant responsibilities." Id. at 6.
8. See M. HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA: POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES (1969).
Though this book was published nineteen years ago, many of the conditions Harrington
described still exist today and some of them have deteriorated. See supra note 2; see
also N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1987, at A27, col. 1, which stated that, "[p]oor Whites living in
poverty areas declined 5 percent over the decade [1970-1980], to 1,106,166, but the
number of poor Blacks living in poverty areas rose 23 percent. In 1980, 84 percent of
poor Blacks lived in poverty areas, as against 47 percent of poor Whites." The article
concluded that the "concentrated Black poverty in large cities has become a central con-
cern of many political scientists, who see the increasing isolation of the poor as perpetu-
ating the cycle of unemployment, broken families, teen-age pregnancy, crime and drug
use." Id. at A27, col. 2.
9. In Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), Justice Thurgood Mar-
shall in his dissenting opinion, while criticizing the majority's non-recognition of the
unique status of Black people in the society, stated
[tihe experience of Negroes in America has been different in kind, not just in
degree from that of other ethnic groups. It is not merely the history of slavery
alone but also that a whole people were marked as inferior by the law. And that
mark has endured. The dream of America as the great melting pot has not been
realized for the Negro; because of his skin color he never even made it into the
pot.
Id. at 400-01 (emphasis added).
10. See Part V, infra at notes 287-420 and accompanying text.
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brated, others mourned." A momentous victory for some was a
painful defeat for others. 2 It is very easy to remember the ac-
complishment of those who drafted this important document,
but history often fails to record and glorify the suffering of those
whose rights were sacrificed at the altar of justice 3 in order that
"the blessings of liberty"' 4 would be secured for some and their
"posterity.' 5 Today, the posterity of the Framers enthusiasti-
cally celebrate this two-hundredth anniversary, while the poster-
ity of the "sacrificial lambs" question whether there is anything
to celebrate.' 6
The other Constitutional commemorations' 7 held this year
celebrated the triumph of the Constitution over its original flaws
and contradictions. However this conference paid homage to the
individual and collective s efforts that made the triumph possi-
ble, while recognizing that total victory has not been obtained.
The other celebrations sang songs of the marvelous light which
the Constitution has cast over this nation and the world. This
Conference, on the other hand, sang "a song full of the faith that
the dark past has taught us ... full of the hope that the present
has brought us."' 9
11. See V. HARDING, supra note 3, wherein he states that:
[in] spite of the onset of a gradual movement toward the freeing of the African
slaves in the Northern states, and in spite of continued black uses of the Revolu-
tion's rhetoric and ideology, many blacks realized that they would have to look
elsewhere for true revolutionary inspiration. The white American Revolution was
not ours.
Id. at 46.
12. A classic example of this phenomenon is the compromise by the delegates at the
Constitutional Convention on the issue of representational status of African people who
were enslaved in the South. The North and South reached a compromise wherein anAfri-
can would be considered as 3/5th of a person. See discussion, infra note 45.
13. See D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 29-30 (1980). See also discussion,
infra note 101.
14. U.S. CONST. preamble.
15. Id.
16. This article will strongly suggest at a later point, that there is a great deal to
celebrate. However, the celebration should focus on the "transformation of the Constitu-
tion," and those who made this transformation possible. See infra, text at notes 188-420.
17. The major celebration of the Bicentennial occurred on September 17, 1987 in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. This commemoration included speeches from the President
of the United States, former Supreme Court Chief Justice Warren Burger, a ceremonious
ringing of a replica of the Liberty Bell and other gala events.
18. See Part V infra.
19. These lines are from a song written by James Weldon Johnson entitled, Lift
Every Voice and Sing. This song is referred to as the Black National Anthem, and has
1988]
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The purpose of this gathering involved more than the mere
recognition that there exists another America in 1987. These dis-
tinguished individuals assembled so that collectively they could
propose solutions to the lingering problems which resulted from
the constitutional errors of the Framers and the Supreme Court.
The Conference Planners selected five areas for the speakers to
direct their attention. They were: Reparations, Economic Rights,
Political Representation, Criminal Justice, and the Fourteenth
Amendment.2 The speakers' insightful presentations generated
intensive debates and discussions. Out of this process emerged
very powerful and illuminating proposals. Contained in this vol-
ume are articles which elaborate and expound upon these con-
cepts. These articles embrace ideals which voice the needs and
aspirations of a "not yet free people."
The aims of this introductory article are quite modest, yet
quite worthy. It intends to provide a general overview of the dy-
namics of racism in the origin and development of constitutional
law in this country. It does not intend to provide an exhaustive
analysis of any particular area, but to identify consistent
themes. More importantly, it attempts to re-focus the attention
of constitutional celebrants, in hopes that they might observe
one of the most significant factors in the transformation of law
in the United States. The "Black Freedom Struggle," this article
submits, has been the key factor for the injection of sacred prin-
ciples of liberty, equality and freedom into the Constitution's
structure. It ushered in a social and legal reality which the
been a hallmark of the Black Struggle for Freedom in America. The first stanza reads:
Lift every voice and sing
Till earth and heaven ring,
Ring with the harmonies of Liberty;
Let our rejoicing rise
High as the listening skies,
Let it resound loud as the rolling sea.
Sing a song full of the faith that the dark past has taught us,
Sing a song full of the hope that the present has brought us,
Facing the rising sun of our new day begun,
Let us march on till the victory is won.
For full text of song see The City Sun, Feb. 15, 1988, at 3.
20. The National Conference of Black Lawyers is deeply indebted to Prof. Derrick
Bell for his assistance in developing the background research and ideas for these areas.
The genesis for the development of Constitutional amendments was a series of meetings
between Professor Bell and the Planning Committee.
236 [Vol. V
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American Revolution and the "founding fathers" were unwilling
and unable to secure. Therefore, one must examine this histori-
cal movement as a source for constitutional construction and
interpretation.
Parts I, II and III of this article provide a critical analysis of
the Framers and their Constitution. It draws upon their writings
and upon the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention.
Parts IV and V examine the "Black Freedom Struggle," and its
contribution to the development of the Constitution and society.
It draws upon the spirit and words of the various individuals
who made this movement possible. Part VI briefly reviews some
of the contemporary challenges that impede the freedom move-
ment. These sections reflect some of the major goals of the con-
ference and, hopefully, they elucidate its theoretical foundation.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES: ECONOMICS OR IDEALS
Some commentators21 have strongly encouraged critics of
the "founding fathers" and the Constitution to place them
within the proper historical context before ascribing value to
their important enterprise. The concern is that one cannot accu-
rately judge the Framers by today's standards and values. As
compelling as this argument may appear, it does not shield the
Framers from a probing and demanding critique. Even when
these men and their Constitution are placed within the proper
historical context, there are numerous contradictions and falla-
cies in their reasoning and their results. This can be discerned
by examining the provisions in the Constitution22 that affected
21. See, e.g., C. ROSSITER, 1787 THE GRAND CONVENTION (1966). The author in rebut-
ting the critics of the Framers' decision not to abolish slavery, stated,
[all such persons, in my opinion, have failed to "[t]hink themselves back into
the twilight" of 1787 and to understand the limits under which the Framers were
operating in this matter-limits that permitted them as builders of a nation to
do nothing positive and only a few things negative about their potentially most
explosive social problem.
Id. at 267.
22. D. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987). Professor Bell cites historian William
Wiecek's chronology of pro-slavery provisions in the Constitution as follows:
1) Article I, section 2: representatives in the House were apportioned among the
states on the basis of population, computed by counting all free persons and
three fifths of the slaves (the 'federal number' or 'three-fifths' clause); 2) Article
I, section 2, and Article I, Section 9: two clauses requiring redundantly that di-
rect taxes (including capitations) be apportioned among the states on the forego-
JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS [Vol. V
the rights and conditions of African people.
Certain scholars would like to dismiss the Framers's treat-
ment of African people as a peripheral historical error, which
detracted from an otherwise sound and magnificent document.2"
To the contrary, these decisions affected the essence of the
Framers's manifested objectives. When they decided to support
the existing system of slavery and the European/American '
slave trade, they destroyed all possibilities for the original Con-
stitution to embrace the principles of liberty, justice and equal-
ity. These ideals are destroyed when they are given to a certain
segment of society and denied to others who are similarly situ-
ated. " Either they exist fully or they do not exist.
A dispassionate analysis of the Framers would reveal that
they were not attempting to create a moral or social declaration
of human rights when they met in Philadelphia. They were en-
gaged in the process of constructing a nation which respected
and protected property rights.26 These men came together in
ing basis, the purpose being to prevent Congress from laying a head tax on
slaves to encourage their emancipation; 3) Article I, section 9: Congress was pro-
hibited from abolishing the international slave trade to the United States before
1808; 4) Article IV, section 2: the states were prohibited from emancipating fugi-
tive slaves who were to be returned on demand of the master; 5) Article I, sec-
tion 8: Congress was empowered to provide for calling up the states' militias to
suppress insurrections, including slave uprisings; 6) Article IV, section 4: the fed-
eral government was obliged to protect the states against domestic violence,
againincluding slave insurrections; 7) Article V: the provisions of Article I, sec-
tion 9, clauses 1 and 4 (pertaining to the slave trade and direct taxes) were made
unamendable; 8) Article I, section 9, and Article I, section 10: these two clauses
prohibited the federal government and the states from taxing exports, one pur-
pose being to prevent them from taxing slavery indirectly by taxing the exported
products of slave labor.
Id. at 34-35. [Quoting W. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN
AMERICA 62-63 (1977)].
23. See C. RosSITER, supra note 21, at 266-73; see also B. MITCHELL & L. MITCHELL, A
BIOGRAPHY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES xi, 75 (1975).
24. This tragedy is generally referred to as the African Slave Trade. This is a misno-
mer since Africans were not the "traders"; they were the ones traded. More importantly,
to state it as the European/American Slave Trade places needed emphasis on the perpe-
trators of this travesty.
25. Despite the rhetoric of the time, it is clear from the writings of the Framers that
they knew that African people were human beings who should have received the same
rights, privileges and protections which the Constitution afforded to its white inhabi-
tants. See infra text accompanying notes 116-17.
26. The classic support for this proposal is C. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1960); see also T. DYE & L. H. ZEIGLER, THE
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1787 to correct the major deficiencies in the Articles of Confed-
eration. Their primary concern was to create a "strong national
government" which had the power to resolve existing commer-
cial disputes between the various states, establish a strong mon-
etary system in order to protect the economic viability of the
new republic, and to build a strong militia which could quash
internal uprisings and defend against external attacks. Their
motivations were economical and political. The document they
created was a very conservative document written by very con-
servative men," and did not place moral and social concerns as a
IRONY OF DEMOCRACY: AN UNCOMMON INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN POLITICS 27-56 (1972);
see also Higginbotham, 4 The Black Journey: From Slavery To "Freedom" and Inequal-
ity 1619-1954, Part I at 43 (1984), (unpublished) [hereinafter Black Journey],
wherein Judge Higginbotham states,
[t]he revision (of the articles of confederation) was necessary because of the
critical lack of power and authority in the national government. It had been
unable to enforce its laws or control the states in the essential functions of taxa-
tion, regulation of trade, protection of commerce, the common defense, and the
enforcement of treaty obligations.
Further support can be found in M. FARRAND, 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVEN-
TION OF 1787 18-19 (1911) [this four volume collection is hereinafter cited as M. FARRAND
with corresponding volume number, preceding]. In a letter from several gentlemen of
Rhode Island to the Chairman of the General Convention on May 11, 1787, the purpose
of the Convention becomes quite clear. They wrote:
[i]t is the general Opinion here and we believe of the well informed through this
State, that full power for the Regulation of the Commerce of the United States,
both Foreign and domestick, ought to be vested in the National Council. . . . As
the Object of this Letter is chiefly to prevent any impressions unfavorable to the
Commercial Interest of this State, from taking place in our Sister States from
the Circumstance of our being unrepresented in the present National Conven-
tion, we shall not presume to enter into any detail of the objects we hope your
deliberations will embrace and provide for being convinced they will be such as
have a tendency to strengthen the Union, promote Commerce, increase the
power and Establish the Credit of the United States.
Id. at 19. See also a letter from Madison to Jefferson on March 18, 1786 wherein he
stated," ... [m]ost of our political evils may be traced up to our commercial ones, as
most of our moral may to our political." 9 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 334 (J. Boyd
ed. 1954). See also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), wherein the Supreme
Court stated, "[i]f there was any one object riding over every other in the adoption of the
constitution, it was to keep the commercial intercourse among states free from all invidi-
ous or partial restraints." Id. at 231.
27. See C. RosSITER, supra note 21, at 270. Rossiter eloquently supports this conclu-
sion when he states,
[t]he Constitution they wrote was not the first act of a second revolution; it was
rather, a prudent set of rules for peaceful evolution of large ends upon which all
men of good will would agree. It did not demand, it did not even anticipate an
upheaval in the social order or a forced redistribution of property; it did not
challenge any existing institution or arrangement in the American economy, so-
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high priority. Therefore, to view and critique the original Consti-
tution primarily as a moral or social document is to assign char-
acteristics to it which were not central to its inception. Though
the preamble appealed to principles of liberty and justice, these
concepts had different meanings for the Framers than those nor-
mally ascribed to them.
One does not have to look very hard to find evidence that
the Constitution was primarily an economic and political agree-
ment. The starting point could be the status and position of
those who were delegates at the "Grand Convention. ' 28 The del-
egates were men of great wealth who understood the importance
of sound fiscal policies. Professors Thomas Dye and L. Harmon
Zeigler stated:
The 55 men at Philadelphia formed a major part of the
nation's economic elite. The personal wealth represented
at the meeting was enormous ... at least forty of the 55
delegates were known to be holders of public securities;
fourteen were known to be land speculators; 24 were
moneylenders and investors; eleven were engaged in com-
merce or manufacturing; and fifteen owned large
plantations.29
One of the delegates, Robert Morris, was so wealthy that he un-
derwrote a substantial part of the American Revolution. 0 Thus
the financial survival and viability of the Nation had to be of
utmost concern for him and others similarly situated. As Charles
Beard points out in his classic book, An Economic Interpreta-
ciety, culture, or pattern of religion. It was, I repeat, a conservative document,
and the Framers were, although they did not know it, men of conservative style
and temper. The refusal to engage in social engineering, the continuity of princi-
ple with the teachings of Cicero and Locke, the self-identification of the Framers
as members of a ruling and serving aristocracy, the moderately pessimistic view
of human nature that pervaded the debates, the cautiously optimistic view of
human destiny that had persuaded these men to come together-all these quali-
ties of the Convention led me inexorably, and rather against my will, to describe
the Great Happening of 1787 as a triumph for the best kind of conservatism.
Id.
28. This is the title given to the Convention of 1787 by Clinton Rossiter and other
scholars. It is also the title of Rossiter's book which analyzed the men and the proceed-
ings of 1787. See supra note 21.
29. See T. DYE & L. H. ZEIGLER, supra note 26, at 36-37.
30. Id. at 37.
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tion of the Constitution of the United States,- the Framers
represented distinct economic groups who would benefit from
the principles and ideals enshrined into the Constitution. It
should not be inferred from this analysis that the Framers were
only seeking self-gratification and enrichment when they created
the Constitution. These men had high and noble aspirations for
their country, and they were very experienced and astute politi-
cal scientists. They aspired to create a form of government
which reflected their political vision. Furthermore, Beard's eco-
nomic thesis has been subjected to serious criticism concerning
the unreliability of his data and the narrowness of his ap-
proach."2 Nevertheless, it is beyond refutation that the protec-
tion of property rights was a critical concern of the Framers.
How else does one explain their position on slavery?13 Even the
Declaration of Independence when it was first drafted pro-
claimed that all men were endowed with certain inalienable
rights, which included "life, liberty, and property." 3" This phi-
losophy tempered their vision and influenced their decisions.
Another major concern of the Framers was the creation of a
31. See C. BEARD, supra note 26.
32. See L. LEVY, ESSAYS ON THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 88-91 (2nd ed. 1987),
wherein he discusses one of the earliest critiques of Beard by Edward S. Corwin in 1914
in the History Teachers Magazine; see also R. BROWNE, REINTERPRETATION OF THE FOR-
MATION OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION(1963); F. McDONALD, WE THE PEOPLE: THE Eco-
NOMIC ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION (1958).
33. The protection of property rights and the economic development of the nation
were inextricably linked to the delegates' position on slavery in the Constitution. This
point is made clear by C.C. Pickney, a delegate from South Carolina, in a speech wherein
he explains his opposition to any restrictions in the Constitution concerning the slave
trade. He stated:
while there remained one acre of swampland uncleared in South Carolina, I
would raise my voice against restricting the importation of negroes ... I am as
thoroughly convinced . . . that the nature of our climate, and the flat swampy
situation of our country, obliges us to cultivate our lands with negroes, and that
without them South Carolina would soon be a desert waste.
See 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 26, at 254. This statement demonstrates how economic
development superseded humanity in the minds of some, if not all, the Framers of the
Constitution. It also demonstrates the enormous contribution that Black people made to
the economic advancement of this nation; a contribution for which they have never re-
ceived any compensation. Yet the English and American legal traditions have always
abhorred forfeitures and have developed sound rules against unjust enrichment.
34. Jefferson adopted Locke's natural rights rhetoric which emphasized "life, liberty
and property." It has been said that Benjamin Franklin objected to the use of the word
"property," and Jefferson inserted the "pursuit of happiness" clause. See L. BALDWIN,
REFRAMING THE CONSTITUTION: AN IMPERATIVE FOR MODERN AMERICA 4 (1972).
19881
JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS
government which respected the right of men to advance in
power and prestige regardless of their lineage. They strongly re-
sisted notions of "hereditary monarchy" and "governing nobil-
ity.""5 Yet they were not populist; they believed that govern-
ments should be directed by those who had acquired experience,
power and wisdom. Their vision of the Constitution saw it pro-
tecting the rights of those who had property from the "animosi-
ties" and acts of those who had less property or none at all."
They wanted a strong national government which could ensure
that the avenues for obtaining wealth and power remained open
and free from local, sectional and regional constraints.
[T]he men who wrote the Constitution believed that gov-
ernment had the obligation not only to protect private
property but also to nourish it. They expected govern-
ment to foster trade and commerce, protect manufactur-
ing, assist in land development, and provide other posi-
tive economic assistance. And, to protect the rights of
property, they expected government to enforce contracts,
maintain a stable money supply, punish thievery, assist
in the collection of debts, record the ownership of prop-
erty in the form of deeds, punish counterfeiting and
piracy, protect copyrights and patents, regulate the value
of money, establish courts, and regulate banking and
commerce.
3 7
35. See T. DYE & L. H. ZEIGLER, supra note 26, at 39.
36. See A. HAMILTON, J. MADISON, & J. JAY, THE FEDERALIST (Random House 1937)
[hereinafter FEDERALIST]. The Federalist papers were originally published under the
name of Publius, and were written by some of the leading political scholars at the Con-
vention in 1787, who intended the writings to aid in the ratification of the Constitution.
They are considered a primary source for obtaining the "original intent" and meaning of
the Framers. The FEDERALIST contains eighty-five different letters written by either
Hamilton, Madison or Jay in defense of the Constitution. In FEDERALIST No. 10, Madison
states that:
So strong is [the] propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that
where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful dis-
tinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their
most violent conflicts. But the most common and durable source of factions has
been the various and unequal distribution of property ...The regulation of
these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern
legislation.
Id. at 56 (emphasis added).
37. See T. DYE & L. H. ZEIGLER, supra note 26, at 39-40.
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These are primarily economic concerns which the Constitution
embraced and still secures to this day. Even the Framers's de-
termination that governmental powers should be separated was
rooted in their economic concerns that too much power in one
branch could result in the confiscation of property or in unnec-
essary restraints on alienation. The writings of some of the
Framers confirm the point that the political theory which sup-
ported the Constitution had significant economic connotations.
James Madison in the Federalist letter No. 10,38 in describing
the sources of divisions and "factions" within a society, indi-
cated that the "most common and durable source of factions has
been the various and unequal distribution of property."39 In
Madison's view these "unequal distributions" of property derive
from "the diversity in faculties of men."'40 He felt that it was the
"first object of government" '41 to protect these diverse faculties
of men and their attempts to acquire different amounts and
kinds of property. This process of "diverse" acquisition inevita-
bly results in a "division of the society into different interests
and parties.""2 It then becomes the "principal task of modern
legislation" to regulate these divisions and "interfering inter-
ests" so they do not destroy "liberty", which is the catalyst for
this process.43 Madison concludes this portion of his analysis by
stating that "the causes of factions [diverse acquisitions of prop-
erty] cannot be removed, and . . . relief is only to be sought in
the means of controlling its effects."" It is clear from their writ-
ings that the Framers saw the Constitution as providing a gen-
eral framework through which man's attempt to acquire prop-
erty would be encouraged and protected.' The fact that the Bill
38. FEDERALIST, supra note 36, No. 10 (J. Madison).
39. Id. at 56.
40. Id. at 55.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 56.
44. Id. at 57.
45. The writings of the Framers confirm this point at various times. Madison's official
record of the Convention contained a statement which reflected the views of one of the
delegates from South Carolina who favored counting African people as equal to
"freemen" for representational purposes. Madison wrote:
Mr. Butler insisted that the labour of a slave in S. Carol[ina] was as productive
and valuable as that of a freeman in Mass[achusetts], that as wealth was the
great means of defence and utility to the Nation they were equally valuable to it
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of Rights, which is primarily concerned with the protection of
human dignity, was not added to the Constitution until two
years after the delegates met in Philadelphia, lends support to
the idea that property rights superseded human rights."
An awareness that the political and social philosophy of the
Constitution supported the protection of individual property
rights, makes it easier to understand the Framers's approach to
the issue of slavery and the slave trade. They felt that it would
be inconsistent and unfair to bring together men of property in
order to create a nation which would destroy the property rights
of some of those men.4 7 This point supports the earlier sugges-
with freemen: and consequently an equal representation for them [was appropri-
ate] in a Government which was instituted principally for the protection of
property, and was itself to be supported by property.
See 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 26, at 580-81 (emphasis added). The above proposal was
not adopted since the delegates settled on the 3/5th compromise, however the reasoning
of Mr. Butler was never refuted and was incorporated into the Constitution by the adop-
tion of the 3/5th compromise. In addition, even Madison recognized that the major divi-
sion between the states was the type of property they controlled, and that this division
had to be accommodated in the Constitution. He stated:
[Tihe States were divided into different interests not by their difference of
size, but by other circumstances; the most material of which resulted partly from
climate, but principally from [the effects of] their having or not having slaves...
and if any defensive power were necessary, it ought to be mutually given to these
two interests.
Id. at 486. Madison was so concerned about accommodating this division that he also
was in favor of "counting slaves as [if] free," in order to give the southern states an
advantage in one house of Congress and the northern states the advantage in the other.
Id. at 486-87. This position by Madison and others confirms the point that property
rights were an essential component of the new republic, and that the 3/5th compromise
was an express recognition of the preeminent status of property. Furthermore, it demon-
strates that the rights of African people were used to settle the divisions in society,
which Madison felt naturally arose over the diverse acquisition of property.
46. Some of the delegates felt that it would be inconsistent to attach a Bill of Rights
to the Constitution at the same time that they were subjugating the rights of other
human beings. C.C. Pinckney, a delegate from South Carolina, stipulated that this was
one of his reasons. He stated:
Another reason weighed particularly, with members from this state, against the
insertion of a bill of rights. Such bills generally begin with declaring that all men
are by nature born free. Now, we should make that declaration with a very bad
grace, when a large part of our property consist in men who are actually born
slaves.
See 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 26, at 256.
47. This sentiment was strongly expressed at the Convention by General Charles
Pinckney, the delegate from South Carolina. In response to some of the Virginia dele-
gates who were opposed to slavery, Pinckney declared, "South Carolina and Georgia can-
not do without slaves. As to Virginia she will gain by stopping the importation. Her
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tion that human equality and liberty were not the major con-
cerns of the Framers, nor major elements of the original Consti-
tution. If one accepts the above analysis, it becomes necessary to
examine whether the Constitution still retains its original eco-
nomic tone, or has it been transformed? And, if it has been
transformed, then what forces were responsible for the transfor-
mation? This article strongly suggests that the Constitution has
changed substantially in the last two hundred years, and the
quest for freedom by Black people and other people of color has
been a major contributing factor to this transformation. Though
the economic legacy of the Constitution still affects the structure
and operation of society, it clearly is a more humane instrument
today than it was in 1787. The realization that the original Con-
stitution was not drafted as a document of morality should not
prevent critics from analyzing the Framers' decisions regarding
African people. Instead, it should inspire a more probing inquiry
into the reasoning processes of individuals who had the audacity
to transform, through law, an entire people into property.
II. HISTORICAL THEMES
There are three concepts which appear to capture the Fram-
ers' modus operandi when confronted with the rights and condi-
tions of African people. They were: Silence, Contradictions and
Compromise. These themes consistently emerged from the ac-
tions, writings and decisions of the delegates to the Convention.
They combined to create one of greatest human and legal trage-
dies in American history.
A. Silence
Although courage is an attribute often ascribed to the
Framers, when confronted with the contradictions between slav-
ery and their principle of equality they chose to remain silent.
As Clinton Rossiter, the author of The Grand Convention and a
strong defender of the Framers indicated, this contradiction was
"one with which few white men were willing to grapple coura-
slaves will rise in value and she has more than she wants. It would be unequal to require
South Carolina and Georgia to confederate on such unequal terms." See C. BEARD, supra
note 26, at 177.
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geously. 4 8 Silence, omission and denial was the standard ap-
proach to the problem. When the issues of slavery and the slave
trade were addressed there was never a call for the granting of
"liberty" and "equality" to African people. The Framers con-
stant concern was whether these individuals would take on some
of the characteristics of personhood or be considered the
equivalent of "horses and cattle." '49 Even though the delegates
came from varying geographical and economical backgrounds,"
all of them maintained the same general posture on the issue of
freedom for African people: They forthrightly proclaimed invisi-
ble rights for invisible people, and hoped that history would jus-
tify their blindness and inhumanity.
Despite the continuous involvement of various states in the
capturing, transporting, importing, selling and killing of millions
of Africans, the delegates did not consider this as a major item
for the Convention's agenda. The great historian and sociologist,
W.E.B. Dubois, in his definitive work entitled The Suppression
of the African Slave Trade, confirmed this when he stated:
Slavery occupied no prominent place in the Convention
called to remedy the glaring defects of the Confederation,
for the obvious reason that few of the delegates thought
it expedient to touch a delicate subject which, if left
alone, bade fair to settle itself in a manner satisfactory to
all. Consequently, neither slavery nor the slave trade is
specifically mentioned in the delegates' credentials of
any of the states, nor in Randolph's, Pickney's, or Ham-
ilton's plans, nor in Paterson's propositions. Indeed, the
debate from May 14 to June 19, when the Committee of
the Whole reported, touched the subject only in the mat-
ter of the ratio of representation of slaves. With the same
exception, the report of the Committee of the Whole con-
tained no reference to slavery or the slave trade, and the
48. See C. ROSSITER, supra note 21, at 32.
49. See Black Journey, supra note 26, at 54. A delegate to the Convention from Mas-
sachusetts stated that if African people who were being enslaved in the south were repre-
sented in the government, then "[hiorses and [c]attle ought to have the [r]ight of
[r]epresent[ation]." Id.
50. For a description of the various economic and business endeavors of each of the
Framers, see C. BEARD, supra note 26, at 73-151; see also T. DYE & L. H. ZEIGLER, supra
note 26, at 33-38.
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twenty-three resolutions of the Convention referred to
the Committee of Detail, July 23 and 26, maintain the
same silence.51
This "sound of silence" '52 which covered the Convention floor
and proceedings concerning the severest restriction on human
liberty rendered a fatal blow to the moral validity of the Con-
vention, the delegates and their Constitution."3 The contradic-
tion between their stance on slavery and the slave trade and the
pronouncement that their purpose was to "secure the blessing of
liberty" are irreconcilable. This contradiction destroyed the
moral force of the document, and set in motion events which
would cripple the nation for centuries.
This "sound of silence" must not be interpreted to mean
51. See W.E.B. DuBois, THE SUPPRESSION OF THE AFRICAN SLAVE-TRADE TO THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1638-1870 53 (1896). This does not mean that the status of
African slaves was not debated at various times throughout the Convention. However,
these debates related more directly to the issues of taxation and representation than to
slavery. This again demonstrates how the economic and commercial issues of the day
took precedence over the moral and humanitarian ones.
52. The "Sound of Silence" was the theme of a recent law conference sponsored by
Critical Legal Studies, in January 1987 in Los Angeles, California, following the Associa-
tion of American Law Schools (AALS) Convention. Based on the discussions at that con-
ference, it became clear that several in attendance felt that the issues of race and racism
were being "silenced" by the legal community and society in general. The theme re-
flected not only the active denial of the existence of racism in American society today,
but the passive resistance that many take to discussing, confronting and resolving these
issues. Thus the approach which the original Framers to the Constitution adopted to the
issue of slavery is still employed within the legal community today. The technique of
avoidance is frequently used to resolve disputes that are distasteful or very disturbing to
one or both of the disputants. The emotional and psychological aspects of the phenome-
non of White Supremacy (racism) makes it a difficult topic for most individuals to dis-
cuss. Yet, the underlying hope behind this approach (i.e., that the problem will take care
of itself) has not proven to be reliable or successful. Generally, the problem becomes
worse when it is ignored. The Framers's postponement of the issue only set the stage for
a devastating civil war between the same states seventy-four years later.
53. Tench Coxe, a delegate to the Convention from Pennsylvania, explained after the
Convention how he worked to prevent a resolution, which restricted the slave trade, from
being presented. In a letter to James Madison in 1790, he wrote:
I will mention to you confidentially that great pains have been heretofore taken
to restrain Application to the general Government on the subject of the slave
trade. A very strong paper was drawn and put into my hands to procure the
signature of Dr. [Benjamin] Franklin to be presented to the federal conven-
tion-I enclosed to the Dr. with my opinion that it would be a very improper
season and place to hazard the Application considering it as an over zealous act
of honest men.
See 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 26, at 361.
248 JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS [Vol. V
that the delegates totally ignored the issue of slavery or the sta-
tus of African people within the newly created republic. It
means that slavery was not addressed directly. There were no
resolutions put forth for discussion concerning its total prohibi-
tion or gradual abolishment." Instead, the Framers chose to en-
sure the continuation of this inhuman institution,"s and to sup-
54. These are only two of the possible alternatives that the delegates could have ex-
plored. See Black Journey, supra note 26, at 41-42, wherein Judge Leon Higginbotham
explores the various options available to the Framers.
One could debate endlessly the theoretical options before the Constitution Con-
vention in 1787 as to lessening the plight of blacks. As a matter of theory, the
framers could have required the immediate abolition of all slavery, or they could
have provided for a system of gradual abolition of slavery similar to the plan
subsequently adopted by Pennsylvania in 1790. Furthermore, even if they did
not take a forthright position on recognizing the inhumanity and immorality of
slavery, they could have inserted some type of "bill of rights" for slaves. As an
example, they could have provided that slaves had the right to marry, or that
slave families could not be broken up, or that, without provocation, slaves could
not be assaulted by their masters or others, or that slaves could under no cir-
cumstances purchase their freedom. All of these provisions were in fact adopted
by various jurisdictions at different times. The possibility of enacting provisions
- to abolish slavery or to limit its cruelty would be contingent upon the founding
fathers having such goals as a high priority. However, justice for blacks was not
their predominant concern.
Id. (emphasis added).
55. This was done by the inclusion of article I, section 9, clause 1, which stated:
The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing
shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the
Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed
on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 1. The "founding fathers" thereby "ordained" the continuation
of the butchery, torture and enslavement of free human beings. One must keep in mind
that this section did not require the abolishment of the slave trade by 1808, but ensured
that the states (especially Georgia and North Carolina), could continue in the trade with-
out fear of restriction for at least 20 years. This was done despite their knowledge of the
horrors and inhumanity of this enterprise. See W.E.B. DuBois, supra note 51, at 54,
wherein he quotes Colonel George Mason of Virginia who denounced the traffic in slaves
as "infernal," and Luther Martin of Maryland who regarded it as "inconsistent with the
principles of the Revolution, and dishonoraeir knowledge of the horrors and inhumanity
of this enterprise. See W.E.B. DuBois, supra note 51, at 54, which supported the enslave-
ment of African people by white Europeans and Americans. This philosophy was en-
shrined throughout the Constitution; however, it was more vividly manifested in article
I, section 2, clause 3, which "ordained" that Black people were only 3/5th of a person.
U.S.CoNST. art. 1, § 2, ci. 3. This political compromise between the Northern and South-
ern delegates to the Convention was possible because neither side was willing to recog-
nize Africans as human beings. The partial recognition was made not for the benefit of
the Africans, but for the benefit of the Southern delegates who wanted their slaves
counted for purposes of increasing the number of representatives they could send to
Congress, and for the Northern delegates who wanted to generate additional revenue for
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port its underlying philosophy56 and practices.5 7
the National government by making sure that "direct taxes" were apportioned according
to the number of free persons and slaves. Article I, section 2, clause 3 stated that:
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States
which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Num-
bers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons,
including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not
taxed, three fifths of all other Persons.
Id.
56. White Supremacy/Black Inferiority were the main tenets of the philosophy which
supported the enslavement of African people by white Europeans and Americans. This
philosophy was enshrined throughout the Constitution; however, it was more vividly
manifested in article I, section 2, clause 3, which "ordained" that Black people were only
3/5th of a person.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3. This political compromise between the Northern and
Southern delegates to the Convention was possible because neither side was willing to
recognize Africans as human beings. The partial recognition was made not for the benefit
of the Africans, but for the benefit of the Southern delegates who wanted their slaves
counted for purposes of increasing the number of representatives they would send to
Congress, and for the Northern delegates who wanted to generate additional revenue for
the National government by making sure that "direct taxes" were apportioned according
to the number of free persons and slaves. Article I, section 2, clause 3 stated that:
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States
which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Num-
bers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons,
including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not
taxed, three fifths of all other Persons.
Id.
57. One of the major practices of the institution of slavery was the process of recap-
turing African people who had escaped from a particular slave owner. The customs of the
time supported this practice throughout the south. However, a famous English case,
Somersett v. Stewart, 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B. 1772), cast serious doubt on the legal valid-
ity of this practice. In Somersett, the court refused to uphold Mr. Charles Stewart's
attempt to forcibly return Mr. James Somersett (African) back to Jamaica. Mr. Somer-
sett had escaped from Mr. Stewart when he was brought to England in 1769. The court
in rendering its decision, not only commented on the practice of "recapturing" persons
who had escaped human bondage, but also gave its views on the entire institution of
slavery. The opinion reads in part:
The state of slavery is of such a nature, that it is incapable of being introduced
on any reasons; moral or political, but only by positive law, which preserves its
force long after the reasons, occasion, and time itself from whence it was created,
is erased from memory. It is so odious, that nothing can be suffered to support
it, but positive law.
Id. at 510. This decision and especially the above passage was "repeated and followed in
hundreds of American decisions and pamphlets for the next several decades,"See L. HIG-
GINBOTHAM, IN THE MATTER OF COLOR 354 (1980). The delegates at the Convention
wanted to ensure that there was "positive" law available to support the practice which
had been denied in Somersett. Therefore, they included article 4, section 2, clause 3, into
the Constitution which stated:
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, es-
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"Silence" was also present by the manner in which the
Framers avoided the use of words, phrases and concepts which
would expressly reveal that they were sanctioning slavery and
promoting white supremacy. At various points throughout the
Constitution5" there are provisions which relegate free human
beings to the status of property, yet nowhere in the document is
slavery or the nationality of these individuals mentioned. 9 The
obvious reason for this omission was the delegates's awareness
that their support for slavery was in contradiction to the major
professed ideals of the Revolution 0 and the Constitution. They
wanted to shield themselves from criticism, and ensure that the
Northern states, some of whom had already abolished slavery or
restricted the slave trade, would ratify the document.' The
three classic provisions62 of the Constitution which supported
caping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be
discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of
the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.
U.S. CONST. art. 4,§ 2, cl. 3. The delegates through the above provision ensured that the
insidious institution of slavery would be protected and maintained, and that one of its
essential practices would be preserved.
58. See U.S. CONST., supra notes 55-57.
59. According to Clinton Rossiter, the Framers's use of the phrase "such persons,"
was a polite way of saying "slaves." See C. ROSSITER, supra note 21, at 210. He also
stated that "the Framers, like almost all men of their time, may have had trouble think-
ing of slaves as persons." Id. at 266. It is very disturbing that these "noble" men could
not view their subjects as persons but were willing to label them as such in order to avoid
criticism. What is even more unacceptable is that those who were offended by the insti-
tution of slavery would vote to ratify the Constitution, even though it maintained this
inhuman institution, as long as there was no references made to it within the Constitu-
tion. Id. at 267. For a summary of the proceedings at the Convention wherein the term
"slave" was deleted, see 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 26, at 415-16.
60. The Declaration of Independence of 1776, which was signed by many of the same
delegates at the Constitutional Convention in 1787, stated that
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these
are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Gov-
ernments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent
of the governed, That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive
of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it ....
The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
61. See 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 26, at 210. Luther Martin, a delegate from Mary-
land, confirmed that the fear of criticism "influenced them ... to guard against the word
'slave.' " He stated: "They anxiously sought to avoid the admission of expressions which
might be odious in the ears of Americans, although they were willing to admit into their
system those things which the expression signified." Id.
62. See supra notes 55-57.
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the institution of slavery used the word "Person"63 or "Persons"
when referring to African People. The irony of their choice of
this word is that each provision created a legal determination
that these individuals were not persons, but property. This ap-
peal by the Framers to the use of "neutral" terminology proba-
bly demonstrated a deep psychological aversion to the reality
and the humanity of African people." They preferred avoiding
any reference to these "people of color" who they were subju-
gating, as though the process of omission would somehow hu-
manize the tragedy, and legitimize their action.
B. Contradictions
It is not difficult to find the contradictions in the original
Constitution. The preamble's declarations of "liberty" and "jus-
tice" clashes dramatically with the various provisions in the
body of the document which embraced slavery and upheld the
continuation of the slave trade. What is even more revealing are
the inconsistencies in the reasoning and writings of the delegates
as they attempted to justify their major decisions.
The inconsistencies can be traced back to the principles of
the "American Revolution." When the Framers assembled in
63. Webster defines "person" as, "[a] human being as distinguished from things or
animals." WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 628 (2d ed. 1960) [hereinafter WEB-
STER] (emphasis added). Though Webster distinguishes "person" from "things" and "an-
imals," some of the Framers had difficulty making this distinction. Despite their use of
the word "persons" in article I, section 2, clause 3, they determined that Africans would
only amount to 3/5th of a person for purposes of representation. Certain delegates were
adamant that African people were things. Delegate Patterson from New Jersey stated
during the debate over the above provision that he regarded
Negroes in no light but as property. They are no free agents, have no personal
liberty, no faculty of acquiring property, but on the contrary are themselves
property, and like other property entirely at the will of the master ...and if
Negroes are not represented in the States to which they belong, why should they
be 'in the General Government . .. .'
See Black Journey, supra note 26, at 53. Governor Morris of Pennsylvania expressed the
contradiction with eroperty. They are no free agents, have no personal liberty, no faculty
of acquiring property, but on the "[h]orses and cattle ought to have the right of repre-
sentation" in the North. Id. at 54. It is evident from these remarks and many others,
that the Framers of the Constitution did not define "Person" according to Webster's
definition when they inserted it into the Constitution at certain points.
64. For an interesting discussion of the dynamics of racism in American society and
the deep psychological effects that it has upon the perpetrators of this system of oppres-
sion, see Welsing, The Cress Theory of Color Confrontation, BLACK SCHOLAR 32-40 (May
1974).
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1787 they were attempting to strengthen a nation which had de-
clared its independence on principles of "liberty" and the
"equality of man."'65 Even though African people fought and
died in the Revolutionary War,66 they never received their free-
dom when the war ended. The contradictions in the Revolution-
ary rhetoric are dramatically displayed in the sentiments of Pat-
rick Henry. He is often hailed as the human symbol of freedom
and liberty because of his famous pronouncement: "Give me lib-
erty or give me death. 6 7 Yet during the ratification of the Con-
stitution in Virginia, he sternly warned that to give freedom to
the Africans who were held in human bondage in the Southern
states would create "the most dreadful and ruinous conse-
quences."6 8 Eight of the delegates to the Constitutional Conven-
tion signed the Declaration of Independence69 in 1776 which de-
clared that "all men are created equal," yet none of these
delegates attempted to incorporate this axiom into the
Constitution.
The writings of the Framers extolled the virtues and bene-
fits of "liberty" for the development of man and society, 0 yet
fifteen of the delegates were owners of other human beings.71
Despite the overwhelming evidence of the horrors and inhumane
65. This rhetoric often referred to slavery as it exalted the liberty of man. One pa-
triot stated: "Slavery, the forcible deprivation of the fruits of one's labor was the nega-
tive pole of Revolution. What lay at the positive pole? What was the revolution fought
for? Liberty was to be free of official leeches and bloodsuckers and to enjoy the fruits for
oneself." See Bushman, Freedom and Posterity in the American Revolution in LEGACIES
OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 76-77 (1978).
66. See V. HARDING, supra note 3, at 42.
67. This famous slogan was part of an address given by Patrick Henry to the Virginia
House of Delegates on March 23, 1775. He stated, "[is life so dear or peace so sweet as
to be purchased at the price of chains and slavery? Forbid it, Almighty God! I know not
what course others may take; but as for me ... give me liberty, or give me death!" W.
WIRT HENRY, 1 PATRICK HENRY: LIFE CORRESPONDENCE AND OTHER SPEECHES 266 (1891)
(emphasis added).
68. See C. ROSSITER, supra note 21, at 269.
69. See T. DYE & L. H. ZEIGLER, supra note 26, at 36.
70. See, e.g., FEDERALIST, supra note 36. Such acclamations can be found in Nos. 1,
26, 27, 62, 63, 70 & 83. See also B. FRANKLIN, An Historical Review Of Pennsylvania,
The Constitutions And Government Of Pennsylvania, From Its Origins, in 3 THE
WORKS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 107 (1882), wherein he quotes from a letter written by
the Assemblies of Pennsylvania, (of which he was a member and leader) to the Proprie-
tary Governor, stating "[tihose, who would give up essential liberty, to purchase a little
temporary safety deserves neither liberty nor safety." Id. at 429.
71. See C. BEARD, supra note 26, at 151.
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conditions of the European/American slave trade, and its devas-
tating effects on African people, many delegates felt it "unfair"
to South Carolina and Georgia to prohibit the importation of
African people as slaves.72 Their understanding of unfairness
and inequality clashed with the human rights of millions of peo-
ple whom their decision affected.
The social reality the Framers adopted and created also
clashed with their political theories. An essential attribute of the
federal republican form of government proffered by the Framers
was its inherent safeguards against the dangers of the majority.
In the Federalist letter No. 51, James Madison indicates that
there are two methods of "oppression" which must be combated
in a republic: oppression by the rulers of the society and oppres-
sion by the majority. 7 It is the latter evil which he was con-
cerned about in his defense of the Constitution. He stated, "[i]f
a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the
minority will be insecure. '7 4 According to Madison there were
only two processes for combating this potential evil. The first
solution could be employed by "creating a will in the community
independent of the majority, '7' and the second "by compre-
hending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens
as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole
very improbable, if not impracticable. ' '7 1 It was the second of
these two solutions which Madison and his compatriots at-
tempted to implant into their new republic. Through the use of
a representative form of democracy77-a bicameral structure of
the legislature, with somewhat insulating terms of office 8-and
the "separation of powers, 7 9 the Framers felt that they were
creating a system where "the rights of individuals, or of the mi-
nority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of
the majority."8
72. Id. at 177.
73. FEDERALIST, supra note 36, No. 51, at 339-41 (J. Madison).
74. Id. at 339 (emphasis added).
75. Id.
76. Id. (emphasis added).
77. See G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN, & M. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 12
(1986) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL LAW].
78. Id. at 13.
79. Id.
80. FEDERALIST, supra note 36, No. 51, at 339 (J. Madison).
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Unfortunately, none of these safeguards were strong enough
to uproot the racism which had been implanted into the hearts
and minds of the Framers and the society. More importantly, as
they constructed this governmental system, they violated the
theories and principles they extolled. The safeguards were in-
tended to create a process where wise men would come together
and deliberate on behalf of "the people," without sacrificing
their wisdom to "temporary or partial considerations."'8' How-
ever, the Framers acted contrary to their own prescription. The
vulnerability of the delegates to the social mores of their time is
often cited as the rationale for their treatment of African peo-
ple.82 Yet this defect was the very evil which their form of gov-
ernment was structured to prevent. At the "Grand Convention,"
the rights of individuals and groups were violated by the "unjust
combination of the majority." If the Framers were not able to
eschew this evil, then how could their successors overcome it?
The Framers failed to realize or admit that there are certain
common interests which cut across other social divisions and
classes, and can thereby endanger the rights of individuals. That
common interest in 1787 was white supremacy. That same com-
monality still afflicts this country, and continues to subvert the
Framers' safeguards.
At the root of the Framers's contradiction was their attempt
to create a "separate class of persons" in a society which re-
belled against this same type of classification a decade earlier.
Despite the glaring inconsistency between this determination
and the revolutionary ideals, the Supreme Court later upheld
the reasoning of the delegates. Chief Justice Taney, writing for
the Court in the Dred Scott case,88 felt that the Framers were
81. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 77, at 12.
82. See C. ROSSITER, supra note 21, at 68.
83. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). The issue in this famous
case was whether individuals of African descent were entitled to the rights, privileges
and immunities provided other citizens. The Court held that they were not and justified
the decision by indicating that the laws in existence at the time the Constitution was
framed did not recognize African people as equal human beings. The case arose when
Dred Scott was taken to territory in the United States which had been designated as
"free." He petitioned the Court to recognize his freedom. The case has been highly criti-
cized for its procedural errors; the involvement of politicians in the Supreme Court's
decision-making powers; its misconstruction of the laws pertaining to slavery at the time
of the enactment of the Constitution; and its incorporation of white supremacy into the
judicial processes of the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Black Journey, supra note 26, at 224-
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quite clear and consistent in their purpose and resolve. He
stated:
The brief preamble sets forth by whom it was formed, for
what purposes, and for whose benefit and protection. It
declares that it is formed by the people of the United
States; that is to say, by those who were members of the
different political communities in the several states; and
its great object is declared to be to secure the blessings of
liberty to themselves and their posterity . . . But there
are two clauses in the Constitution which point directly
and specifically to the negro race as a separate class of
persons, and show clearly that they were not regarded
as a portion of the people or citizens of the Government
then formed.8
This explanation and interpretation by the Court suggests that
the Framers were not creating a contradiction when they used
the term "persons" when referring to Africans within the United
States. They intended to create a "separate class of persons;"
one not equal to all others, but not quite the equivalent of ani-
mals.8 5 The fallacy in the Framers' reasoning is that this cate-
gory did not exist. It was one of many legal fictions which serve
some overriding social interest. From a legal perspective this
dual classification of individuals was possible.86 However, from a
moral standpoint there was an inherent contradiction in the
Framers' reasoning. A Constitution which emerges from a move-
ment that embraced the sanctity of individual freedom and lib-
erty, contravenes those principles when it upholds the enslave-
ment of other human beings.
The preamble to the Constitution declared that its purpose
29; D. BELL supra note 13, at 15; C. SWISHER, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES at 592-652 (1974).
84. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 411 (emphasis added).
85. This process of creating new categories for Black people and other people of color
is one of the constant themes of white supremacy. The history of segregation statutes in
this country is another good example of this process.
86. There are numerous legal classifications which separate individuals into catego-
ries. For example, Minor/Adult, Sane/Insane, Consumer/Merchant, Married/Divorced,
etc. Unlike the Framers' classification there are reasonable justifications for these dis-
tinctions. The Framers' classification attempted to deprive African people of their
humanity.
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was the "establishment of justice." This new union could have
only established justice by making the slave trade illegal, abol-
ishing slavery, compensating the Africans and Africa, and grant-
ing full rights of citizenship and protection to all Africans who
chose to remain in this country. Clearly, this was a price that the
delegates were not willing to pay and instead chose to establish
the nation on a foundation riddled with contradictions and in-
justice.8 7 Despite subsequent amendments and numerous legisla-
tive enactments, the consequences of their choice still remains.8 8
87. It has been argued that any alternative, other than the one chosen by the Fram-
ers, would have resulted in a destruction of the confederation and a more severe treat-
ment for Black people in the South. See Black Journey, supra note 26, at 117-20. The
assumptions upon which this argument rest are: (1) the South would refuse to ratify the
Constitution if it abolished slavery, (2) they would have eventually formed a separate
confederation with harsher laws and severer treatment of African people, and (3) by
remaining in the Union the South became subject to the later amendments to the Con-
stitution (i.e., 13th, 14th and 15th), which provided certain political rights to African peo-
ple in America. Though there is clearly some validity to the above argument, it overlooks
the great need that the South had for the North. One of the primary incentives for the
South to enter the Union was the guarantee that a strong national government could
provide them protection against slave insurrections. The South also needed the North to
provide security against foreign invasions. The North was the primary consumer of the
products produced by the South. Thus the South could not easily dismiss its relationship
with and dependency on the North. More importantly, the above argument does not
consider the possible outcomes at the Convention if the North was totally unified and
clear on its position on slavery and the slave trade. As W.E.B. DuBois points out in THE
SUPPRESSION OF THE AFRICAN SLAVE TRADE,
[t]he slavery side was strongly entrenched, and had a clear and definite demand.
The forces of freedom [Northern delegates) were, on the contrary, divided by
important conflicts of interest, and animated by no very strong and decided
anti-slavery spirit with settled aims. Under such circumstances it was easy for
the Convention to miss the opportunity for a really great compromise, and to
descend to a scheme that savored unpleasantly of "log-rolling." The student of
the situation will always have good cause to believe that a more sturdy and
definite anti-slavery stand at this point might have changed history for the
better.
W.E.B. Dusois, supra note 51, at 57-58. Even if DuBois's optimism is misplaced, one
should not justify the tremendous harm that was inflicted upon Africans and all human-
ity by stating that the "Framers had no choice." They all had a choice, but chose not to
take it. All of the delegates, Northern and Southern, must be judged by the same moral
standard. History has demonstrated that all of them failed to obtain an acceptable
standard.
88. The criminal justice system is one example of how those consequences are still
present today. The disproportionate number of Black persons who are arrested, 28%;
incarcerated, 46%; given the death penalty, 41%; has lead many to label the criminal
justice system as the "criminal injustice system." See Hall, The Elimination of Institu-
tional Racism in the Criminal Justice System in 1 INSTITUTIONAL RACISM AND BLACK
AMERICA 121-23 (1985). See also economic statistics, supra note 2 and 8. The Framers'
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The preamble also declared that the Constitution would "insure
domestic tranquility." However, the unresolved contradiction
eventually brought about a civil war seventy-four years after the
delegates signed their names to the document. This war ex-
tracted a high price in the form of lives, resources and pride.
The contradiction which the Framers chose to ignore, had to be
partially resolved on the battlefield. 9
The greatest contradiction in the preamble is found in its
declaration that the Constitution would secure "the blessings of
liberty" for the people of the United States. "Liberty" is defined
as an "exemption from slavery, bondage, imprisonment, or con-
trol of another."90 Clearly the "blessings of liberty" could not
exist in a society that sanctioned and glorified slavery. Liberty
did not exist for the African people who were held in bondage in
the South, nor did it completely exist for those who were fortu-
nate enough to live in or escape to the North. The Constitution,
by embracing "liberty" and sanctioning the European/American
slave trade and a Fugitive Slave provision, created an irreconcil-
able moral dilemma. This was a true dilemma for the Framers,
because from their perspectives all "alternatives were unsatisfac-
tory."'" They were not willing to give up their appeal to the ide-
als of individual freedom, nor were they willing to give up slav-
ery. Their resolution was to hold on to the principle of liberty
but to insure that it was allotted on the basis of one's skin color.
This was not a resolution of the contradiction, but the total mis-
appropriation of an important ideal.
In addition to the inherent inconsistency in the Constitu-
tion's use of the liberty concept, there was another contradiction
between the preamble's guarantee of liberty and its promise of
"domestic tranquility." The evidence is very convincing that the
Framers did not intend to usher in the full exercise of liberty by
all of its inhabitants, but to the contrary, wanted to guard
against the full expression and quest for liberty by those who
failure to resolve the contradictions insured that Black people would remain second class
citizens even after their rights were restored.
89. See Black Journey, supra note 26, at 119. "Because the abolitionist made a moral
compromise of their position in 1787 by refusing to run the risk of creating two separate
sovereigns, the slavery problem was partially solved on the battlefields of the 1860s."
90. WEBSTER, supra note 63, at 484.
91. Id. at 232. Webster defines dilemma as, "[a] situation involving choice between
equally unsatisfactory alternatives." WEBSTR, supra note 63, at 317.
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were being oppressed by existing social arrangement. A "strong
national government" with an effective and efficient militia pro-
vided security to the various states against the possibility of
"debtor uprisings''92 and "slave revolts. '93 Madison in the Fed-
eralist letter No. 43 strongly encouraged ratification of the Con-
stitution on this basis. He stated:
I take no [little] notice of an unhappy species of popula-
tion abounding in some of the states, who, during the
calm of regular government, are sunk below the level of
men; but who, in the tempestuous seeds of civil violence,
may emerge into human character, and give a superiority
of strength to any party with which they may associate
themselves."'
This fear and concern was so great that a specific provision was
included in the Constitution which guaranteed that the Federal
Government would protect the states against "domestic vio-
lence. '95 This provision had tremendous appeal to the Southern
states who feared that the large number of African people in
their midst would soon engage in a systematic quest for freedom
92. Alexander Hamilton begins the ninth Federalist letter by indicating that a strong
national government would provide a "barrier against domestic faction and insurrec-
tion." FEDERALIST, supra note 36, No. 9, at 47 (A. Hamilton). This was a direct reference
to Shay's Rebellion which occurred in the summer of 1786 in Springfield, Massachusetts.
A group of angry debtors and farmers led by Daniel Shay captured various courthouses
and engaged in an open rebellion against tax collectors who were attempting to repossess
their farms on behalf of creditors. This uprising was quashed by mercenaries who were
hired by the business establishment who feared that this outburst would result in an
uncontrollable attack against property rights. "The growing radicalism in the states was
intimidating the propertied classes, who began to suggest that a strong central govern-
ment was needed to 'insure domestic tranquility,' guarantee 'a republican form of gov-
ernment,' and protect property 'against domestic violence.'" T. DYE & L. H. ZEIGLER,
supra note 26, at 32.
93. For a description of some of the slave revolts which occurred prior to the Consti-
tution, see infra, text at notes 310-25. Those that occurred subseqent to the Constitu-
tion are found infra notes 332-43 and accompanying text.
94. FEDERALIST, supra note 36, No. 43, at 285 (J. Madison). The Federalist version of
this quote does not include the word "little." However, other versions of the statement
do include this word. See T. DYE & L. H. ZEIGLER, supra note 26, at 48. The sentence
makes more sense when the word little is included.
95. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. "The United States shall guarantee to every state in this
Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Inva-
sion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature
cannot be convened) against domestic violence." Id.
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and liberty. This guarantee was so important to the Southern
states that they were willing to submit to commercial regulations
which were contrary to their interest in exchange for this extra
security." Viewed in this light it becomes clear that there was a
direct conflict between the "liberty" and "domestic tranquility"
precepts in the preamble. Instead of promoting liberty, the
Framers intended to create a form of government which could
curtail the expression of liberty by those who could upset ex-
isting economic and social arrangements. When the preamble re-
ferred to "domestic tranquility" in 1787, it was laying the foun-
dation for the contemporary concept of "law and order."97 "Law
and order" had the same meaning and effects on the aspirations
and activities of Black people during the 1960s, as "domestic
tranquility" had on their ancestors who aspired to be free in the
1780s. Thus, the contradictions in the Constitution were not
only there at its inception, but have remained as a continuing
96. See C. BEARD, supra note 26, at 30. He states
[t]he southern planter was also as much concerned in maintaining order
against slave revolts as the creditors in Massachusetts were concerned in putting
down Shay's "desperate debtors." And the possibilities of such servile insurrec-
tions were by no means remote. Every slave owner must have felt more secure in
1789 when he knew that the governor of his state could call in the strong arm of
the federal administration in case domestic disturbance got beyond the local po-
lice and militia. The North might make discriminatory commercial regulations,
but they could be regarded as a sort of insurance against conflagrations that
might bring ruin in their train. It was obviously better to ship products under
adverse legislation than to have no products to ship.
97. The concept "law and order" became very popular during the 1960s after various
cities erupted in urban protest. The riots of the late 1960s in most major cities through-
out the country were a quest for freedom and liberation against White domination. Like
the earlier slave revolts they met with the same response. The security and protection of
property rights and interests become critical and the underlying social injustice was dis-
missed or rationalized away. Many public officials were elected because of their stance on
the issue of domestic violence.
"Law and Order" and "Get tough with Blacks" candidates triumphed in almost
every city that had experienced a riot, and even in some that had not suffered
racial turmoil. For the first time in a decade, Congress rejected a proposed civil-
rights bill in 1966. The House of Representatives in 1967 refused to seat Harlem
Congressman Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., for illegal payroll practices that Whites
in Congress went unpunished for .... appealing to those weary of protest, Rich-
ard Nixon rode the backlash into the White House. He campaigned against open
housing and busing for racial balance. He promised to slow federal efforts at
school integration and to appoint only conservative justices to the federal courts.
Nixon particularly solicited the support of traditional Democratic voters dis-
gruntled with the excesses of the black struggle.
H. SITKOFF, supra note 3, at 222-23.
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legacy of the document's glory and peril.
Contradictions are not inherently wrong or immoral. Many
scholars have recognized that antagonistic forces are not only a
staple of life, but can be very beneficial for the overall develop-
ment of society."8 Therefore, one should not criticize the Fram-
ers because they were forced to develop a Constitution in a soci-
ety that contained glaring contradictions. It is their failure to
seize the conflicting forces and marshal them in the direction of
moral and social advancement that exposes them to criticism. It
is the effective moral resolution of conflict that advances society.
The Framers' decision to ignore and preserve the contradictions
repressed the moral growth of this nation. The same "conflicting
ideals"9 9 which lead to war, destruction and racial domination,
were also the seeds for the development of a just society. To the
detriment of society, the Framers chose the former instead of
the latter.
C. The Compromise
It is expected that politicians will compromise their posi-
tions on various issues in order to achieve a desired result. Com-
promise in a political forum is as predictable and acceptable as
flowers from an estranged spouse. The Constitution, like all po-
litical documents, is the product of numerous compromises and
concessions. One of the essential prerequisites for settlement is
the availability of resources or positions which the parties are
willing to "sacrifice" in order to secure other advantages or to
consummate the agreement. In many of the key compromises at
the Constitutional Convention, the humanity and political rights
of African people became the expendable item. The delegates
98. See, e.g. R. DAHRENDORF, CLASS AND CLASS CONFLICT IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 258-
72 (1959) [wherein the author refers to the extensive writings of Karl Marx and Freder-
ich Engels on the subject]; R. APPELBAUM, THEORIES OF SOCIAL CHANGE (1970).
99. The concept of "conflicting ideals" has become a focal point of discussion in the
legal academic community due to the scholarly efforts of those involved in the Critical
Legal Studies movement. This concept basically suggest that in the structure of legal
doctrine and rules there exist opposing ideals which could lead a decision maker to de-
cide a case in diametrically different ways and still remain within the bounds of the text.
Thus, there is no inherent logic in law which always produces a certain result. There are
choices, and the society can develop along totally different lines depending on the ideal
which is chosen. An analysis of the Constitution in the context of slavery suggests that
there is considerable validity to this theory.
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were eagerly willing to create this "more perfect union"100 at the
expense of the lives of millions of people of African descent. The
sacrifice of their lives and liberties was the glue that held this
fledgling nation together. They were the "sacrificial lamb,"''
which reconciled the northern and southern delegates. The
Framers willingly compromised the rights of people who had no
voice in the process, yet these same men led a revolution against
England because they were being "taxed without representa-
tion" in the political processes of their mother country.'02 This
contradiction is glaring and the compromises were clearly inhu-
mane and deplorable.'0
100. U.S. CONST. preamble.
101. Professor Derrick Bell has described this phenomenon of "Involuntary Sacrifice"
in his writings and speeches. He explains how the rights of Black people have continu-
ously been sacrificed in order to reconcile differences between competing white groups in
America. He states:
In the resolution of racial issues in America, black interests are often sacrificed
so that identifiably different groups of whites may settle a dispute or reestablish
their relationship. We have observed the phenomenon at work in seventeenth
century Virginia, and in the settlement of the sectional differences that enabled
the United States Constitution to be signed by the delegates and ratified by the
states. Arguably, Chief Justice Taney tried to use the technique in his Dred
Scott opinion, but the sacrifice of black interests in that situation was so heavy-
handed that it damaged many white interests as well. In the Hayes-Tilden Com-
promise of 1877, on the other hand, the sacrificial technique worked to
perfection.
See D. BELL, supra note 13, at 29-30.
102. The protest slogan of the Revolution was "No Taxation Without Representa-
tion." This slogan is attributable to James Otis, a Massachusetts lawyer and Stamp Act
activist. He wrote that "[n]o part of his Majesty's dominion can be taxed without their
consent." Otis, The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved, in THE DEMO-
CRATIC SPIRIT, A COLLECTION OF AMERICAN WRITINGS FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE
PRESENT DAY 59 (B. Smith ed. 1941).
103. From the perspective of the delegates at the Convention the compromises were
acceptable. However, their action cannot be judged just from the standpoint of their
subjective interest. From the perspective of the African and any reasonable human be-
ing, there is no "defense" for the Framer's immoral action. During the bicentennial year
it is imperative that we judge the document and the Framers not from the perspective of
those who benefited from their actions, but more importantly from the perspective of
those who were victimized because of their action and inaction. W.E.B. DuBois echoed
this perspective when he stated:
[I]nstead of calling the whole moral energy of the people into action, so as grad-
ually to crush this portentious evil [slave trade/slavery], the Federal Convention
lulled the Nation to sleep by a "bargain" and left to the vacillating and unripe
judgment of the States one of the most threatening of the social and political ills
which they were so courageously seeking to remedy.
W.E.B. DuBoIs supra note 51, at 62.
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The factors and forces behind Article I, Section 9, Clause 1
of the Constitution are a classic example of the compromise pro-
cess. The northern delegates, being loyal to their constituents,
were strongly concerned with the "free flow of commerce" be-
tween the states. They represented the industrial businessmen
of the north who wanted no restrictions on their rights to sell
their products to other states. 10 4 The southern delegates, being
loyal to their constituents, were very concerned about maintain-
ing the institution of slavery, including the importation of more
Africans, 106 which they felt was essential to their economic and
social stability. There were delegates from the North and South
who spoke out against the slave trade.10 6 However, since much of
their protest was rooted in concerns other than morality and hu-
manity10 7 they easily gave up their positions. Luther Martin, a
delegate to the Convention from Maryland, later explained this
compromise in uncompromising terms. He stated
I found the Eastern states, notwithstanding their aver-
sion to slavery, were willing to indulge the Southern
states, at least with the temporary liberty to prosecute
the slave trade, provided the Southern states would in
their turn, gratify them, by laying no restriction on Navi-
gation acts ... and after a very little time, the Commit-
104. See Black Journey, supra note 26, at 68.
105. There were certain Southern delegates who were not in favor of the continuous
importation of African people, but their objections were rooted more in economic factors
than in humanitarian ones. States such as Maryland and Virginia had less use for the
labor of Africans than the states in the deep South. Therefore, they were engaged in the
business of selling the Africans who they had imported as slaves to the states who had a
greater need for them. A restriction on the future importation of Africans would greatly
increase the value of those who they already possessed. This economic factor motivated
the delegates to argue against the slave trade. However, they eventually were willing to
compromise their economic concerns in exchange for other economic considerations (i.e.,
no restrictions on the free flow of commerce between the various states). See Black Jour-
ney, supra note 26, at 72, wherein he observes:
[S]tates of the upper South wanted the international slave trade stopped as soon
as possible. In 1790 there were 293,000 slaves in Virginia, 103,000 in Maryland,
107,000 in South Carolina, 29,000 in Georgia. With their depleted tobacco lands
and overstocked with slaves, Maryland and Virginia were interested in highest
prices for the sale of their slaves. These areas could serve as breeding places
which would export their surplus blacks to the newer and more fertile slave-
operated agricultural areas south and west of their frontiers.
106. Id. at 79-80.
107. Id. at 70-71.
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tee, by a great majority, agreed on a report, by which the
general government was to be prohibited from preventing
the importation of slaves for a limited time, and the re-
strictive clause relative to navigation acts was to be
omitted.108
The dynamic could not be clearer. No matter how offensive the
slave trade was to some, they would not allow it to override their
own self interest. In the process, they sentenced thousands of
African people to death through the "Middle Passage."'109 This
provision in the Constitution relating to the importation of Afri-
can people as slaves is considered the "second major compro-
mise" 1 0 of the Constitutional Convention. Even though it was
an "essential step toward constructing a government that dele-
gates from every part of the country could take home to their
108. Luther Martin's letter, in J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CON-
VENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 373 (1941); see also WEB.
DuBois, supra note 51, at 59; Black Journey, supra note 26, at 68; M. FARRAND, supra
note 26, at 210-11.
109. The "Middle Passage" is the term used to describe the journey between Africa
and America. Many scholars have described the horrors and inhumane experience of
these slave ship voyages. See P. FINKELMAN, SLAVERY IN THE COURTROOM (1985). He
states,
[iut is estimated that only one out of every three potential slaves actually sur-
vived to reach America. The rest died in Africa or on board ship in what was
known as the "Middle Passage." During the middle passage slaves were crowded
into the hulls of ships under conditions that led to disease and often death...
Profits from the slave trade were so great that even with a high mortality rate
those who financed the trade could expect a good return on their investment.
Id. at 211. One of the most eloquent arguments against the slave trade and vivid descrip-
tion of the "Middle Passage" was given by Justice Joseph Story in his charge delivered
to the grand jury of the circuit court, at an October term in 1819, in Boston, Massachu-
setts, concerning the enforcement of a recently enacted Slave Trade Prohibition Act.
(The case was not reported so there is no record of the facts or specific charges in the
case). He stated:
[I]t is impossible to stand erect in most of the vessels, and in some scarcely to sit
down in the same posture . . .Some go down apparently well at night and are
found dead in the morning. Some faint below and die from suffocation before
they can brought upon deck ... [t]he motion of the ship rubs the flesh from the
prominent parts of their body and leaves their bones almost bare... [Often] the
whole place becomes covered with blood and mucus like a slaughter house... [It
is] a picture of human wretchedness and human depravity, which the boldest
imagination would hardly have dared to portray, and from which (one should
think) the most abandoned profligate would shrink with horror.
Id. at 216.
110. See C. ROSSITER, supra note 21, at 218.
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constituents,""' it was not the major compromise of the summer
of 1787.
In the words of Rufus King, a delegate from Massachusetts,
the "3/5th provision ' ' n 2 was the "greatest concession" made by
the delegates in order "to secure the adoption of the Constitu-
tion." '"8 This provision declared that for purposes of taxation
and representation, only 3/5th of African people who were held
as slaves would be counted. The Framers through the compro-
mising process defied nature and logic by creating a new cate-
gory of human beings. They were not disturbed by their viola-
tion of the laws of nature but were content in the realization
that they had found a formula which would satisfy the interest
of all parties involved. This compromise allowed the South to
receive political benefits from the enormous number of African
people who lived in its states, yet also provided the newly
formed government with potential tax revenue since "direct tax-
111. Id.
112. The roots of this conflict emerged as issues of representation and taxation were
considered at the Convention. The presence of Africans in the South who were held in a
state of bondage gave the Southern delegates another bargaining chip which from their
perspective had advantageous and disadvantageous aspects. Since the laws of the land
had already created this special category for African people, which possessed some of the
characteristics of personage and of property, then the Southerners could employ this
dichotomy to their advantage. If the Africans were counted as persons for purposes of
representation, this would greatly enhance the Southerner's political power in Congress.
The 1790 census indicated that about 94.3% of the African population that was enslaved
was located in the South and only 5.7% were in the North. See Black Journey, supra
note 26, at 50. This additional political strength would not be ignored by the South or
the North. On the other hand, if taxation was going to be imposed on the states based on
the number of its inhabitants then it would be best for the Southerners if Africans were
considered property. The 3/5th compromise allowed the Southerners to "have their cake
and eat it too." This formula allowed them to enjoy a political advantage by counting the
Africans which they held in bondage as persons, yet avoid some of the burden of taxa-
tion. The fact that the formula was totally inconsistent with the type of democratic gov-
ernment that the Framers were attempting to create did not dissuade them. Many schol-
ars have commented on the history and wisdom of this compromise.
After the competing theories had been argued in detail, a compromise was fi-
nally arrived [at]. The Framers at the Constitutional Convention were familiar
with the ratio which had been embodied by the Congress of the Confederation in
the revenue amendment of 1783, where five slaves were counted as the
equivalent of three free men or the slave as three-fifths of an inhabitant. Thus,
the three-fifths rule for representation surfaced at the Constitutional Conven-
tion at various times.
Id. at 59. See also D. BELL, supra note 13, at 22; J.H. FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY To FREE-
DOM: A HISTORY OF NEGRO AMERICANS 98-101 (4th ed. 1974).
113. See C. ROSSITER, supra note 21, at 173.
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ation" was tied to representation." 4 This dual classification of
African people as persons and property is a vivid example of the
contradictions and compromises of the Framers as they at-
tempted to avoid the great moral issue of their day. The incon-
sistencies and illogical reasoning become more apparent when
one examines the explanations given for the compromise. James
Madison in Federalist letter No. 54, meticulously justifies their
decision. He stated: "But we must deny the fact that slaves are
considered merely as property, and in no respect whatever as
persons. The true state of the case is, that they partake both
these qualities: being considered by our laws, in some respects,
as persons, and in other respects as property.""' 5 After ex-
pounding upon the legal variables which supported the conclu-
sion that African people were property, Madison then explained
how the law had recognized and respected the humanity of these
same people. It is at this point where the crisis in his reasoning
began. He stated: "[Tihe slave is .. .regarded by the law as a
member of society, not as a part of the irrational creation; as a
moral person, not as a mere article of property." 6 This admis-
sion that the law recognized African people as possessing the
human qualities of "rationality" and "morality," forecloses any
argument that the Framers' treatment of African people in the
Constitution was based on their belief that these individuals
were "inferior beings.""' 7 Since morality and rationality were
deemed by the political philosophers of that period as the
sources and justifications for natural rights," 8 how could the
114. See Black Journey, supra note 26, at 60. This compromise turned out to be a
windfall for the South since the states were never taxed nor required to finance the Fed-
eral government. Id. at 62.
115. FEDERALIST, supra note 36, No. 54, at 354 (J. Madison).
116. Id. at 355 (emphasis added).
117. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. at 407, wherein Justice Taney determined
that African people were not entitled to the rights of citizenship under the Constitution
because the Framers and the laws of the land considered them as "beings of inferior
order."
118. Many of the Framers were heavily influenced by the writings of John Locke who
exposed a "liberty-oriented political philosophy," based on the "natural law" or "natural
rights" of man. According to this philosophy, man was a rational and moral being who
should be free to exercise his will. The government was therefore required to protect the
exercise of this will, and the natural rights which flowed therefrom. See C. ROSSITER,
supra note 21, at 59-60, 68, 71. It is not surprising that the "students" could not see the
contradiction in this reasoning since the "teacher" got it wrong also. Locke's philosophy
permitted slavery. The "liberties" which Locke extolled only belonged to those who were
19881
JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Framers justify denying these individuals their rights? The an-
swer is found in Madison's vision of law. Instead of confronting
the contradiction in his reasoning, he chose to conclude that
"[t]he federal Constitution ... decides with great propriety on
the case of our slaves, when it views them in the mixed character
of persons and of property."11 9 Madison's "majoritarian vi-
sion '120 emerges clearly in the above conclusion. The socially ac-
ceptable norm that African people could be denied their human-
ity overrode Madison's own admission that they were rational
and moral human beings. The power of the majority to defy na-
ture, God and humanity was firmly embraced by Madison. He
conceded that this was an unnatural determination when he
stated:
it is only under the pretext that the laws have trans-
formed the negroes into subjects of property,.., and it is
admitted, that if the laws were to restore the rights
which have been taken away, the negroes could no longer
be refused an equal share of representation with the
other inhabitants.1 2 1
It is crystal clear from the above passage that Madison's view of
law would permit it to nullify the natural rights of individuals. If
the law could deny the natural rights of human beings because
technically "free men."
119. FEDERALIST, supra note 36, No. 54, at 355 (J. Madison).
120. Madison did not totally embrace majoritarianism; he realized that the majority
could easily oppress the minority. Yet he felt that in a large republican form of govern-
ment, based on representational democracy instead of direct democracy this evil could
be curbed. In the famous FEDERALIST No. 10 he stated
[tihe smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and in-
terests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more fre-
quently will a majority be found of the same party; ... the more easily will they
concert and execute their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere, and you take
in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a
majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other
citizens.
FEDERALIST, supra note 36, No. 10, at 60-61 (J. Madison). Maybe this form of majoritari-
anism makes it "less likely" that the majority will act in concert to oppress the minority,
but clearly it does not make it impossible. The best evidence of this was the Framer's
action at the convention; the delegates were not precluded from invading the rights of
Black people who resided in the republic at that time. Madison's safeguards have not
prevented this drama from being a recurring nightmare to the rights and interest of
people of color, and other subjugated groups.
121. FEDERALIST, supra note 36, No. 54, at 355 (J. Madison) (emphasis added).
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the majority deemed it appropriate, then clearly there was tre-
mendous danger in the majoritarian form of government that
Madison and others were proposing. The history of this country
demonstrates that this danger was more real than imagined.
Therefore, those contemporary scholars and judges.22 who ad-
here to "Madison's majoritarian vision" of Constitutional law, or
to an "original intent" formula of judicial review pose a tremen-
dous threat to various groups in society.12 3
The Framer's 3/5th compromise created a precedent for fu-
ture policies and practices. They sanctioned the practice of in-
122. Edwin Meese III, Attorney General of the United States adheres to both of
these ideas and has been very outspoken about Supreme Court decisions which he feels
do not adhere to the "original intent" of the Framers. In a speech before the Washing-
ton, D.C. Chapter of the Federalist Society, Lawyers Division, on November 15, 1985, he
stated
Constitutional adjudication is obviously not a mechanical process. It requires an
appeal to reason and discretion. The text and the intention of the Constitution
must be understood to constitute the banks within which constitutional inter-
pretation must flow. As James Madison said, if "the sense in which the Constitu-
tion was accepted and ratified by the nation ... be not the guide in expounding
it, there can be no security for a consistent and stable government, more than
for a faithful exercise of its powers."
See THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY, THE GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR WRITTEN CONSTI-
TUTION 36 (OCCASIONAL PAPER No.2 1986) [hereinafter THE GREAT DEBATE]. In another
speech before the American Bar Association in Washington, D.C. on July 9, 1985 he
stated, "[I1n my opinion a drift back toward the radical egalitarianism and expansive
civil libertarianism of the Warren Court would once again be a threat to the notion of
limited but energetic government. What, then, should a constitutional jurisprudence ac-
tually be? It should be a Jurisprudence of Original Intention." Id. at 9. What the Attor-
ney General and others fail to comprehend is that it was this so-called "radical egalitari-
anism" of the Warren Court which allowed this country to at least approach the
principles which the Framers espoused. The Brown decision of the Warren Court was the
first significant vindication by the Court of the rights of those who had been subjugated
by the law and by a jurisprudence of "original intention." See Brown v. Board of Educ.,
374 U.S. 483 (1954). The Constitution had to be "expanded" in order to serve the needs
of the entire society and especially those who had been the victims of this "energetic
majoritarian government." There are other prominent scholars who adhere to the princi-
ple of "original intent." In a speech before the University of San Diego Law School,
November 18, 1985, Judge Robert H. Bork stated, "[tihe only way in which the Constitu-
tion can constrain judges is if the judges interpret the document's words according to the
intentions of those who drafted, proposed, and ratified its provisions and its various
amendments." THE GREAT DEBATE, id. at 45.
123. The fourteenth amendment precludes any strict adherence to the "original in-
tent" and vision of the Framers. Yet these ideas lead to a very strict and neutral inter-
pretation of the Constitution which results in a preservation of the status quo. Since the
past injustices which the fourteenth amendment was intended to correct are still present,
theories that tend to preserve present social, economic and political arrangements are a
serious threat to the rights and aspirations of Black people and other people of color.
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voluntarily sacrificing certain parts of humanity in exchange for
what they felt was in the best interest of the whole."" This prac-
tice has become a pattern in the arena of race relations in this
country. 2 5 The interests of Black people have constantly been
offered as a sacrifice by individuals and groups on theories of
political expediency, economic efficiency" 6 and white superior-
ity. 27 This approach to compromise and its numerous negative
consequences are attributable, at least in part, to the beliefs and
actions of the Framers of the United States Constitution.
III. AN EVALUATION OF THE FRAMERS: PRAISE OR
CONDEMNATION
This brief excursion into various provisions of the Constitu-
tion and the writings of the Framers revealed numerous injuri-
ous compromises and contradictions. This is by no means a de-
finitive analysis of the Constitution, yet it does provide a basis
for certain general assessments. If one could somehow remove
the presence of millions of Africans and Native Americans from
the history pages, the evaluation given to the Framers would be
impressive. 28 These men came together with various competing
interests and backgrounds and created a framework of govern-
ment which has lasted for two hundred years and which en-
shrined some important ideals and principles. 12 9 Nevertheless,
124. Delegate Ellsworth from Connecticut in defending the continuous involvement
of the South in the slave trade reminded his Northern brethren that "what enriches a
part enriches the whole." See W.E.B. DuBois, supra note 51, at 56. Ellsworth and others
failed to consider the opposite side of his axiom: "what stains a part stains the whole."
125. See note 9, supra.
126. See W.E.B. DuBois, supra note 51, at 56. Economic efficiency was given as a
reason for the North's acquiescence to the slave trade. Rutledge of South Carolina re-
minded his Northern delegates that if they "consult their interest, they will not oppose
the increase of slaves, which will increase the commodities of which they will become the
carriers." Id.
127. Many of the segregation laws in the South served as an appeasement for poor
Whites. Unable to secure real economic advantages from the established order, they set-
tled for the hollow belief that they were "better-off" than Black people, even those who
earned and achieved more than them. See D. BELL, supra note 13, at 39.
128. Clearly, their grade should also be drastically reduced by the position that they
took with regards to the rights of women. Just as the rights of African people were rele-
gated to an inferior position under the Constitution, so were those of the feminine gen-
der. An exhaustive analysis of this moral defect is also a desirable task for this bicenten-
nial year.
129. Despite the weaknesses in the original Constitution, there are important ideals
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their actions cannot be measured and evaluated in a vacuum.
They must be responsible for their failures as well as their suc-
cesses. It has been suggested that it is unfair to judge an entire
Constitution and its drafters on the basis of one weakness.
When the travesty inflicted upon African people under the sanc-
tion of the Constitution is considered, the above argument loses
all of its force. The action of the Framers was not de minimus. 30
It was not a harmless error which could be easily corrected at a
later stage in history. The error was fundamental and universal.
It related to the essence of the Framer's declarations " ' and
therefore must be a deciding factor in any deliberation.
From the perspective of those who attended the Convention
the Framers did an outstanding job. The words of Benjamin
Franklin eloquently express the above sentiment:
I doubt too whether any other Convention we can obtain
may be able to make a better Constitution. For when you
assemble a number of men to have the advantage of their
joint wisdom, you inevitably assemble with those men all
their prejudices, their passions, their errors of opinion,
their local interests, and their selfish views. From such an
Assembly can a perfect production be expected? It there-
fore astonishes me, Sir, to find this system approaching
so near perfection as it does .... -1
Contrary to Franklin's admonition, the dominant prejudice
of the time did not put the Framers at odds with each other.
and principles contained therein. Freedom of Speech, Separation of Powers, Safeguards
against Self-incrimination, and many other rights were created and preserved by the
Framers. Unfortunately, certain groups have had a more difficult time securing and exer-
cising these rights.
130. The impact that slavery and the slave trade had on African people and the Afri-
can continent is immeasurable. The economic, cultural, educational and human depriva-
tion which occurred is unsurpassed in the annals of history. In addition, the psychologi-
cal and spiritual injuries were also overwhelming and have not been fully documented or
explored. The millio~ns of lives lost in the "middle passage" and the horrors of this expe-
rience is alone enough to justify the condemnation of all who participated in it or sanc-
tioned its continuation. The long and devastating history of slavery, segregation and dis-
crimination in this country makes it impossible to categorize the Framers action as a
minor incident.
131. That essence can be found in the language of the Declaration of Independence,
dedicated to the proposition that "all men are created equal." The Declaration of Inde-
pendence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
132. See Black Journey, supra note 26, at 111 (emphasis added).
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Regardless of their political, geographical and economical differ-
ences, they all agreed on one thing: the inherent superiority of
the white race. Even those who opposed slavery did not view
African people as equal to them, but objected to their subjuga-
tion on humanitarian, economical and political grounds. The
Framers had recognized the humanity of African people but still
felt compelled to elevate themselves beyond humanity. This
prejudice blinded them to the fallacy of their own actions and
turned what should have been praise into condemnation. Some
attempted to blunt this charge by claiming that morality was
not an acceptable standard by which to judge the Framers. Con-
gressman Smith of South Carolina stated at the first session of
Congress: "When we entered into this Confederacy, we did it
from political and not from moral motives."' 3 Though this is a
persuasive defense on behalf of the Framers, it is not dispositive
of the issue. It is clear from the proceedings of the Convention
and other writings of the time' that the formation of a strong
national government was the major priority and motivation of
the delegates. Yet, one cannot dismiss morality from law that
easily.' Especially when those who defend or praise the Consti-
tution and its Framers invoke adjectives which have heavy
moral overtones. 36 More importantly, a constitution is more
than a political compact, it is the embodiment of the sacred and
cherished principles of a society. Therefore the Constitution of
the United States should be judged according to this standard.
One of the most eloquent defenses of the Framers' decisions
regarding slavery is provided by Clinton Rossiter, author of the
classic book The Grand Convention. He stated:
Most who criticize the Framers for not acting boldly in
133. Id. at 117.
134. Id. at 111.
135. There is strong support for this distinction in the legal literature. The Positivist
theory of jurisprudence accept the notion that law should be judged not by its connec-
tion to some moral standard, but by the mere fact that it is law.
136. A contemporary writer captures this grand legacy when he states, "(t]o a scrip-
turally-based people, it [the Constitution] has been a sacred text. John Marshall, the
great Supreme Court Chief Justice, spoke for many Americans when he described the
Constitution as having sprung from a historically unique moment, guided by a force
larger than its authors." See Higgins, Motherhood, apple pie and the Constitution, The
Boston Globe, Sept. 13, 1987, (The U.S. Constitution At 200: Conflict And Consensus),
at 15 [emphasis added].
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this matter [slavery] see them as men they never were or
could have been-audacious heralds of a social revolu-
tion-rather than as the men they were-prudent build-
ers of a nation. Both the angry men of the North and
troubled men of the South, who went along with the four
offensive clauses and the silences of the Constitution in
defiance of principle and disregard of conscience, were
blocked by a whole array of circumstances-inertia, tra-
dition, sectionalism, poor timing, lack of imagination, the
preferences for "essential principles only," and above all,
their passion for nationhood-from striking for the
emancipation of a misunderstood, and, for that matter,
feared description of men.'37
Instead of condemning the Framers, Rossiter passionately sug-
gests that these men did as much as they were humanly capable
of doing. The Framers did not come together in 1787 to chal-
lenge existing institutions, redistribute wealth, nor to "make the
world over."' 8 They came together to "make their corner of the
world secure."' 39
Rossiter's argument overlooks the fact that this difficult
problem was not thrust upon the Framers, but was one which
many of them helped to create. These misunderstood and feared
men which Rossiter spoke of did not voluntarily show up in the
American colonies.'40 African people were feared because the
Framers and the society were keenly aware of the injustice and
inhumane treatment that had been leveled against them.'4 ' As
137. See C. ROSSITER, supra note 21, at 268 (emphasis added).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. There is overwhelming evidence that Africans did travel to the American conti-
nent long before Europeans arrived. See, e.g., I. VAN SERTIMA, THEY CAME BEFORE CO-
LUMBUS (1976). However, those who were the focus of Rossiter's comments were forcibly
brought against their will.
141. This awareness and the inevitable consequences were reflected in Luther Mar-
tins' summary of the proceedings of the Convention, which was delivered to the Mary-
land Legislature on November 29, 1787. While describing the opposition to the clause
permitting the importation of Africans who were enslaved, he stated:
It was said, that we had just assumed a place among independent nations, in
consequences of our opposition to the attempts of Great Britain to enslave us
• . . that now we scarcely had arisen from our knees, from supplicating [God's]
aid and protection, in forming our government over a free people, a government
formed pretendedly on the principles of liberty and for its preservation-in that
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Thomas Jefferson stated, "[ifndeed, I tremble for my country
when I reflect that God is just; that his justice cannot sleep for-
ever .... ,142 This problem which existed in the Framers' "cor-
ner of the world" should not be dismissed because they were not
willing to confront it.
Furthermore, Rossiter's defense de-values the lives of Afri-
can people. Their suffering, crucifixion and death becomes a nec-
essary price that had to be paid in order to build the nation.
This attitude is a classic example of white supremacy disguised
as political practicality. The argument expressly negates the fact
that the Framers' decision sanctioned and condoned the killing
of millions of human beings. In addition, the fact that certain
sectional and regional interest would have fought against the
ratification of a constitution which abolished slavery does not
excuse the Framers. The criticism of the Constitution's stance
on slavery is not a criticism of the fifty-five men who assembled
in Philadelphia. It is a condemnation of the values, customs and
ideals of the entire nation. The Framers, as the society's repre-
sentatives to the Convention, have received the thrust of the cri-
government, to have a provision not only putting it out of its power to restrain
and prevent the slave-trade, but even encouraging that infamous trade, by giving
the States power and influence in the Union, in proportion as they cruelly and
wantonly sport with the rights of their fellow creatures, ought to be considered a
solemn mockery of, and insult to that God whose protection we had implored,
and could not fail to hold us up in detestation, and render us contemptible to
every true friend of liberty in the world. It was said, it ought to be considered
that national crimes can only be, and frequently are punished in this world, by
national punishments.
See M. FARRAND, supra note 26, at 211. A better statement for the development of a
general collective theory of redress can not be found. Luther was clearly stating that the
wrong was not an individual wrong but a national violation. It was private as well as
public. Thus any remedy to address this problem should not focus on individual acts of
discrimination, nor on specific victims. The entire governmental system, including all
citizens, who through their respective representatives, created and ratified this national
deprivation of life, liberty and property are responsible for compensating the "collective
victims," and specific individuals. Contemporary theories of affirmative action must have
at their base the above rationale in order to be effective.
142. See Black Journey, supra note 26, at 112. The remainder of Jefferson's state-
ment reads:
[Wihat incomprehensible machine is man! who can endure imprisonment, and
death itself, in vindication of his own liberty, and the next moment be deaf to all
those motives, whose power supported him through his trial, and inflict on his
fellow men a bondage, one hour of which is fraught with more misery than that
which he rose in rebellion to oppose. . ..
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tique. Yet the critique, if understood, is aimed at all sections
and regions of the country, regardless of whether they had abol-
ished slavery in their particular state. Their representatives,
along with the representatives from the other states, allowed a
nation to come into existence with one of the greatest crimes
against humanity hanging over its head. Slavery was not just a
southern problem, it was a problem for the entire nation. Ros-
siter's defense only provides more evidence that the American
Revolution did not strike a blow for true freedom and equality,
but only cleared the way for the establishment of an "aristo-
cratic government. 1
43
There have been numerous14 4 critics of the Constitution and
the founding fathers, but few were as eloquent and prophetic as
William Lloyd Garrison. He stated:
The Union that can be perpetuated only by enslav-
ing a portion of the people is "a covenant with death and
an agreement with hell" and destined to be broken in
143. See C. ROSSITER, supra note 21, at 270; see T. DYE & H. ZEIGLER, supra note 26,
at 27-56.
144. Some of them include:
Frederick Douglass:
The Constitution of the United States. What is it? Who made it? For whom and
for what was it made? Is it from heaven or from men? .... We hold it to be a
most cunningly devised and wicked compact, demanding the most constant and
earnest efforts of the friends of righteous freedom for its complete overthrow. It
was conceived in sin, and shapen in inequity.
Black Journey, supra note 26, at 113.
Sojourner Truth:
Now I hear talk about the Constitution and the rights of man. I come up and I
take hold of the Constitution. It looks might big. And I feel for my rights. But
they aren't there. Then I say, "God, what ails this Constitution?" And you know
what He says to me? God says, "Sojourner there's a little weevil in it."
See V. ORTIZ, SOJOURNER TRUTH, A SELF-MADE WOMAN 67-68 (1974). The major critics of
the Framers when the Constitution was drafted were the Anti-Federalists. They were
opposed to the amount of power which was given to the federal government under the
Constitution. They felt that the model for government should be the "old town meet-
ing," were citizens had more direct input into the operation of government. The anti-
federalists were also concerned about the role that commercial development played in
the decision to abandon the articles of confederation. The model the Framers offered was
inconsistent with the Revolution, according to the anti-federalist, because it removed the
people from the political process. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 77, at 5-6; For an
exhaustive analysis of the anti-federalist position, see H. STORING, WHAT THE ANTIFEDER-
ALIST WERE FOR (1981). Though the anti-federalist criticized the 3/5th compromise in
the Constitution and the provision that provided protection to the slave trade, these
issues were not the primary focus of their critique.
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pieces as a potter's vessel... The Republic that depends
for its stability on making war against the government of
God and the rights of man, though it exalt itself as the
eagle, and set its nest among the stars, shall be cast into
the bottomless deep, and the loss of it shall be a gain to
the world. There must be no compromise with slav-
ery-none whatever. Nothing is gained, every thing is
lost, by subordinating principle to expediency . . . The
apologist for oppression becomes himself the oppressor.
To palliate crime is to be guilty of its perpetration. To
ask for a postponement of the case, till a more conven-
ient season, is to call for a suspension of the moral law,
and to assume that it is right to do wrong, under present
circumstances.145
"A covenant with death, and an agreement with hell" is the first
part of Garrison's statement which deserves close attention. This
phrase could be easily dismissed as flowery exaggerated rhetoric
of an overly enthusiastic abolitionist. To the contrary, Garrison's
words have proven to be an accurate precursor of American his-
tory. When one reflects on the numerous lives that have been
lost because of racial oppression, racially motivated violence,
and a civil war, it is clear that the "founding fathers" were sign-
ing death certificates when they penned the Constitution."' Cer-
tainly, Black people have been the primary victims of this com-
pact with death, 47 yet Whites have also been forced to pay the
ultimate price for the Framers' agreement.148 The Framers re-
fusal to give protection in the Constitution to the Africans in
145. See Black Journey, supra note 26, at 114.
146. For a brief overview of the history of racially motivated violence in America, see
D. BELL, supra note 13, at 207-09. See also C. Cobb, Racially Motivated Violence in
America, United Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice, New York (1983).
147. D. BELL, supra note 13, at 207-209.
148. Many whites have also lost their lives because of the existence of racial domina-
tion in this country. Some, like John Brown, who led a slave revolt in Harper's Ferry,
Virginia, sacrificed their lives to bring about change. Others like, Goodman and Sch-
werner, two civil rights workers in Mississippi, were killed because they chose to align
themselves with the cause of racial justice. Many others lost their lives on the battlefield
during the Civil War as this country struggled to resolve its major contradiction.
Throughout the history of this country many White Americans have had to make the
supreme sacrifice in order to bring attention to the lingering injustices of the "founding




their midst was in essence the signing of their death warrants.
Black people in America were made vulnerable to any violent
and inhumane act which Whites could conceive. Their vulnera-
bility was even recognized and sanctioned by the Supreme Court
in Dred Scott, when Justice Taney pronounced that Black peo-
ple "had no rights which the White man was bound to re-
spect."' 49 This custom earlier invoked by the Framers of the
Constitution became a license for many to impose the ultimate
punishment of death without any subsequent retribution. 15°
The easiest way to support the second part of Garrison's
prediction (i.e., an agreement with hell) would be to cite the con-
ditions that Black people have been forced to live under in this
country. "Hell" has been frequently invoked by African Ameri-
can people as a metaphor to describe their feelings of being
Black in a country whose laws and customs attributed only neg-
ative connotations to that color.' Historical evidence strongly
suggest that their usage of this metaphor is not fanciful exagger-
ation. 52 Yet Garrison's words have a much deeper meaning than
just the misery that Black people would encounter in America.
Garrison was predicting that the entire nation would be sub-
jected to forces of misery, divisiveness, fear and discomfort. The
country, not just people of African descent, has suffered greatly
because of the Framers' decisions. 15 Racial strife, division, and
confusion have constantly threatened the tranquility and stabil-
149. Dred Scott v Sanford, 60 U.S. at 407. This statement by the Court has generated
enormous criticism. There is overwhelming evidence that Black people did have rights at
the time the Constitution was enacted. The colonial laws of the various colonies provided
protection to "free Black persons," and some protection was afforded even those in slav-
ery. For a full discussion of this point, see D.E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE:
ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS (1978). This statement by Justice Ta-
ney, though literally and legally incorrect, expressed the general sentiments and atti-
tudes of the society. A review of the history of crimes committed against Black people is
strong support for Taney's proposition. Furthermore, this proposition had to be at the
heart of any decision which precipitated and sanctioned the capture and enslavement of
African people. Clearly the Framers were operating on this proposition when they wrote
the Constitution.
150. The most classic example among many is the story of Emmitt Till. See L. Lo-
MAX, THE NEGRO REVOLT 87 (1963).
151. One of the songs produced by the Nation of Islam at two separate points in its
history was entitled; "A White Man's Heaven is a Black Man's Hell."
152. See supra notes 2 and 8.
153. See supra notes 147 and 148.
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ity of this nation.154 The country's survival is due more to the
humanity of those oppressed than to the virtues and strengths of
the Constitution. 15 5 Hell does not only refer to the physical and
psychological conditions which Black people have been sub-
jected to in America, but is also an appropriate depiction of the
state of mind of many Whites who have been nurtured on the
hollow belief of white superiority, only to have their self-concept
shattered when confronted with a Black person whose talents
and abilities serve as an automatic destruction of that myth.
Furthermore, hell describes a contemporary fear that some
Whites have faced when confronted with the notion that their
children would have to go to school with Blacks,'56 or even
154. American history is filled with incidences of riots, civil disobedience, sit-ins, boy-
cotts, demonstrations, marches, wars, police brutality, and individual acts of violence
which were produced by the unjust racial stratification within the society. See H.
SITKOFF, supra note 3; V. HARDING, supra note 3; D. BELL, supra note 13.
155. This point is supported by the fact that the Constitution and the Supreme
Court were the sources of injustice, inequality, and civil disobedience for close to two
centuries. It was not until 1954 that any major changes were made in the overall legal
status of Black people in America. How does one account for the one hundred and sixty
seven years of limited Constitutional advances in behalf of Black people? What type of
patience, humility and humanity would a people have to have in order to "wait" that
long without resorting to extreme, though justifiable forms of violence? See V. HARDING,
supra note 3, at 327. A classic example of the humanity of African people is found in the
following passage which was drafted by delegates at the Black Convention in Charleston,
South Carolina in 1865, following the emancipation of African people from slavery.
As American chattel slavery has now passed forever away, we would cherish in
our hearts no malice nor hatred toward those who were implicated in the crime
of slaveholding: but would extend the right hand of fellowship to all; and would
make it our special aim to establish unity, peace and brotherhood among men.
Id. at 327. The non-violent civil rights movement of the 1950s and '60s is another exam-
ple of this tremendous capacity to "turn the other cheek." Still, it has been often stated
that it was the constitutional form of government in America that was responsible for
the stability and survival of the nation. However, even those who don't adhere to the
"unlimited capacity to suffer" thesis, realize that the Constitution alone has not ensured
the nation's survival. Leland Baldwin writes:
[ilndeed, Americans have been a little too smug about having experienced only
one serious revolution in almost two centuries. The fact is that the abundant
resources of this continent have enabled the government to buy off the discon-
tented, at first with land and now with welfare payments and subsidies. It may
be suggested that this, even more than the virtues inherent in the Constitution,
has ensured peace and more or less orderly progress.
See L. BALDWIN, supra note 34, at 17.
156. The fierce resentment and anger that was expressed when various educational
institutions were finally integrated supports this idea. The reaction by Whites to the
integration of public schools in Little Rock, Arkansas, and Boston, Massachusetts, and of
universities in Mississippi and Alabama can easily be described as periods of "torment
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worse, marry one. The fact that many Whites do not feel safe in
certain segments of various cities and must go to extreme
lengths to protect themselves from the "undesirable elements"
of the society is a manifestation of this miserable fate which
Garrison predicted. The conditions of Black people which were
sanctioned by the Framers two hundred years ago has become a
thorn in the side of White America and a burden to the coun-
try's economy. 157 The self-righteous critics must remember, as
they bemoan the Black family, governmental social programs,
and the timidity of the criminal justice system; that the same
"founding fathers" whom they praise should be the object of
their condemnation. Many of the Framers personally initiated
and benefited from this problem. 158 Furthermore, they had the
opportunity to resolve this critical social injustice centuries ago,
but instead "asked for a postponement of the case, till a more
convenient season." 159 That season has still not arrived. America
and destruction" in American history.
157. This is seen by the recent moves to curtail, if not eliminate, various social pro-
grams. This point is demonstrated in the significant curtailment of various governmental
programs. Programs which were initiated to correct many of inequities that Black peo-
ple, the poor and other people of color confronted in this country have been reduced in
the name of new economic theories. Former Speaker of the House, Tip O'Neill, com-
mented about the severity of these cuts in his recent book, MAN OF THE HousE. He states:
[A]mericans were hurt through cuts in various social, health, and education
programs. Goodbye to public service jobs under the Comprehensive Employment
Training Act .... Medicare payments were lowered .... Child nutrition pro-
grams were slashed .... Unemployment compensation was reduced .... A mil-
lion food-stamp recipients were struck from the rolls, and the rest had their ben-
efits cut.
See The Boston Globe, Sept. 13, 1987, (Magazine) at 12, 59 (wherein excerpts from Tip
O'Neill's book appear). Though these reductions affected people across the spectrum,
their impact on Blacks was significant.
158. This accusation is supported by numerous authorities. The following quote is a
very balanced description of the Framers' involvement in slavery and the slave trade.
We have to take men in their time. Some there were in the South, and in the
Constitutional Convention, who deplored slavery ... But most were persuaded
by their selfish interest . . . Numbers of states to the north had slaves, and
northern shipowners and ports were heavily engaged in the slave trade. In pic-
turing the case to ourselves today we are helped by remembering that George
Washington, the president of the convention, was the owner of many slaves. We
know his integrity, but we are compelled to include, in his noble nature and
correct conduct, his steady practice of holding human beings in bondage, profit-
ing by their unrequited labor, buying and selling them at will.
See B. MITCHELL & L. MITCHELL, supra note 23, at 75.
159. See Garrison's quote, supra, text at note 145.
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still refuses to correct the sins of the fathers, by providing com-
plete justice to the thirty million descendants of the Africans
whom their fathers constitutionally condemned to hell. Ironi-
cally, the long delay makes it even more unlikely that justice will
occur. Time has led many to believe that the wrong happened so
long ago that no one today should be held responsible. Yet Gar-
rison's admonition160 still rings true and this state of misery,
though more subtle in form, appears to be destined to remain in
America as it continues to extract high prices.
Another portion of Garrison's statement, which was very
prophetic, is his warning that the country was "destined to be
broken in pieces as a potter's vessel." The clearest proof of this
was the Civil War. Seventy-four years after the Constitution was
signed, the Union was torn apart by a bloody and devastating
war. Many of the same states that swore total allegiance to the
Union, seceded. At the root of their secession was the issue of
slavery; the same issue which served as the impetus for Garri-
son's warning. Americans who once lived, worked and studied
together were now divided into factions; committed to the de-
struction of each other. The Civil War not only divided the
Union, but it divided families. Like before, Garrison's words
rang true to form. It is also necessary to appreciate and under-
stand the esoteric meaning behind his warning. Garrison, on a
very intuitive and deep level, knew that unless the issue of racial
oppression was completely and satisfactorily resolved, there
could never be one America. There would always be a dividing
line which would separate the country into "pieces." As W.E.B.
Dubois reaffirmed a century later, the issue of the twentieth cen-
tury is the color-line." 1 The famous "Kerner Report" '162 poign-
antly made this point when it concluded in 1968 that the nation
"[was] moving toward two societies, one black, one
white-separate and unequal." 15 Despite the integration phe-
160. Id.
161. See W.E.B. DuBoIs, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 23 (1961).
162. Full title of this report was, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON
CIVIL DISORDER (1968). This was one of the most comprehensive studies of the major
urban riots of the 1960s. It gave a detailed discussion of the social forces and factors
which caused the disruptions and offered recommendations for avoiding them in the
future.
163. Id. at 1. The report also indicated the cause of this division. It stated, "..
white society is deeply implicated in the ghetto. White institutions created it, white in-
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nomenon of the 1960s and '70s, America is still a divided nation.
Significant numbers of Black people and other people of color
are still cordoned-off into certain segments of all major cities
and many small ones. Not only is there still physical separation,
but more importantly there are deep psychological,"' cultural,
political, 6 " economic"' and educational' 17 divisions and dispari-
ties. These divisions are not the type that one would normally
attribute to a pluralistic society. These divisions are much
deeper, and are attributable to this country's long history of
sanctioning and promoting white supremacy, "under law."'68
The potter's vessel is clearly in pieces, even in nineteen hundred
and eighty-seven. During this bicentennial year, significant num-
bers of Black people and other people of color in their most hon-
est moments of reflection will silently paraphrase Frederick
Douglass: "This [Bicentennial] is yours, not mine .. .the sun-
light that brought light and healing to you, has brought stripes
stitutions maintain it, and white society condones it." Id. at 2. See also Justice Thurgood
Marshall's dissent in Bakke, 438 U.S. at 396 wherein he warns
[iun light of the sorry history of discrimination and its devastating impact on the
lives of Negroes, bringing the negro into the mainstream of American life should
be a state of interest of the highest order. To fail to do so is to ensure that
America will forever remain a divided society.
164. See, Welsing, supra note 64.
165. Voting patterns in America are still generally along racial lines. This point is
vividly displayed in the candidacy of Jesse Jackson for President of the United States.
As one columnist observed:
Rev. Jesse Jackson is the front-runner who cannot be a front-runner. Though
some polls show him leading the Democratic pack for the presidential nomina-
tion, those polls are dismissed. The polls do not matter in the case of Jesse Jack-
son, we are told, because Jesse Jackson cannot become president of the United
States . . . . [I]f we don't like him because of his skin color, that is not his
problem.
See Chicago Tribune, May 25, 1987, at 5 , col. 1.
166. See supra notes 2 and 8.
167. See A Dream Deferred, supra note 2, at 11-16.
168. See J. KUSHNER, APARTHEID IN AMERICA (1980). He states, "[w]e live in a divided
nation. In an examination of desegregation, perhaps the only certainty is that residential
segregation is pervasive and the degree of separation is increasing." Id. at 1. He goes on
to conclude that, "[t]he United States Supreme Court, contrary to popular understand-
ing, has consistently acted in a manner legitimizing America's pervasive pattern of racial
discrimination and segregation." Id. at 5. This should not suggest that the Supreme
Court is the only culpable branch. Kushner states, "[t]his study is not intended to ascer-
tain the most culpable branch of government. However, there is meager data to rebut the
overwhelming evidence of a conspiracy of constitutional magnitude." Id. at 5 n.9.
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and death to me."' 9
A. Redemption
Even those who agree that Garrison's predictions were accu-
rate, contend that the Civil War Amendments rehabilitated the
country. If the "founding fathers'" original compact could be
characterized as an "agreement with hell," then the passage of
the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments ' ° should
be viewed as their redemption.17 After fighting a bloody war, in
part, 1  over the issue which the delegates to the Federal Con-
vention of 1787 failed to address and correctly resolve, the na-
tion was ready to heal its wounds and redeem itself from the
sins of the fathers. However, just as the process of compromise
prevented the Framers of the Constitution from effectively
avoiding the sin, so did it prevent the members of Congress from
effectively redeeming the Constitution. 7 1 Yet, on its face the
Constitution no longer carried any signs of the blemishes of slav-
ery and inequality.1 4 Furthermore, the history,'7 5 purpose 6 and
169. F. DOUGLASS, The meaning of the Fourth of July to the Negro; 1852, in 2 THE
LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS (P. S. Foner ed. 1950). The original quote
read: "This Fourth of July is yours, not mine . . ." Id. at 189.
170. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
171. Redemption is defined as "deliverance from the bondage and consequences of
sin. . ." WEBSTER, supra note 63, at 709 (emphasis added).
172. Though slavery was the central issue of the Civil War, there were strong eco-
nomic and political and geographical factors that contributed to this dispute.
173. The fourteenth amendment was drafted in such general and ambiguous lan-
guage that it resulted in more protection for corporations than for Black people recently
relieved of bondage. See D. BELL, supra note 13, at 33. Professor Bell emphasizes the
effects of compromise at this juncture in history when he states, "[t]he Fourteenth
Amendment, unpassable as a specific protection for black rights, was enacted finally as a
general guarantee of life, liberty, and property of all persons. Corporations, following a
period of ambivalence, . . . received more protection from the courts than did blacks."
Id. at 33.
174. Article I, section 2, clause 3 (3/5th provision) was changed by section 2 of the
fourteenth amendment; article IV, section 2, clause 3 (fugitive slave provision) was su-
perseded by the thirteenth amendment; article I, section 9, clause 1, (importation of
Africans as slaves) was already obsolete due to federal legislation. See W. E. B. DUBOIS,
supra note 51, at 245-46 for a list of the various federal laws introduced and passed by
Congress concerning the slave trade.
175. See Kinoy, The Constitutional Right of Negro Freedom, 21 RUTGERS L. REV. 387
(1967). Professor Arthur Kinoy in his classic essay demonstrates how the purpose and
history of the Civil War Amendments were geared solely and primarily to guarantee
equal citizenship to Black people. He states:
The simple fact of the matter is that the main thrust of the Thirteenth, Four-
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language of the Amendments created sufficient legal power to
make freedom a reality for African people recently released from
bondage. To insure that the redemption process was effectuated,
Congress passed various Civil Rights statutes.' 77
Nevertheless, the change which many had envisioned and
hoped for did not occur. After a brief period of "constitutional
enlightenment"' 78 in a country struggling to outgrow the dark
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments was the construction of a penumbra of legal
commands which were designed to raise the race of freedmen from the status of
inferior being-a status imposed by the system of chattel slavery-to that of free
men and women, equal participants in the hitherto white political community
consisting of the people of the United States. The Constitutional right of the
black race to this status of freedom was the simple and central objective of the
Reconstruction Amendments.
Id. at 388 (emphasis added). See also Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36
(1873), wherein the Supreme Court for the first time clearly articulated the meaning and
purpose of the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. The Court stated, after
an extensive discussion of the events leading up to the passage of the amendments, that
in light of this recapitulation of events, almost too recent to be called history,
but which are familiar to us all; and on the most casual examination of the lan-
guage of these amendments, no one can fail to be impressed with the one per-
vading purpose found in them all, lying at the foundation of each, and without
which none of them would have been even suggested; we mean the freedom of
the slave race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom, and the
protection the newly-made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those
who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him. It is true that only the
fifteenth amendment, in terms, mentions the negro by speaking of his color and
his slavery. But it is just as true that each of the other articles was addressed to
the grievances of that race, and designed to remedy them as the fifteenth.
Id. at 71-72 (emphasis added). Unfortunately, the Supreme Court forgot this history and
purpose in subsequent cases, and systematically interpreted the amendments in a man-
ner that nullified their purpose. See infra notes 370-77; In more recent years, these same
amendments which the Court in Slaughterhouse boldly ordained as the purveyor of
Black rights, have been frequently and forcefully used to thwart the appeals of Black
petitioners. See, e.g. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265; Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ. 476 U.S. 267
(1986).
176. See Karst, The Supreme Court 1976 Term, Forward: Equal Citizenship Under
the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARv. L. REv.1 (1977).
177. See Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27; Civil Rights Act of 1871 (Ku
Klux Klan Act) ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13; Civil Rights Act of 1870 (Enforcement Act) ch. 14, 16
Stat. 140; Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114 Sec. 3-5, 18 Stat. 336, 337; The Reconstruc-
tion Act of 1867, ch. 152, 14 Stat. 428; Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen and Abandoned
Lands Act of 1865 ch. 90, 13 Stat. 507. (Hereinafter Civil Rights Acts of 1860s & 1870s].
178. During this period, which is referred to as Reconstruction, there were significant
societal advancement. With the protection of federal troops, who were stationed
throughout the South, Black people began to receive some of the rights and protections
the Constitution provided to all other citizens. Many were elected to serve in the state
and national government. Education was made available in a manner that had never
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ages 7 9 of law, another part of the legal trilogy began to unfold.
The Supreme Court, through numerous decisions'"0 and political
involvement,' 8' returned the nation to the "bottomless deep' 182
of legalized racial oppression, and any hope of constitutional re-
demption was again postponed for another century. 83 The Court
not only failed to uphold the clear meaning and purpose of the
Civil War Amendments, it developed doctrines and ideas'"
existed before, and some "freedmen" were able to acquire land and engage in economic
development. See D. BELL, supra note 13, at 34-38. [Bjlack literacy increased from 10
percent in 1860 to 30 percent ...the number of Black children attending school in-
creased from two to 34 percent. . . no Black man held public office in 1867, but by 1870
at least 15 percent of all Southern public officials were Black . . .Blacks were clearly at
the bottom of the economic ladder, but the 20 percent who did own land represented an
increase from 0 in 1865, greater than in any comparable period of American history.
Id. at 38.
179. The use of this concept, "dark ages" to depict a period not known for progress,
advancement and human achievement is a classic example of how the language and cul-
ture has been imbued with the ideas of white supremacy. Those things which are consid-
ered negative and undesirable are often assigned "dark" or "Black" characteristics; (i.e.,
Blackmail, Blacksheep of the family, devil food cake (dark), dark ages, black devil, dark
day, etc.); whereas those things that are good and acceptable are assigned white or light
characteristics, (i.e., white angel, angel food cake (white), little white lie, etc.).
180. See e.g., Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); United States v. Criukshank, 92
U.S. 542 (1875); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537 (1896); Cumming v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ. 175 U.S. 528 (1889); Berea
College v. Ky., 211 U.S. 45 (1908); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876). There were
cases during this period where the rights of Black people were vindicated by the Court.
See Strauder v. W. Va., 100 U.S. 303 (1880); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880); Ex
parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
181. One of the interesting points in the history of the Supreme Court is Justice
Joseph P. Bradley's involvement in the Hayes/Tilden Compromise of 1877. Through the
process of political compromise, the Republican party agreed to withdraw federal troops
from the South if the disputed presidential election of 1876 was determined in their
favor. To pass on the disputed votes Congress created an electoral commission consisting
of five Senators, five Representatives and five Supreme Court Justices. There is strong
evidence that Justice Bradley cast the deciding vote in the compromise decision which
gave Rutherford Hayes (Republican) the White House and gave Democrats (primarily
Southerners) the "South" back. Hayes fulfilled his promise once he took office and with-
drew the federal troops from all Southern states. This brought an end to Reconstruction,
reversed the gains that Blacks were beginning to make and removed the only source that
could protect their newly gained constitutional rights.
182. This was part of Garrison's warning about the future of the Constitution. See
supra, text at note 145.
183. The postponement lasted until 1954 when the Supreme Court finally began to
enforce the Constitutional rights of Black people in a significant and sweeping manner.
See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
184. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) were the primary sources for these
concepts and ideas. In holding that the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was unconstitutional,
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which virtually paralyzed the Constitution and Congress for
years. Many of these concepts have become fundamental parts
of modern constitutional theory and still serve to impede the
progress of racial reform. 5" Even though the structural changes
that occurred in the Constitution were intended to cleanse it
and society of all evidence of racial subordination, it appears
that the sins of the fathers remained through the generations.
One could conclude from this additional glance at the devel-
opment of Constitutional law that it was very deficient in its un-
derstanding and embodiment of the sacred principles of a demo-
cratic society. Though it made glowing references to some of
these ideals its structure and application were diametrically op-
posed to them. We cannot praise the Framers for implanting
these concepts into the country's foundation or history. We must
look to other events and individuals for these gifts. These
processes, legal and otherwise, provided the foundation for an
expansive understanding and interpretation of the Constitution.
If modern judges are limited to the vision and wisdom of the
Framers, then they are trapped by a document which contained
a distorted perception of liberty and equality. If one accepts the
benefits of the Framers, she/he must also accept their burdens.
The only way out of this predicament is to utilize one of the
Framers' major benefits as a tool for eliminating the burdens.
The flexibility and adaptability 86 of the document the Framers
Justice Bradley developed and propagated doctrines such as "state rights" (id. at 13),
"state action" (id. at 11), and "reverse discrimination" (id. at 25). These concepts in
various forms are still used by the Court as barrier against the full enforcement of the
general purpose of the fourteenth amendment. This decision can also be credited for
suggesting that civil rights laws could be valid if they were based on the Commerce
Clause. Id. at 18. This became the major strategy for congressional action during the
1960s when various civil rights laws were passed. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 252 (1964). All of the above ideas demonstrates the tremen-
dous influence of this case.
185. See, e.g., Bakke, 438 U.S. at 295 (reverse discrimination idea). See also Burton
v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435
(1970); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S.
163 (1972), (State action principle). Additionally, see Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717,
741, 744 (1974) (state rights argument).
186. The ideas of Judicial Review and Constitutional Amendments are the two pri-
mary characteristics of the Constitution which allow for change and developments. This
aspect of the Framers' vision has been very instrumental in the struggle to obtain and
secure equal rights for all citizens.
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created allows for the injection of a "new meaning: ' 187 a mean-
ing which reflects a true and accurate understanding of liberty
and justice, and one which embraces the hopes and aspirations
of all the country's inhabitants.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION
When the history books are written in future generations,
the historians will have to pause and say, "There lived a
great people-a black people-who injected new mean-
ing and dignity into the veins of civilization." This is our
challenge and our overwhelming responsibility.
Dr. Martin Luther King
Montgomery Bus Boycott I
187. This view is soundly rejected by many lawyers and legal scholars today. The
Attorney General of the United States, Edwin Meese III, devotes attention to this idea
of "new meaning,"yet dismisses it as an improper use of law. He stated in a speech
before the American Bar Association, July 9, 1985:
[Ilt is our belief that only "the sense in which the Constitution was accepted and
ratified by the nation,". . . provide[s] a solid foundation for adjudication. Any
other standard suffers the defect of pouring new meaning into old words, thus
creating new powers and new rights totally at odds with the logic of our Consti-
tution and its commitment to the rule of law.
THE GREAT DEBATE, supra note 122, at 10 (emphasis added). Without the "pouring of
this new meaning," which Meese abhors, the nation would be tied to hollow words and
concepts which could not satisfy the real purposes of the rule of law: the establishment
of justice and an ordered way of life. The Framers' "old words" and their actions haunt
the nation today. The wisdom of the Framers does not lie in their choice of petrified
concepts which bind the nation to their era and their sins, but in their choice of dynamic
ideals that contained the potential to develop a strong nation, that could one day redeem
the "fathers" from their sins.
188. H. SITKOFF, supra note 3, at 50 (emphasis added). This statement is part of the
speech given by Dr. King at the start of the historic Montgomery Bus Boycott. After a
Black woman by the name of Rosa Parks refused to give up her seat on a public bus to a
White man, as all Black people were required to do in Montgomery and throughout the
South, a massive boycott of the Montgomery City Line ensued. Dr. King rose to national
prominence as the leader of the boycott and president of the Montgomery Improvement
Association. The boycott lasted for 381 days. Through a dynamic and courageous show of
unity and resistance the Black people of Montgomery, Alabama were able to pressure
the city officials to alter the system of segregated bus travel. The final blow to the system
came in Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ala. 1956), aff'd per curiam, 352 U.S.
903 (1956). There the Supreme Court held that the Alabama laws requiring segregation
on buses were unconstitutional. The "day after" was described by Sitkoff in the follow-
ing manner:
Shortly before 6 A.M. on December 21, 1956, King and his aides boarded a
Montgomery bus and sat in the front, black next to white. Droves of news re-
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One could easily conclude from the preceeding sections that
there is very little to celebrate during this bicentennial year.
Though this would be a reasonable conclusion to reach, espe-
cially for those who have been the "victims of democracy, 1 189 it
is not the appropriate response. It is proper and mandatory to
celebrate the people and the process which transformed the
Constitution from a shallow testament of human and political
rights into a credible statement of political democracy. This pro-
cess and these individuals should be the object of our venera-
tion. The original Framers of the Constitution must be given
credit for the general form of government which they created,
yet it is improper to attribute to them all of the positive conse-
quences which have developed over the years. Their actions cre-
ated the need for reform. As Justice Thurgood Marshall stated:
The men who gathered in Philadelphia in 1787 could not
have envisioned these changes. They could not have
imagined, nor would they have accepted, that the docu-
ment they were drafting, would one day be construed by
a Supreme Court to which had been appointed a woman
and the descendant of an African slave. We the People
no longer enslave, but the credit does not belong to the
Framers. It belongs to those who refused to acquiesce in
outdated notions of "liberty," "justice" and "equality,"
and who strived to better them."19
These individuals and this process are the focus of this section.
The transformation of the Constitution finds its roots
within the inherent contradictions which existed within the doc-
ument. As stated earlier, the evidence is overwhelming that the
Framers were more concerned with protecting and securing the
economic viability of the country than they were with protecting
porters and cameramen recorded the historic event, proclaiming its significance
throughout the world. "For the first time in this 'cradle of the Confederacy', all
the Negroes entered buses through the front door," [t]he New York Times re-
ported .... The 381 day struggle which began as a hope for simple courtesy and
convenience ended as a major triumph for desegregation."
H. SITKOFF, supra, at 58.
189. See E. WOLFENSTEIN, THE VICTIMS OF-DEMOCRACY: MALCOLM X AND THE BLACK
REVOLUTION (1981).
190. Remarks of Thurgood Marshall at The Annual Seminar of the San Francisco
Patent and Trademark Association in Maui, Hawaii, May 6, 1987, at 8.
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and securing individual rights and liberties.191 On the other
hand, it cannot be disputed that individual freedom and liberty
were major themes of the American Revolution " and the Con-
stitution.' The Conventioners' appeal to ideals of "justice,"
"the blessings of liberty" and other sacred notions created a
platform upon which all who opposed slavery and other forms of
human oppression could forever stand. Though the country has
been able to avoid closing entirely the horrendous gap between
the ideals and the reality, the mere existence of the ideal pro-
duced a tension which created fertile ground for the transforma-
tion process. Certainly, the transformation was not always at-
tributable to the country's true acceptance of the ideal. At
various points in the development of the Constitution and the
society, the ideals of "equality and freedom" were given as the
reason for the change, yet a closer analysis would reveal that
other factors were the real motivation. 19' Regardless of the mo-
tive, the ideals made it more difficult to avoid the issue. The
191. See supra notes 26-47 and accompanying text.
192. See Foner, Tom Paine's Republic: Radical Ideology and Social Change, in THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION: EXPLORATION IN THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN RADICALISM (A. Yound
ed. 1976).
0! ye that love mankind. Ye that dare oppose not only tyranny but the tyrant,
stand forth. Every spot of the old world is overrun with oppression. Freedom
hath been hurled round the globe. Asia and Africa have long expelled her. Eu-
rope regards her as a stranger, and England hath given her warning to depart. 0!
receive the fugitive, and prepare in time an asylum for mankind.
Id. at 199.
193. See C. CARSON, THE REBIRTH OF LIBERTY: THE FOUNDING OF THE AMERICAN RE-
PUBLIC 1760-1800 at 85-210 (1973).
194. Two classic examples of this dynamic are the Emancipation Proclamation and
the landmark case of Brown v. Board of Education. President Lincoln clearly expressed
his motivation for signing the Emancipation Proclamation when he stated, "[m]y para-
mount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or to destroy
slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it . . . ." See
Dillard, The Emancipation Proclamation in the Perspective of Time, 23 LAW IN TRANSI-
TION 95, 97-98 (1963). Prof. Derrick Bell has strongly suggested that the Brown decision
was a product of other social forces and not a humanitarian gesture on the part of the
Court or society. He points to the following as the catalyst for Brown: (1) The country's
opposition in World War II to forces that exposed race superiority doctrines, (2) The
country's need to make friends with emerging third world nations, (3) Black men's re-
fusal to return to segregation after fighting war abroad, (4) The negative effects of segre-
gation on industrial development. See D. BELL, supra note 13, at 93. These are only two
examples where ulterior motives contributed to, if not controlled, the processes of racial
reform in this society.
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history of the "Black Struggle for Freedom in America"' 9 5 is fil-
led with eloquent and compelling appeals to the ideals which
were enshrined into the Declaration of Independence and the
Constitution. a'9 The force of this appeal along with courageous
and defiant acts of protest 97 and pressure brought about a tre-
mendous transformation in social arrangements and the
Constitution.
This transformation cannot be totally understood by exam-
ining various theories of law. Though the structure of law and
one's philosophical orientation affect development, the real
source for change lies outside of the law. The ideals which were
placed within the Constitution could not usher in the transfor-
mation. The source for the change existed within the structure
of the society and its manifestation was inevitable. This process
of transformation began long before the delegates met in Phila-
delphia in 1787. The seeds which would bring about the dra-
matic alteration in the Constitution and the society had already
been planted. They were sown when African people were
brought to the American continent against their will in violation
of the laws of nature and humanity. They were sown when Na-
tive Americans were deprived of their land and resources with-
out just compensation. Thus, the causes for the changes in the
Constitution were inherent in the broader society. Social change
theorists' 98 have long recognized the validity and breadth of this
idea.
[W]hether the system is scientific or religious, aesthetic
or philosophical, whether it is represented by a family, a
business firm, an occupational union, or a state, it bears
within itself the seeds of incessant change ... The whole
series of changes it undergoes throughout its existence is
to a large extent an unfolding of its inherent
potentialities.99
195. This is the sub-title to Vincent Harding's book, There Is a River. See V. HAR-
DING, supra note 3. He provides an excellent analysis of the struggle for freedom from
the slave trade experience to the Reconstruction era.
196. See infra note 392, and accompanying text.
197. See generally infra Part V.
198. See R. APPELBAUM, supra note 99.
199. Id. at 102 (quoting Pitirim SoroKin) (emphasis added).
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Clearly, the dominant political theories of the day greatly
influenced the Framers' construction of the Constitution and the
American form of government. Yet it was the human and social
reality which they confronted which exposed the limits and con-
tradictions in the theories. It was this same human reality which
forged new theories and gave life to the old ones. Therefore, in
order to understand Constitutional transformation, one must ex-
amine the human actors who reside inside, and especially
outside of the law. For it is their human activities, efforts, strug-
gles, weaknesses and conflicts which produce the transformation.
Assuming that the impetus for Constitutional transforma-
tion rests primarily outside the law within the broader societal
conflict, one must still discern how these changes take shape
within the law. An examination of the "Black struggle for free-
dom" reveals that these changes are shaped in various manners.
Sometimes they are the result of strategic planning, while other
times they occur through the fortuitous forces of nature. A su-
perficial analysis would reveal that the changes have taken the
shape of Constitutional amendments,0 0 congressional legisla-
tion 20 1 and landmark cases. 202 The true impact of this movement
on the Constitution was much broader and deeper than the
above. This movement not only altered the external structure of
the Constitution, but it dramatically affected the methods of ju-
dicial interpretation;10 expanded the meaning and application
of various provisions;'O altered the public's perception of the
Court;20 5 precipitated and determined important conflicts be-
tween the various branches of government; 06 created the plat-
form for the resolution of political issues of federalism and the
division of legal authority between national and state govern-
ments;20 7 greatly influenced major political decisions;208 and ulti-
mately provided a certain degree of legitimacy for the entire
200. U.S. CONST., supra note 170.
201. See Civil Rights Acts of 1860s & 1870s supra note 177.
202. See, e.g. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
203. See infra notes 209-19 and accompanying text.
204. See infra notes 227-59 and accompanying text.
205. See infra note 351.
206. See R. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL
COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866-1876, at xi (1985).
207. Id.
208. See infra notes 356-57.
1988] CONSTITUTION AND RACE
constitutional system of governance. Although the next section
of this article will explore how most of these changes have oc-
curred throughout the history of this movement, there are two
areas which deserve special attention. They are: Judicial Review
and Substantive Rights.
A. Judicial Review
In its attempt to reconcile the conflict between the Consti-
tution's ideal that African people were less than human, and the
true reality, the Court appealed to "natural rights."' 09 Though
the political and legal theories of the Framers were rooted in the
recognition that all citizens possessed certain inalienable rights
which could not be trammeled by law, "slavery challenged and"
just about "defeated the jurisprudence of natural law and
rights."21 0 However, the righteousness of the appeal for liberty
forced some courts to use this doctrine as a basis to ignore fugi-
tive slave laws,2"1 provide freedom to Africans who were en-
slaved,212 and as a weapon against the notorious slave trade.2 13
209. The theory of Natural Rights is rooted in the belief that all human beings are
entitled to certain rights and protections regardless of their status in society. These
rights do not derive from a written agreement, but are vested in the "nature of humanity
and morality." These rights are to be preserved for all individuals and governments are
not entitled to contravene them. See C. ANTIEAU, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 153-86
(1982).
210. See Murphy, The Art of Constitutional Interpretation, in ESSAYS ON THE CON-
STITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 142 (M.J. Harmon ed. 1978); for a detailed discussion of
the various cases during this period wherein the Supreme Court upheld fugitive slave
laws and other aspects of the institution of slavery, see R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTI-
SLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975). See also Prigg v. Commonwealth of Pennsyl-
vania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 345 (1842); The Antelope Case, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 302 (1825).
211. See In re Booth, 3 Wis. 1 (1854).
212. Various states in the North abolished slavery based on the principle of "Natural
Law." See D. BELL, supra note 13, at 8-10.
[S]lavery was abolished by constitutional provision in Vermont (1777), Ohio
(1802), Illinois (1818), and Indiana (1816); by judicial decision in Massachusetts
(1783); by Constitutional interpretation in New Hampshire (1857); and by grad-
ual abolition acts in Pennsylvania (1780), Rhode Island (1784), Connecticut
(1784 and 1797), New York (1799 and 1817) and New Jersey (1804).
Id. at 8; see also Somersett v. Stewart, 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B. 1772), where an English
court invoked the principle of "natural rights" to free an African who had been enslaved,
but who was brought to England where slavery had been abolished. The court held that
slavery was so odious and against the natural rights of man "that nothing can be suffered
to support it, but positive law." Id. at 510.
213. See P. FINKELMAN, supra note 109, at 211-49. Chief Justice Joseph Story ap-
pealed for an end to the slave trade by imploring America to "restore the degraded Afri-
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This theory of law, though generally ignored during this period,
was kept alive and given real content by the "freedom struggle."
The appeal and use of natural laws took on greater significance
after the passage of the fourteenth amendment. Even though the
Supreme Court rejected this idea by narrowly construing the
amendment in the Slaughter-House Cases,2"4 the dissenters
planted a strong seed for the recognition of certain "fundamen-
tal rights.12 15 This seed took root, and according to Professor
Laurence Tribe, "by the 1890's the Supreme Court was clearly
on the verge of embarking upon a full-scale substantive due pro-
cess review . ... " The fourteenth amendment, which was
clearly a result of the efforts to restore human dignity to Black
people, became the mechanism through which this doctrine was
employed. The Court's recognition of substantive due process
(natural rights), is attributable "to the jurisprudential impact of
the antislavery movement, which recognized the transcendent
importance of liberty and gave legitimacy to arguments from
moral absolutes." '217 Unfortunately, as has been the pattern of
racism in this country, the Court was more willing to apply these
moral absolutes on the behalf of Whites than Blacks.218 Despite
this limitation, judicial review was expanded tremendously, and
remains so to this day, despite strong opposition.2 9
In addition to natural rights rhetoric, and the use of sub-
stantive due process review, the method of judicial review has
can to his Natural Rights, and strike his manacles from the bloody hands of his oppres-
sors." Id. at 216-17 (emphasis added).
214. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
215. Id. According to the dissenting opinion, the privileges and immunities clause of
the fourteenth amendment should have a natural rights construction. To gain relief
under this clause from unwarranted governmental intervention was "the natural and
inalienable rights which belong to all citizens." at 83 U.S. 36, 96 (Field, J., dissenting).
This concept of natural rights has been taken on the label of "fundamental rights" in
modern judicial terminology. See C. ANTIEAU, supra note 209, at 162.
216. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW at 434 (1978.
217. Id. See Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Movement Upon Styles of Judi-
cial Reasoning in Nineteenth Century America, 87 HARV. L. REV 513. For a review of
some of the other theories concerning the causes for the development of the substantive
due process review, see, e.g., A. PAUL, THE CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW
(1969); L. BETH, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1877-1917 (1971).
218. Most of the cases cited for their use of this expansive notion of judicial review
did not involve issues of racial discrimination. For a general overview, see L. TRIBE,
supra note 216, at 427-55; see also C. ANTIEAU, supra note 209, at 160-64.
219. See infra notes 423, 428s.
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also been expanded by the Court's use of "history" and "socio-
logical jurisprudence ' '1 22 as a basis for interpreting the four-
teenth amendment and other laws. On numerous occasions the
Court has made reference to the historical forces which existed
prior to the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments in order to
construe their intent. 21 In the celebrated case of Jones v. Alfred
H. Mayer,22 the Court cited the history of the thirteenth
amendment in order to utilize it as a ban against private dis-
crimination. In the landmark case of Brown v. Board of Educ.,225
the Court based its decision on "psychological" and "sociologi-
cal" 22' data, in holding that segregation in public schools vio-
lated the Constitution. In addition to providing relief to deserv-
ing Black plaintiffs, these decisions became forceful attacks
against the "strict constructionist"225 method of judicial inter-
pretation. Even though these same devices were and can be used
to impede Black progress, their mere invocation enriched the
procedure of judicial decision-making immensely. These meth-
odologies were not confined to "race cases," but their usage
there provided them with more legitimacy because the ends
sought were generally very laudable. As these limited examples
indicate, the struggle for freedom by Black people contributed
to the alteration in the nature and structure of judicial interpre-
tation. It highlighted an aspect of law which was often ignored.
In the word of Milton Konvitz, it demonstrated that: "Law itself
220. Sociological jurisprudence is described as the "need to consider the social conse-
quences of alternative rulings open to a court, and the obligation to identify, balance and
adjust the opposed societal interest or values involved in a particular case." See C. AN-
TIEAR, supra note 209, at 198.
221. See e.g. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36. The presentation of historical data
to support various conclusions has been a hallmark of the court, especially in the area of
race relations. Justice Thurgood Marshall's opinions are renowned for their vivid
description of the historical events and conditions which affected the lives of Black peo-
ple in America. See e.g. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 387-402 (1987). On the other hand, history
has also been used to justify decisions which were very detrimental to the Black struggle
for freedom. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
222. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
223. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
224. Id. at 494.
225. Strict constructionalism is described as the belief that "when the language of a
constitution provides a clear, plain meaning which does not contradict any other provi-
sion of the organic law, or result in a ruling that is manifestly unjust or absurd, the plain
meaning of the language is to be applied and there is no room for judicial construction."
See C. ANTIEAU, supra note 209, at 3.
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is subject to moral judgment; and justice, human dignity, and
human rights are more fundamental than law." '226
B. Substantive Rights
Another point which is central to this thesis is the enormous
impact of the "freedom movement" on the expansion of rights
for all citizens.2 27 Constitutional transformation does not relate
only to the area which is traditionally labeled as "Civil
Rights,' 22 8 but involves almost every aspect of Constitutional
law.229 Blacks and other people of color raised the ante in the
game of human rights and dignity in America. The issues they
raised forced the entire country to re-examine the principles it
espoused. Through cases like NAACP v. Alabama,30 the right of
freedom of association took on "new meaning." In 1958 the Su-
preme Court held "for the first time that freedom of association
was a fundamental right to be protected against the states as a
necessary part of liberty in the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. ' 23 1 This expansion of the first amendment
by Justice Harlan not only affected constitutional practices but
also altered the Framer's original theory. When Harlan wrote
that "it is immaterial whether the beliefs sought to be advanced
by association pertain to political, economic, religious or cultural
matters,' 2 3 he was revising Locke's original understanding that
this freedom should be limited to religious associations.2 33 Cases
brought to safeguard the Black movement from governmental
attacks forced the judiciary to develop ideas and concepts which
responded to the emerging social need, even though they altered
established legal and political theories.
A case that grew out of the tragic events of the "Scottsboro
Boys" drama,"" firmly established the Constitutional right to
226. See D. DANELSKI, RIGHTS, LIBERTIES, AND IDEALS: THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF MILTON
KONVITZ (1983).
227. See Kinoy, supra note 175, at 389 n. 5.
228. Civil Rights generally refers to those rights guaranteed by the Post War Amend-
ments to the Constitution and subsequent acts of Congress.
229. See infra notes 241-59 and accompanying text.
230. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
231. See C. ANTIEAU, supra note 209, at 167.
232. D. DANELSKI, supra note 226, at 167.
233. Id.
234. The events surrounding this drama are classic examples of the existence of
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counsel. In Powell v. Alabama,35 the Court gave deeper mean-
ing to the sixth amendment by declaring that "the right to be
heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not com-
prehend the right to be heard by counsel. 23 6 Subsequent deci-
sions23 7 expanded this right by holding that it applied to an indi-
gent criminal defendant, because it provided him with a
fundamental safeguard against state invasion through the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.238 Although the
story behind the case is a human tragedy and a disturbing in-
dictment of the criminal justice system,39 the efforts of these
petitioners provided important safeguards for American citizens.
However, the liberty and dignity of Black people were again sac-
rificed in order to secure liberty and dignity for all.
Through the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment the Supreme Court methodically made certain fundamen-
tal rights specified in the Bill of Rights binding upon the
states.2" Rights which were thought to be safeguarded only from
federal intervention were now protected against state intrusion.
American citizens received a windfall of rights due to the exis-
White supremacy in the criminal justice system. Eight Black youths ranging from the
ages of thirteen to twenty were indicted for the rape of two White girls in Alabama.
Despite the weakness in the prosecution's case, including an admission by one of the
girls that the alleged acts did not occur, most of the defendants spent over thirteen years
in prison for a crime they did not commit. Their case received national and international
attention. See H. PATTERSON & E. CONRAD, SCOTTSBORO Boys (1950).
235. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
236. Id. at 68-69.
237. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
238. See Perlin, Dulling the Axe, 3 N.Y.L.ScH. HUM. RTS. ANN. 91, 140 (1985). The
continued growth of this doctrine is described in the following quote from the above
article.
Following Gideon, the Supreme Court-on various due process and equal pro-
tection theories-has expanded the indigent's rights to counsel both horizontally
(through other stages of the criminal process) and vertically (beyond mere place-
ment of a "warm body with a legal pedigree next to an indigent defendant"). A
constitutional right to counsel has thus been found to attach to misdemeanor
prosecutions where a defendant is subject to actual imprisonment, to appeals "as
to right" and at "critical stages" in the criminal prosecution. It has also been
found to apply to parole or probation revocation hearings, where needed to en-
sure "the effectiveness of the hearing rights guaranteed by due process."
Id. at 140. This is a compelling example of the impact of the "struggle for freedom" on
the substantive and procedural rights of all citizens. Powell and its progenies brought
"new meaning" to the sixth amendment.
239. See infra note 418.
240. See L. TRIBE, supra note 216, at 567-69; and C. ANTIEAU, supra note 209, at 171.
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tence of a Constitutional Amendment which was primarily en-
acted to protect the rights of African people. Professor Laurence
Tribe provides an extensive list of these rights.2 41 He states:
The due process clause has been held to protect the right
to just compensation;24 2 the first amendment freedoms of
speech,243 press,24' assembly,24 5 petition,246 free exercise
of religion, 247 and the non-establishment of religion;248
the fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable
search and seizure 24 9 and to exclude from criminal trials
evidence illegally seized; 250 the fifth amendment rights to
be free of compelled self-incrimination 251 and double
jeopardy;252 the sixth amendment right to counsel,253 to a
speedy254 and public 255 trial before a jury,2 5 6 to an oppor-
tunity to confront opposing witnesses,257 and for the pur-
pose of obtaining favorable witnesses;2 58 and the eighth
amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual
punishment.25 9
When all of the rights and the myriad advantages they pro-
vide are considered, it is clear why leading constitutional schol-
ars260 would conclude that the Black struggle for freedom has
had a "catalyzing effect" upon "the development of constitu-
tional rights and liberties applicable to all citizens-White and
241. See L. TRIBE, supra note 216, at 567-68.
242. See, e.g., Chicago Burlington and Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
243. See, e.g., Fiske v. Kan., 274 U.S. 380 (1927).
244. See, e.g., Near v. Minn., 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
245. See, e.g., De Jonge v. Or., 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
246. See, e.g., Hague v. Committee Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
247. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
248. See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
249. See Wolf v. Colo., 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
250. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
251. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
252. See Benton v. Md., 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
253. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
254. See, e.g., Klopfer v. N.C., 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
255. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
256. See Duncan v. La., 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
257. See, e.g., Pointer v. Tex., 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
258. See Wash. v. Tex., 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
259. See Robinson v. Cal., 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
260. Professors Arthur Kinoy and Derrick Bell are two leading proponents of this
idea.
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Black alike." '261 Furthermore, it should serve as an awakening
message to the present generation of lawyers that "the struggles
to eliminate the remaining pervasive influences of the institution
of human slavery are inextricably linked to the efforts to
broaden the base of constitutional liberties for all citizens, and
to defend those already achieved. 26 2
In addition to the above, this movement for Black rights
created social reforms,"8 generated other movements 26 and
changed the Constitution in form, 265 and to a certain extent in
substance, 66 into a different document than the one signed by
the Framers in 1787. Therefore, it is ludicrous for some scholars
and judges to attempt to interpret the Constitution based on the
"original intent"267 of the Framers. It's not the same document.
And the society is better today because of the transformation.
The vision of the Framers cannot be totally transported into this
age and used as the basis for solving all contemporary social
problems. The general framework they created should be
respected and adhered to until some major alteration in the
form of government occurs. However, their understanding was
quite limited268 and their vision was clearly blurred by their own
interests, prejudices2 70 and egos. 27 1 To place a fixed notion in
261. See Kinoy, supra note 175, at 389 n.6.
262. Id. (emphasis added).
263. See infra notes 400-416 and accompanying text.
264. Various social movements were inspired by the civil rights movement in general
and the specific acts of various Black individuals who attempted to secure their rights
under the Constitution. These groups include women, other people of color, the handi-
capped, prisoners, labor, veterans and farmers. As one scholar stated,
[tihe civil rights movement encouraged women, prisoners, and eventually, the
disabled to define themselves as oppressed minorities and to search for constitu-
tional, not political, grounds for winning their rights. It taught them to think of
themselves not as poor unfortunates who should be the object of paternalism,
but as competent individuals who had entitlements.
D. ROTHMAN & S. ROTHMAN, THE WILLOWBROOK WARS 51-52 (1984). These groups had a
significant impact on the transformation of the Constitution. It is not only the "river of
freedom," but the streams and tributaries that river produces that enrich the land.
265. See, e.g. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, U.S. CONST. amend.
XV. For most of the history of this country the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth
amendments were merely symbols of freedom.
266. The substantive changes began to occur in a meaningful way in Brown, and its
progenies. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 439.
267. See C. ANTIEAR, supra note 209, at 71-105.
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the Constitution is to destroy the most valuable elements the
Framers7s carved into it: flexibility and change. The following
analysis by Walter Murphy expresses this idea in a most com-pelling manner.
The American Constitution is a flexible, developing char-
ter for government that must be viewed as an organic
whole. To interpret it, a judge must... play its music as
well as recite its words.., among the Constitution's sub-
stantive values, I believe the most fundamental has be-
come human dignity. One can respond that the framers
did not see it that way.., when faced with a choice be-
tween slavery and national unity they chose the latter,
sacrificing black people's dignity. Confronting much the
same problem, Thomas Jefferson, John Marshall, and, for
a time, Abraham Lincoln each made the same choice...
Because I agree that the framers ... put national unity
ahead of the dignity of blacks (at least), I do not rest my
case on original intent, but on the internal logic of the
polity as the framers built it and as its values have devel-
oped since 1787. The preamble's goals of liberty and jus-
tice were not mere rhetorical flourishes, but meaningful
articles of hope-even faith, as William 0. Douglass
wrote-that have, albeit with painful reverses, become
more and more real over ensuing generations.2"
However, the Framer's internal logic could not have pro-
duced the constitutional changes mentioned earlier. These
changes came about through social forces2 74 and not through in-
ternal legal development.275 Law cannot change by itself. Histor-
272. They insured for flexibility by making the Supreme Court the final interpreter
of the Constitution. The process of Judicial Review creates the possibility for change,
especially when compared to a system where the legislative body which passed the act
also determine its constitutionality (e.g., South Africa).
273. See Murphy, supra note 210, at 155-56.
274. See infra Part V.
275. The idea that law is a closed system with internal logic has been embraced by
prominent legal scholars. Justice Joseph Story, the first Dean of the Harvard Law School
and Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court was one of the early proponents
of "formalism." Though this idea has been modified and severely criticized over the
years, it still remains as a fundamental jurisprudential perspective.
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ical forces and human need transform the law.2 76 The Constitu-
tion is no exception to this general maxim. The ideals which the
Framers employed, and the flexibility which they implanted into
the structure of the document are two primary factors which
kept the Constitution alive. These two forces, joined with the
humanity and humility of those who were oppressed to create a
reservoir of faith, hope and patience. This reservoir was near de-
pletion when the country finally realized it had to change or be
destroyed from within.17 7 This movement to correct the contra-
diction, which began centuries earlier, reached its apex in the
1960s, and the forces of denial had finally backed themselves
into a corner. 78 The Constitution, standing in the shadows of
this great social upheaval, could not answer the pangs and cries
of hungc -, humiliation and distress. Only could the forces of
self-reliance, determination, and God lead a people to confront
their enemy, not with weapons of steel,' 7  but with words taken
from the enemies' mouth.28 0 Though the victory was not final,
the triumph will live forever as one of the greatest movements
for social justice that this country, and maybe the world, have
ever witnessed. Through legislative281 and judicial 282 reform the
276. See Holmes, Book Review, 14 AM. L. REV. 233, 234 (1880) (reviewing C.C. LANG-
DELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1879)).
277. This statement refers to the Civil Rights/Black Power movement of the 1960s.
There was no way that the country could have halted these movements without totally
abandoning all of the principles of democracy and liberty which it had professed. The
changes that occurred were not to save Black people, but again, as in Lincoln's day, "to
save the Union."
278. The Federal government could no longer afford to support the practices of the
Southern States. President Eisenhower's intervention into the desegregation of schools
in Little Rock, Arkansas, and President Kennedy's involvement in the integration of the
Universities of Alabama and Mississippi are some classic examples of this trend. Other
issues such as Federalism, and the division of power between the state and national gov-
ernment were at the core of these disputes. The movement for freedom for Black people
in the South became the platform upon which these recurring issues would be addressed
and resolved.
279. Even the most militant Black groups and individuals did not engage in armed
struggle during this period.
280. See, Martin Luther King, Speech at the March on Washington (Aug. 28, 1963)
in F. FREEDMAN, THE BLACK AMERICAN EXPERIENCE (1970).
281. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352 § 101(a), 78 Stat. 241
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975(a)-(d), 2000(a)-(h) (1987)); Civil Rights
Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-248 § 103(c), 82 Stat. 75 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 1
§ 973(j); 3601-3619, 3631 (1987)); Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110 § 15(a)-
(h), 79 Stat. 445 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973 (1987)); Civil
Rights Act (Fair Housing Title) of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284 §§ 801-819, 901, 82 Stat. 81
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Constitution took on a new meaning.283 A meaning which had
been injected into the "veins of civilization"284 by a people who
had been despised and trampled under foot. This new meaning
of the Framers' ideals should govern the understanding and in-
terpretation of the Constitution. The Framers' definition of lib-
erty and equality are inadequate. They must be discarded if the
Constitution is going to stand the test of time. The entirety of
the meaning of the words and the purpose of the Constitution
cannot be found in the proceedings of the Constitutional Con-
vention, the Federalist papers,28 the ratifying state conventions,
nor the preamble. It must also be found in the spirit and move-
ment of an oppressed people, whose position in society make
them the best measure of the values proclaimed.
Generally, one would survey the cases, legislative acts and
political maneuvers when discussing Constitutional transform-
ation. Though great emphasis on the above elements is deserv-
ing and necessary, it would not reflect the source of the change,
but only its final encasement. It is "fitting and proper" to focus
on the individuals and movements that continuously injected a
deeper meaning into the Constitution. It is their words and ac-
tions which eventually compelled the legislative and judicial re-
forms. So praise must be given to those forgotten heroes and
heroines"8 ' who sacrificed their lives so that liberty would not
ring completely hollow in this country.
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631 (1970, Supp. 1975)); Food Stamp
Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-525 §§ 2-17, 78 Stat. 703-709 (codified as amended at 7
U.S.C. §§ 2011-2026 (1987)); Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-380, Title II, §§ 202, 222, 252, 642(b), 88 Stat. 514, 519, 587 (codified as amended at
20 U.S.C. §§ 1228, 1608, 1701 (1987)); Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub.
L. No. 92-261 §§ 9(a)-(d), 12, 86 Stat. 110, 112 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 5108,
5314-5316 (1987) [hereinafter Civil Rights Acts of 1960s].
282. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U.S.
189 (1973); Boynton v. Va. 364 U.S. 454 (1960); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth.,
365 U.S. 715 (1961); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Heart of Atlanta Motel
v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Loving v. Va. 388 U.S. 1 (1967); S. C. v. Katzen-
bach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
283. See infra notes 399-409 and accompanying text.
284. Id.
285. See FEDERALIST, supra note 36.
286. See infra notes 415-16.
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V. THE BLACK FREEDOM STRUGGLE: THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION
The real "American Revolution" '287 began when the first
Africans resisted the restrictions that American slave merchants
imposed upon their liberty and freedom on the coast of the Afri-
can continent. s8 Long before Patrick Henry made his coura-
geous cry, "Give Me Liberty or Give Me Death,' '259 Africans who
were being brought to America in chains in the holds of slave
ships exercised the latter option of Henry's declaration. 9 They
loved freedom and liberty so much that many chose to jump
overboard 91 instead of submitting to enslavement. They under-
287. The point to be made here is that the revolution of 1776 did not drastically
change the existing social order. Though it clearly defeated the ideas of "hereditary mon-
archy" and "privileged nobility" as the foundation of society, it did not alter the funda-
mental values and beliefs of the people or their institution. The greatest evidence of this
is its disregard of the rights of Black people, women and the debtor classes. Though it
proclaimed the ideals of "liberty" and "equality," it didn't usher in this reality, nor im-
plant the ideals into the social structure. The society's view on property remained con-
stant. The theories that inspired the "revolution" were not new but derived from the
tradition of England. With the exception of placing the power of government "with the
people" instead of "with the King," the "American revolution" was a mere re-affirmation
of what already existed. Furthermore, it didn't truly shift the power to the people since,
a significant number (Black people and women) were not included in the political
processes.
Other scholars have reached this same conclusion, though employing a somewhat
different method of analysis:
Not only did Locke adopt the compact theory, but he went on to portray prop-
erty as the rock on which social order was founded. Locke drew much of his
inspiration from Hooker and thus his ideas . . . were evolutionary rather than
revolutionary . . . Some writers have attributed the American Revolution to
Locke, and in a sense this is true, but in another sense the American Revolution
was not a revolution but a confirmation of an existing condition.
L. BALDWIN, supra note 34, at 3.
288. See V. HARDING, supra note 4, at 3-23.
289. See H. WIRT HENRY, supra note 67, at 266.
290. See V. HARDING, supra note 4, at 13-23.
291. A captain of a slave ship described one of these incidents in the following man-
ner, "We stood in arms, firing on the revolted slaves of whom we kill'd some and
wounded many . . . and many of the most mutinous, leapt over board, and drowned
themselves in the ocean with much resolution, showing no concern for life." See V. HAR-
DING, supra note 4, at 18 (quoting from E. DONNAN, 2 DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE O THE
SLAVE TRADE (1931)). Vincent Harding responds to the Captain's statement that the
Africans had no concern for life by stating that:
[tihose who threw themselves resolutely into the ocean in fact had great "con-
cern for life." That was why they fought so relentlessly in a seemingly hopeless
situation, driven by a vivid urgency that only those who face bondage can know.
They were incited by a wild and terrible hope which winds its way through all of
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stood the ideal of equality so well that they frequently at-
tempted to rebel against their captors in the midst of the Atlan-
tic, even though the odds were severely stacked against them. 92
This drama was an American drama. It was a resistance move-
ment that future Americans would confront for centuries. The
American captors were implanting into the land some very pow-
erful seeds; human beings who would never totally accept the
contradictions in the American creed. It was their non-accept-
ance at this early point which set in motion the dynamics which
would eventually transform the nation and its Constitution.2 93
The contradictions in the American creed were apparent at
the point when ships arrived off the coast of Africa, bearing the
names Hope,294 Liberty, Justice and Dignity,295 though they
came for no other purpose than to destroy the liberty and dig-
nity of other human beings, and dispense to them the bitter
pangs of enslavement. Africans confronted this contradiction
then as they have for generations, and this constant resistance
became America's "saving grace."'29 When asked what prompted
them to resist against such tremendous odds, one African,
speaking for a group that rebelled, stated that they "were re-
the history of our struggle against white domination. They lost the battle to live
and be rid of their captors, but they won the struggle to die and be free.
Id. This eloquently expresses the major thesis of this section of the article. The struggle
of these Africans for freedom is the greatest symbol of courage and heroism that America
has ever known. Many Whites (abolitionist and modern day liberals) have willingly
joined the "Black struggle" because they identified it as the "true" quest for freedom in
America. Only when the country fully appreciates the severity of the bondage and cap-
tivity of Africans in America can it understand how sacred liberty and freedom are to the
entire nation and the world.
292. For an excellent description of how difficult it was for Africans to overthrow
their captors while at sea, see V. HARDING, supra note 3, at 11-15.
293. See infra notes 399-409 and accompanying text.
294. This was the name of a Rhode Island-based vessel. This ship sailed during the
apex of the Independence Movement in America. See V. HARDING, supra note 3, at 22.
295. Id. at 3. Though many of these vessels were owned by Europeans, their cargo
was generally headed for the "new land"-America.
296. If for some inhuman reason Africans would have totally submitted to the op-
pression of White domination, then the country would never have willingly corrected the
inherent contradiction which existed between its claim of equality and the institution of
slavery and second class citizenship. The evidence is overwhelming, especially during the
Civil Rights Movement that America had to be forced to live up to its creed that "all
men are created equal." Without the great tradition of "Black protest" it is unlikely that
this would have occurred.
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solved to regain their liberty if possible. 2 97 The historian, Vin-
cent Harding, explains the deep human, political and legal sig-
nificance of this response:
The captives were challenging the justice, authority, and
legitimacy of their captors. Their words, which surely
represented the speeches-and the screams-of many
other men and women on those voyages, were among the
earliest forms of what we shall call the Great Tradition of
Black Protest. As such, the speakers and others like them
were the first bold face-to-face petitioners against slavery
•.. Essentially, they declared that for them this system
had absolutely no legitimacy; they persistently acted ac-
cordingly and often took the consequences. This was
black radicalism at the outset.2 8
This beginning of the Black struggle for freedom and liberty
was also the beginning of the "transformation movement" of
American law and policy. Even though the Declaration of Inde-
pendence and the Constitution would not be declared and writ-
ten for two centuries, the real struggle for freedom and equality
had already begun. When compared with the grievances of Afri-
cans who were enslaved, dehumanized and butchered, the cries
of the "founding fathers" against "taxation without representa-
tion"2 99 seem mild and superficial indeed. 00 It is within the
struggle of these Africans, against hopeless situations, that one
must look for a clear understanding of bondage and freedom.
Although their rebellions were generally quashed,3 1 they re-
297. See V. HARDING, supra note 3, at 14.
298. Id. at 14-15.
299. Otis, supra note 102.
300. Even Thomas Jefferson, someone who participated in the "American revolu-
tion," agrees with this point. See supra note 142.
301. Many of the revolts were successful, despite the tremendous odds they faced.
Harding describes a few of these instances. "[I1n 1730 the captive Africans of the Massa-
chusetts schooner William conspired together and killed almost all the crew, then made
their way back to the nearby shores." See V. HARDING, supra note 3, at 13. He continues:
On another Massachusetts ship of the same period, "the Negroes got to the powder and
Arms, and about 3 o'clock in the morning, rose upon the whites; and after wounding all
of them very much ...ran the Vessel ashore a little to the Southward of Cape Lopez
and made their escape." So too, near the end of 1732, a contemporary account reported
that a group of captives from Guinea on board a Bristol slaving ship "rose up and de-
stroyed the whole crew, cutting off the Captain's Head, Legs and Arms." Id. at 13-14.
For additional information on these revolts see Greene, Mutiny on the Slave Ship, 5
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mained resolved to gain their "liberty." "Like the independence
struggles of the American colonists-indeed; more than the
White battles in America-the issue was simply freedom."3"2
Africans resisted the inhuman and evil conditions of the
"middle passage."30 8 This despicable drama seeped into the
courtrooms as laws were eventually passed to curtail it, 30 4 and as
some judges denounced it as a "picture of human wretchedness
and human depravity, which the boldest imagination would
hardly have dared to portray." 03 Judicial pronouncements such
as these provided fuel to the abolitionist flames in the North.
Yet these African freedom fighters did not rely on the law to
liberate them, but continued to seek their liberty by coura-
geously overtaking slave ships.306 The most famous of these inci-
dents reached the American legal system in The Amistad °7
wherein the Court determined that the Africans who had seized
a Spanish vessel that ended up off the coast of Long Island, were
"free," and should be "dismissed from the custody of the Court
... .,"0 This case which was persuasively argued by John
Quincy Adams on behalf of the Africans, "brought to the United
States living proof of the horrors of the African slave trade. '3 09
The African resistance movement continued on the shores
of America, despite the complete domination which the institu-
tion of slavery imposed upon their lives. There were numerous
instances where Africans fought against the institution of slav-
ery before the Constitution was written. 10 The Stono Rebel-
PHYLON 346 (1944); Wax, Negro Resistance To The Early American Slave Trade, 51 J.
NEGRO HIST. 1 (1966).
302. See V. HARDING, supra note 4, at 22.
303. For a description of the horrors of the middle passage, see supra note 109.
304. See W.EB. DuBois, supra note 51, at 230-88.
305. Chief Justice Joseph Story's instruction to the Grand Jury in 1819. See P.
FINKELMAN, supra note 109, at 216.
306. See V. HARDING, supra note 3, at 13-17, for a description of the various rebel-
lions at sea.
307. 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 518 (1841).
308. Id. at 597.
309. See P. FINKELMAN, supra note 109, at 228.
310. There is evidence that at least 25 insurrections occurred before the Constitution
was adopted. For an excellent discussion of many of these rebellions, see V. HARDING,
supra note 3, at 24-51. The following statement by two Black petitioners who were held
as slaves in Connecticut in 1779 expresses the deep commitment and appreciation that
Africans possessed for liberty and equality.
Reason and Revelation join to declare that we are the creatures of that God, who
[Vol. V
1988] CONSTITUTION AND RACE
lion 11 of 1739 in South Carolina was one of the most famous of
this period. Twenty miles outside of Charleston an enslaved Af-
rican by the name of Jemmy led about twenty other Africans in
an attack against their master." After having acquired arms
and ammunition they methodically executed everyone who came
within their reach as they marched "like a disciplined com-
pany"3 13 to the beat of drums. It was reported that as they
marched "they called out liberty. 3 14 Historian Vincent Harding
again described the significance of their action. He stated:
In the annals of our struggle for freedom in America, this
tradition of black men marching flamboyantly in military
formation is persistently repeated ... at Stono and else-
where it was more likely a radical statement of identity, a
message of self-possession, for what was ultimately at
work was a movement toward self-transformation. A
group of Black people whom the White world had identi-
fied as slaves chose to organize and see themselves as
soldiers of liberty, crusaders for freedom. Living under
the White man's menace, but no longer in his time, they
made of one Blood, and kindred, all the nations of the Earth; we perceive by our
own Reflection, that we are endowed with the same Faculties with our masters,
and there is nothing that leads us to a Belief, or Suspicion, that we are any more
obliged to serve them, than they us, and the more we Consider of this matter,
the more we are Convinced of our Right . . . to be free . . . and can never be
convinced that we were made to be Slaves.
Id. at 24. It is interesting to compare the previous statement with the following quote
from the trial judge in the famous decision in Loving v. Va. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). In uphold-
ing Virginia's ban against interracial marriages the lower Court stated;
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and placed
them on separate continents. And but for the interference with His arrangement
there would be no cause for such marriages. The fact that he separated the
races, shows that He did not intend for the races to mix.
388 U.S. at 3. (This holding was subsequently reversed by the Supreme Court). Both
individuals are appealing to a higher authority to support their position on race relations
in this country. The Black petitioner in 1779 was using God as the rationale for destroy-
ing the system of slavery and White domination, whereas the White Judge in 1967 was
using God as the rationale for upholding the system of White domination. It is clear that
the Black petitioner, in his captive state had a deeper and more pressing understanding
of the ideals of liberty and equality than the judge who was trained in the American legal
system.
311. See V. HARDING, supra note 3, at 34.
312. Id.
313. Id. (quoting an observer of the revolt.)
314. Id.
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had declared their own small but significant revolution-
ary war. 15
The resistance movement did not always take the form of
organized rebellions as in Stono. Africans consistently sought
their freedom and liberty through numerous individual acts.
They poisoned plantation owners; s16 burned buildings; 17 es-
caped through various means; s refused to work or cooperate
with overseers;"1 9 and conducted an extensive underground com-
munity of "outlyers."' 0 Though many paid dearly 2 ' for these
rebellious acts, no punishment could deter the quest for free-
dom. Collectively these acts continued to undermine the im-
moral system of slavery. They forced some of the colonies to im-
pose more restrictive and inhumane legislation,' which
315. Id. at 34-35.
316. Id. at 38.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 37-38. One astounding example of the determination of African people to
acquire their freedom is found in the life of a man named Ceasar who was enslaved in
New England. It has been reported that Ceasar, who lost both of his legs, managed to
escape and join with a group of fellow runaways in 1769. Id. at 40.
319. Id. at 38.
320. Id. at 30, 39-40, 48-49, 72-73, 81, 196-97. These were organized groups of individ-
uals who escaped from slavery and formed "communities" outside the reach of the slave
system. These bands of men and women would serve as a base for others who were seek-
ing freedom from slavery. The "outlyers" would secure food and other essentials by raid-
ing plantations at night. They also made frequent visits to those who were still in bond-
age, either to help them escape or to provide information about the "freedom
movement." The "outlyers" were a constant threat and menace to the system of slavery.
They sent a strong message to others that one could defy white domination and survive.
These groups were often well organized and armed; their presence was a permanent fix-
ture on the landscape of slavery. Vincent Harding describes their importance in the fol-
lowing manner. "Throughout the history of slavery, their existence and widespread activ-
ities demonstrated the willingness of relatively large numbers of black men and women
to live outside the nets of white law and order .... [T]heir very existence was an act of
radical disobedience." Id. at 39.
321. Id. at 39. An exhaustive analysis of the various laws developed to deal with
"runaways and rebels" is found in L. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 57. After analyzing the
laws in South Carolina which were intended to deter and stop those who sought freedom
from slavery, Judge Higginbotham concludes:
One must be mindful that these statutes directing the branding, mutilation, am-
putation, and killing of blacks were imposed by whites under English law, a legal
process supposedly notable for its sensitivity to the rights of mankind. But to
the extent that this sensitivity existed it was for whites alone; the most brutal




eventually brought about more public condemnation of the en-
tire institution. The greatest legal legacy of these defiant acts
was the incorporation of a Fugitive Slave provision into the
United States Constitution. 23 This provision and similar legisla-
tive enactments 324 were a direct result of African people's refusal
to submit to the illegitimate domination of white people. In ad-
dition, the resistance movement led to the passage of various
anti-slave-trade statutes in northern states. 2 5 These individual
and collective human acts precipitated positive and negative
changes in American law. Despite these numerous regulations,
Africans continued to seek their freedom. Since those who re-
sided in southern states, and most in the North, could not find
sanctuary in the courts, or through law in general, they sought
their liberty "by any means necessary. )326
The dawn of the revolutionary era in America and the ap-
peal to morals of "the equality of man" made it clear to some
Africans that a free America included them.3 27 Therefore, many
323. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
324. The first fugitive slave law was passed by Congress in 1793, and was upheld by
the United States Supreme Court in Prigg v. Pa., 41 U.S. 345. See also Fugitive Slave
Act, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462 (1850) (repealed, ch. 165, 13 Stat. 200 (1864)).
325. See, e.g., Connecticut (1769). The preamble to the act stated: "Whereas the in-
crease of slaves is injurious to the poor, and inconvenient thereof. ... ; Delaware
(1776); Rhode Island (1774); see W.E.B. DuBois, supra note 51, at 201-24 for an
extensive listing of all acts by the colonies in relation to the
Slave Trade.
326. This statement was popularized by Malcolm X, a latter day American revolu-
tionary, in the 1960s. His analysis was rooted in the tradition of the early freedom fight-
ers during this period of American slavery. He often referred to this era as he attempted
to reawaken the militant aspects of the resistance movement. See MALCOLM X, By ANY
MEANS NECESSARY (G. Breitman ed. 1970).
327. Declarations made by the leaders of the American revolution raised the expecta-
tion of Africans that the slave trade and slavery would end if the colonists won their
freedom. The following quote is indicative of this revolutionary rhetoric. During the first
Continental Congress in 1774 it was proclaimed that,
we will neither import nor purchase any slave imported after the first day of
December next, after which time we will wholly discontinue the slave trade and
will neither be concerned in it ourselves nor will we hire our vessels nor sell our
commodities or manufacture to those who are concerned in it.
See J. H. CLARKE & V. HARDING, SLAVE TRADE AND SLAVERY 58 (1970). This promise, like
so many others, was not kept. Even Thomas Jefferson in his first draft of the Declaration
of Independence included an indictment against the King of England for his authoriza-
tion and support of the European Slave Trade. However, this statement was deleted
from the final draft of the document, due to pressure from Southern delegates at the
Convention. This was another example of the "involuntary sacrifice" of the rights and
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participated in the Revolution and fought valiantly against Eng-
land. 28 However, they were unable to benefit from these decla-
rations of equality when the Framers met in Philadelphia in
1787."29 Even though the Constitution declared that Africans
humanity of African people in order to secure the resolution of conflict between compet-
ing whites.
On a local level various colonies were taking a stand against the importation of Afri-
cans as slaves. Massachusetts passed anti-slave-trade legislation in 1771 and 1774, but
the royal governor would not allow them to be enacted. Rhode Island and Connecticut
passed laws which placed a tremendous obstacle to the slave trade by "stipulating that
any slave brought within her boundaries would immediately become free." See B.
QUARLES, THE NEGRO IN THE MAKING OF AMERICA 44 (1964). Pennsylvania levied a stiff
tax on each imported African, and even some of the Southern colonies (Virginia (1774),
North Carolina (1774), Georgia (1775)) passed restrictive measures. Id. For an exhaustive
list of the various measures of the Colonies in regards to the importation of Africans, see,
W.E.B. DuBois, supra note 51, at 201-29. An interesting point about many of these mea-
sures is that they were passed to 1) avoid the possibility of slaves measures is that they
were get back at the Mother country for passing objectionable laws. See B. QUARLES, id.
at 44. Therefore, the existence of the history of Black resistance and its commitment to
the ideals of freedom and liberty was initiating a "transformation" in American law.
The revolutionary spirit that engulfed the colony also increased the quest for free-
dom on the part of Blacks. "The slogans of liberty that became fashionable on the eve of
the Revolution had their effect on the slaves, particularly in New England, where they
made use of two techniques, freedom suits and petitions." Id. at 44-45.
328. The Revolutionary spirit of the time encouraged many Africans to fight for their
freedom as the colonists fought for theirs. This point has been documented in various
sources. See V. HARDING, supra note 3, at 42; see also B. QUARLES, supra note 327, at 46-
47. Yet many knew that their freedom was not intricately interwoven with that of the
colonist, so they chose to join armed bands of Blacks who were fighting for their own
independence against their white captors. Both types of "resistors" are captured in the
following quote by Harding: There were, of course, thousands of black men who consid-
ered service in the Revolutionary armies as a possible path to their own freedom and,
eventually, to the freedom of their people. But it was not until the British colonial gover-
nors-especially Virginia's royal governor, Lord Dunmore-began appealing for black
support, that George Washington and other American leaders saw fit to permit blacks
officially to enlist. Even then, there were fewer blacks fighting for white American Inde-
pendence than were engaged in the large, unorganized, fugitive army in flight toward
their own independence. See V. HARDING, supra note 3, at 41-42.
329. The Framers of the Constitution not only failed to remember the valiant acts of
those Blacks who helped them win their freedom, but they also ensured that the institu-
tion of slavery and the importation of Africans as slaves remained unaltered. The Ameri-
can Revolution did not destroy the slave trade. To the contrary, the frequency and vol-
ume of the trade increased after the Revolution. The following letter from a British
governor in Sierra Leone to an American abolitionist confirms this point. He wrote in
1796 that:
You will be sorry to learn that during the last year, the number of American
slave traders on the coast has increased to an unprecedented degree. Were it not
for their pertinacious adherence to that abominable traffic, it would in conse-
quence of the war, have been almost wholly abolished in our neighborhood.
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were chattel"' and that their liberty and freedom could be re-
stricted, 31 the Africans did not accept this antiquated notion of
equality. Nat Turner, 32 Denmark Vesey,333 Gabriel Prosser, 34
See V. HARDING, supra note 3, at 46 (quoting from E. DONNAN, 3 DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRA-
TIVE OF THE SLAVE TRADE IN AMERICA (1935; rpt. 1965)).
330. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. See discussion of 3/5th compromise, supra note 56.
331. U.S. CONST. art. 4, § 2, cl. 3. See discussion, supra note 57.
332. Nat Turner was the leader of the most famous revolt by Africans against the
institution of slavery. The revolt occurred on August 21, 1831 in Southampton County,
Virginia. It is estimated that seventy Africans were involved in this revolutionary act and
that fifty-nine whites were killed. Turner escaped and stayed at large for over two
months, hiding during the day and coming out at night to acquire water and food. His
"escape" sent terror through the South, as many suspected that a full scale revolution
was afoot. Turner was eventually caught and his confession remains as a lasting testa-
ment to his vision, courage and determination. The following excerpt is indicative of the
spiritual aspect of his struggle.
I heard a loud noise in the heavens, and the spirit instantly appeared to me and
said the serpent was loosened, and Christ had laid down the yoke he had borne
for the sins of men, and that I should take it on and fight against the serpent, for
the time was fast approaching when the first should be last and the last should
be first. And by signs in the heavens that it would make known to me when I
should commence the great work; and until the first sign appeared, I should con-
ceal it from the knowledge of men. And on the appearance of the sign, (the
eclipse of the sun last February) I should arise and prepare myself, and slay my
enemies with their own weapons.
See F. FREEDMAN, supra note 280, at 78.
333. Denmark Vesey was one of the wealthiest Black men in Charleston, South Caro-
lina, and purchased his own freedom in 1800. He 'became a skilled carpenter and leader
of the African Church, and planned one of the most intricate revolts to free Africans
from slavery in America. The plan involved a Black takeover of Charleston, for the sec-
ond week of July, 1822. Vesey, through his intelligent and powerful leadership ability,
recruited free Africans and those enslaved to be part of this massive insurrection. The
plan was spoiled when a potential recruit exposed the plans to a plantation owner. De-
spite his arrest and conviction, Vesey died a gallant and courageous man in the cause of
Black freedom. The Magistrate at his trial could not understand why a person in Vesey's
position would attempt this type of act. He stated: "It is difficult to imagine what in
fatuation could have prompted you to attempt an enterprise so wild and missionary. You
were a free man; were comparatively wealthy; and enjoyed every comfort, compatible
with your situation. You had, therefore, much to risk and little to gain."
See J. 0. KILLENS, THE TRIAL RECORD OF DENMARK VESEY 135-36 (1970). Contrary to the
Magistrate's understanding, Vesey had a "lot to gain." The liberty and freedom of his
people were at stake. He was willing to pay the highest price possible to secure "the
blessings of liberty;" not so much for himself but for his people who were still in bond-
age. Vesey's vision of liberty equals, if not exceeds, that of the "founding fathers."
334. Gabriel Prosser was the leader of one of the largest conspiracies to overthrow
slavery during this period. In the spring of 1800 in the area surrounding Richmond, Vir-
ginia, Prosser and his two brothers began organizing a resistance movement which in-
volved over a thousand individuals. The plan called for several hundred men to attack
Richmond; capture necessary arms; create civil unrest; and take the Governor as a hos-
tage. Some accounts indicate that Prosser's eventual aim was "to subdue the whole of
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Sojourner Truth,"'5 Harriet Tubman33 and countless others 3 7
were committed to injecting a new meaning into the Constitu-
tion and the society. They courageously continued and con-
ducted the real American Revolution. They refused to accept
this country's attempt to create two classes of human beings.
This did not coincide with their intuitive understanding of life
and liberty. Without the support of foreign governments 338 and
the country where slavery was permitted . See V. HARDING, supra note 3, at 56. The
motto of the group that Prosser organized was "Death or Liberty." Id. at 46. An unex-
pected and unprecedented rain storm, coupled with a few informants, prevented the con-
spiracy from taking place. The discovery of it sent shock waves throughout Virginia and
other parts of the South. The Governor of Virginia believed that the plot "embraced
most of the slaves in this city and neighborhood .... there was good cause to believe that
the knowledge of such a project pervaded other parts, if not the whole state." Quoted in
W. CHEEKS, BLACK RESISTANCE BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 111 (1970). See also V. HARDING,
supra note 3, at 57. The real effect of this conspiracy was the message it sent to whites in
Virginia and throughout the South, that Black people would never totally submit to
white domination. Whites would always have to worry about the "next insurrection" and
prepare accordingly. The Governor of Virginia expressed this view after Prosser's death.
"Unhappily, while this clas[] of people exist among us we can never count with certainty
on its tranquil submission." Id. at 57.
335. Sojourner Truth was one of the most influential and famous abolitionists during
this period. She was also an important stateswoman and adviser to an American Presi-
dent. After having escaped from slavery, she traveled to the North (particularly New
England), where she spoke out and fought vigorously against the institution. Her
speeches fueled the flames of abolitionist fervor. She also worked diligently to enforce
the desegregation of public transportation facilities in the North, and was very dedicated
to improving the lives of Black people after the Civil War. See J. NOBLE, BEAUTIFUL,
ALSO, ARE THE SOULS OF MY BLACK SISTERS: A HISTORY OF THE BLACK WOMAN IN AMERICA
(1978); V. ORTIZ, SOJOURNER TRUTH, A SELF-MADE WOMAN (1974).
336. Harriet Tubman was the conductor of the "underground railroad." She escaped
from slavery,but returned to liberate those whom she left behind. It was estimated that
she liberated over three hundred African people from slavery. She accomplished this
enormous task, generally by herself (with some aid from sympathizers who were scat-
tered along the way), and "never lost a passenger" throughout her attempts. She was
secretly conducting a major portion of the American Revolution. She once stated:
I grew up like a neglected weed-ignored of liberty, having no experience of it..
• I was not happy or contented ... everytime I saw a white man I was afraid of
being carried away. I have seen hundreds of escaped slaves, but I never saw one
who was willing to go back and be a slave. I think slavery is the next thing to
Hell ....
See D. STERLING, FREEDOM TRAIN: THE STORY OF HARRIET TUBMAN 124 (1954).
337. During the period of American slavery it has been estimated that there were
over a hundred recorded slave revolts. This is probably a conservative number since
many of these incidents were not recorded, and many others never reached the point
were the plantation owners would classify it as a revolt. In addition, this number clearly
does not include all the individual defiant acts which challenged the system of slavery.
338. Various foreign governments helped to finance the American Revolution. At the
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wealthy financiers, a3 9 they struck a blow for democracy and con-
stitutional reform. They put needed pressure on the institution
of slavery, and highlighted the glaring contradictions between
the reality and the ideal.
The magnitudes40 and potential upheaval of the conspiracy
to take over Charleston, South Carolina led by Denmark Vesey
had a tremendous impact on the development of American law.
First, it led to the passage of the "Negro Seaman Act"3 ' which
restricted the importation of free Blacks into South Carolina by
declaring that they would be "taken as absolute slaves. 3 4 2 It
was thought that free Black seamen were responsible for inspir-
ing Vesey's conspiracy. 43 This act was later held unconstitu-
tional by the United States Supreme Court in Elkinson v. De-
liesse line. " ' This was one of the earliest instances where the
Court upheld the rights of Black people because a state law in-
end of the war, the new republic owed about ten million dollars to foreign investors. See
T. DYE & L. H. ZEIGLER, supra note 26, at 30.
339. Robert Morris, one of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention, was one of
the richest men in America and had invested greatly in the revolutionary effort. He was
often referred to as "the patriot financier," because he underwrote a large share of the
debt of the United States during and after the Revolutionary War. See T. DYE & L.H.
ZEIGLER, supra note 26, at 37.
340. It has been estimated that Denmark Vesey and his co-conspirators recruited
over nine thousand Africans to participate in his rebellion against the citizens of Charles-
ton. He organized them into various cells, and no one knew anyone outside of their cell
except the leaders of the conspiracy. Vesey planned for six simultaneous attacks on the
city, and recruited some of the "most trusted" persons of the white plantation owners.
He gained access to the store that sold guns and ammunition, and to the stable where
the horses were kept. See P. FINKELMAN, supra note 109, at 204.
341. South Carolina, in December 1822, passed "an Act for the better regulation and
government of free negroes and persons of colour, and for other purposes." No. 2277, 7
Stat. S.C. 461 (1822). The act regulated the ingress of free Black seamen to the state by
requiring them to be, "seized and confined in gaol until such vessel shall clear out and
depart from this state . . .". See P. FINKELMAN, supra note 109, at 256. To make matters
worse the captain of the vessel who brought the sailors into port was required to pay for
their incarceration or be fined. If a sailor was left in the state after the ship departed he
would automatically become a "slave absolute." Id.
342. P. FINKELMAN, supra note 109, at 256.
343. This concern was misplaced since Vesey was inspired by forces beyond those of
"free seamen." Even though he was at one time a sailor and traveled throughout the
Caribbean and Africa, Vesey felt that his mission in life was to liberate his "bretheren."
See V. HARDING, supra note 3, at 66. He planned his first insurrection in 1817 while
heading an all-black church in Charleston. His plan was disrupted when whites forced
the church to disband. However, by 1821, a new church was organized and See P.
FINKELMAN, supra note 109, at 202.
344. 8 F. Cas. 493 (C.C.D.S.C. 1823) (No. 4366).
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terfered with the commerce clause. 5  Secondly, the plot led
many South Carolinians to believe that there was a general con-
spiracy to overturn the system of slavery throughout the South.
Many of them also believed that northern states, especially abo-
litionists, were responsible for initiating this social revolution.3"
One historian concluded that, "the discovery of Vesey's planned
rebellion also led to a polarization of the North and the South.
In the years after the Vesey plot, South Carolina would lead the
South on the road from nullification to secession. ''47 Thus, this
courageous and brilliantly designed quest for freedom was in
part the impetus for the Civil War, which eventually ushered in
a new era in Constitutional law and policy.
During this era, the courtroom also became a major arena
for the advancement of liberty, and indirectly precipitated an
eventual change in the structure of society. The infamous Dred
Scott34 ' decision of Chief Justice Taney contributed to the
forces for social change. By declaring that Blacks could not be-
come citizens of the United States,3 49 becabdse they had "no
rights which white men were bound to respect,"3 50 Chief Justice
Taney brought tremendous criticism upon the Court; 5' fueled
345. Id. This is one of the earliest recorded cases wherein the Court used the com-
merce clause so that it protected the rights of Black individuals. However, the federal
government's involvement in the case was due to its fear that the act would create havoc
in interstate commerce and would possibly lead to international conflict with England
and other countries that employed Black seamen. See P. FINKELMAN, supra note 109, at
256. In modern congressional initiatives, the commerce clause has been used as a basis
for various Civil Rights statutes. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,
379 U.S. 241 (1964). This avenue was chosen in part because the Supreme Court re-
stricted the powers of the fourteenth amendment to provide relief and protection to
Black citizens. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
346. They were wrong on this point. See supra discussion at note 343.
347. See P. FINKELMAN, supra note 109, at 203 (emphasis added).
348. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393.
349. In Dred Scott v. Sandford, Judge Taney wrote that it "[is very clear, therefore,
that no State can, by any act or law of its own, passed since the adoption of the Consti-
tution, introduce a new member into the political community created by the Constitu-
tion of the United States." Id. at 407. Therefore only the federal government was em-
powered to bestow this right upon a person. After an extensive analysis of existing laws,
customs and attitudes at the time of the Constitution's formation, Chief Justice Taney
concluded that the Framers did not intend to include people of African descent as mem-
bers of the political community.
350. Id. at 407.
351. See C. SwisHER, supra note 83, at 631-52. The author also cited the N.Y. Trib-
une, Mar. 7, 1857, at 5 col. 2, which read, "If epithets and denunciation could sink a
judicial body, the Supreme Court of the United States would never be heard of again...
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public opinion against slavery;352 and created a platform for the
election of a President who would later sign the Emancipation
Proclamation.53 Carl B. Swisher, in Volume V of the definitive
historical record of the United States Supreme Court,3 54 con-
firmed this last point. He stated:
Lincoln failed to oust Douglass as United States Senator,
but the Lincoln-Douglass debates, with the Dred Scott
decision at their core, led to his nomination and election
as President in 1860, and thereby precipitated the Civil
War. In that sense, at least, the Dred Scott decision
played its part in ...... "the irrepressible conflict. 3 55
A few state courts began to contravene the decisions of the
United States Supreme Court during this era. Following the cou-
rageous act of a white Wisconsin citizen 35  to free an African
Justice Taney's opinion was long, elaborate, able and Jesuitical. His arguments were
based on gross historical falsehoods and bold assumptions, and went the whole length of
the extreme Southern doctrine." Id. at 633. Three days later, on March 10, 1857, the
same newspaper declared, "Alas! that the character of the Supreme Court of the United
States, as an impartial judicial body, has gone! It has abdicated its just functions and
descended into the political arena. It has sullied its ermine; it has dragged and polluted
its garments in the filth of Pro-Slavery politics .... Id., Mar. 10, 1857, at 5, col.6.
352. Many people in the North were outraged with the decision by Justice Taney.
The flames were fueled even higher when Justice Curtis released his dissenting opinion
to the press which revealed tremendous factual errors in the majority opinion. The news-
papers were filled with criticisms of Taney and his reasoning. See N.Y. Tribune, Mar. 7,
1857, as cited in C. SWISHER, supra note 84, at 633-34. "[The] Court, instead of planting
itself upon the immutable principles of justice and righteousness, has chosen to go upon
a temporary and decaying foundation .... " Carl Swisher stated that, "when the Su-
preme Court became anathema to growing numbers of people in the North because of a
proslavery decision, the South, however great its own reverence for the Court ... could
no longer count on effective judicial protection." Id. at 650. Not only did the decision
make the North more upset with slavery, but it also made the South more unsure about
the Union.
353. The Dred Scott decision entered the political debate arena when Stephen A.
Douglass, a Senator from Illinois, running for re-election, endorsed the decision in a
speech given in Springfield, Illinois on June 12, 1857. Abraham Lincoln, a candidate for
Douglass' seat, challenged his position on the Dred Scott decision. This issue became the
core of the famous debates between Douglass and Lincoln.
354. See C. SWISHER, supra note 83, at 646-50.
355. Id. at 650 (emphasis added).
356. A Black man by the name of Joshua Glover escaped from slavery in Missouri
and went to Wisconsin were he established himself as a "faithful laborer and an honest
man." His former enslaver came to his house with two United States Deputy Marshals.
After an attempted escape, Joshua was placed under arrest in Milwaukee. Sherman
Booth, a local abolitionist and editor of the Milwaukee Free Democrat, began to rally the
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who had escaped from slavery, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in
In re Booth, "nullified" the Fugitive Slave Law by holding that
it was an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty without due
process. 357 Though the United States Supreme Court35 eventu-
ally overturned the Wisconsin decision, the flames of public re-
sentment to these laws were already fueled.3 59 More importantly,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court decision was strong evidence that
the American legal system was reaching a stage where, "the rule
of law was to give way to the enforcement of sentiments, not
yet embodied in law."3 60
One of the most eloquent spokespersons for freedom during
this era was David Walker. In his famous Appeal of 1829 he
stated:
I speak Americans for your good. We must and shall be
free... in spite of you. You may do your best to keep us
in wretchedness and misery, to enrich you and your chil-
dren, but God will deliver us from under you. And woe,
woe, will be to you if we have to obtain our freedom by
fighting. 61
local townspeople in Joshua's defense. On the evening of March 10, 1854, a huge crowd,
led by Booth, broke into the jail, rescued Joshua Glover and placed him on a ship for
Canada. Five days later Booth was arrested along with some of the other leaders of the
group, and charged with aiding in "the escape of a fugitive slave." Booth eventually ap-
plied to Associate Justice Abram D. Smith of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin for a writ
of habeas corpus, asking for release on the ground of the unconstitutionality of the Fugi-
tive Slave Law. On June 7, 1854, Justice Smith ordered Booth's release. Federal authori-
ties took the case to the full Supreme Court of Wisconsin on writ of certiorari. The
Supreme Court of Wisconsin unanimously upheld Justice Smith's opinion. Id. at 653-57.
357. See In re Booth, 3 Wis. 1, 48 (1854)
358. See Abelman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 169 (1859).
359. See C. SWISHER, supra note 83, at 665-69. The same newspaper that attacked the
Dred Scott decision also attacked Booth as another political document emanating from
the Judicial branch. The N.Y. Tribune on Apr. 1, 1859, at 4, col. 3, stated that the Booth
case was "destined to become quite as famous as the Dred Scott case, and forming a part
of the same system of usurpation tending to the concentration of all power in the Fed-
eral Judiciary." Id. at 665. Furthermore, the Wisconsin legislature passed a resolution
condemning the United States Supreme Court's decision as a denial of liberty. The reso-
lution was signed by the Governor. Id. at 668. Booth, though eventually arrested after
the Court's decision, was able to avoid imprisonment for a long time due to the public
sentiment in favor of his actions. He was eventually pardoned by President Buchanan in
1860. Id. 671-72.
360. Id. at 675 (emphasis added).
361. See V. HARDING, supra note 3, at 75. David Walker was an organizer and spokes-
person for a black abolitionist organization in Massachusetts, and the Boston agent for
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This revolutionary voice was appealing to the American creed
for justice. He was sounding a consistent theme of protest and
victory, urging America to transform itself. Yet Walker, like
other revolutionaries of this era, knew that the source for this
change rested inevitably with those who were victimized "under
color of law." Thus, he hoped that the appeal would "awaken in
the breasts of my afflicted, degraded and slumbering brethren, a
spirit of inquiry and investigation respecting our miseries and
wretchedness in this Republican Land of Liberty. 36 2 Exposing
the contradictions, raising the consciousness of the oppressed
and the oppressor, continuing the flow of the river that leads to
freedom, was the legacy of Walker and the other American
revolutionaries.
During the Civil War and Reconstruction era, the source of
the "transformation movement" shifted to the battlefield,36 3 the
White House36 4 and the Congress.3 6 5 This period marked the
the first Black newspaper in America, The Freedom's Journal, which began its publica-
tion in 1827. Walker's appeal is the most famous and eloquent uncompromising critique
of slavery and the Black quest for freedom. Id. at 82.
362. Id. at 86.
363. One of the major issues, if not the major issue of the Civil War, was the issue of
slavery. Clearly the rhetoric of Lincoln demonstrates that there were issues other than
the humanity of Black people at stake during this dispute. The power of the federal
government versus the state's ability to control its own destiny was clearly at stake. The
equality of Black people was not the issue for the North. Slavery no longer served any
viable purpose for them. The possibility of slave revolts and the mere presence of Black
people within the republic created numerous discomforts. Lincoln, in explaining the real
issue stated: "The sooner national authority can be restored, the nearer the Union will
be 'the Union as it was.' If there be those who would not save the Union unless they
could at the same time save slavery, I do not agree with them." See D. BELL, supra note
13, at 4. Despite these motivations, Lincoln, along with those who were involved in this
tremendous struggle, were attempting to correct the contradictions that the Framers im-
planted into the Constitution. They were forced to resolve this contradiction in great
part because Black people, regardless of the forces released against them, would not sub-
mit to the contradiction. Their efforts, and those of courageous abolitionists, created a
situation where military intervention was necessary in order to secure the basic rights of
humanity for Black People.
364. The Emancipation Proclamation was issued by President Abraham Lincoln on
January 1, 1863. 12 Stat. 1268-1269. This Executive order emancipated "all persons held
as slaves within any State . . .the people whereof then shall be in rebellion against the
United States ...." Although limited in its breadth, this was an important catalyst for
the culmination of the Civil War and the recognition of Black people as free human
beings.
365. During this period three amendments were passed by Congress and ratified by
the states which had a tremendous impact on the legal status of Black people in
America, and eventually on the entire constitutional structure. The thirteenth amend-
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cleansing of the Constitution of overt racial oppression. The
Emancipation Proclamation and the Post War Amendments, de-
spite their limitations, 66 signaled a significant transformation in
American life and law. Unfortunately, the vision and platform of
various advocates for justice were not incorporated into the final
solution.3 67 Though Blacks again fought for freedom and dignity,
they ended up with moderate and temporary changes. 6 8 How-
ever, the greatest change occurred in the form of the law. The
Framers' original vision was finally rejected, and the Constitu-
tion's general framework was expanded. The Black struggle for
freedom and equal treatment resulted in the passage of the four-
teenth amendment which changed the nature of Supreme Court
decisions and provided tremendous protection for American citi-
zens and corporations. 69
In the years following Reconstruction, Blacks took their
protest to the Court, attempting to enforce the new promises of
equality which were ushered in by the war. Unfortunately, many
received the same response as before.3 70 These petitioners, de-
ment which abolished slavery and involuntary servitude was enacted in 1865. The four-
teenth amendment which was intended to provide the rights of citizenship to those re-
cently released from slavery was enacted in 1868. The fifteenth amendment which
promised protection against any infringement of the right to vote was enacted in 1870.
For a list of the various legislative enactments pursuant to these amendments, see Civil
Rights Acts of 1860s & 1870s, supra note 177.
366. The Emancipation Proclamation had very little legal effect since it only applied
to those "states that were in rebellion," which had already seceded from the Union and
therefore were not under the legal authority of the President or his orders. The Post War
Amendments were generally very broad in their pronouncement and did not provide spe-
cific protection to Black people, nor provide any compensation for the horrendous injus-
tices that had been inflicted "under color of law."
367. Radical Republicans, as they were called, proposed to the Congress that Black
people should be compensated for the injustices that were inflicted upon them. Thadeus
Stevens, one of the leading proponents of this position, felt that political rights without
economic rights would be meaningless to Black people recently out of bondage. This
proposal was not accepted and the legacy of that decision still remains today. See D.
BELL, supra note 13, at 34.
368. Reconstruction brought some political, economic and educational gains to Black
people. See D. BELL, supra note 13, at 179. Unfortunately because the Court, Congress
and the Executive branch refused to ensure and protect these advances they were soon
destroyed and slavery in substance, if not in form, returned to the American landscape.
See also supra note 178-83 and accompanying text.
369. See, e.g., Santa Clara County v. S. Pac. R.R. (Co.), 118 U.S 394 (1886); Allgeyer
v. La., 165 U.S. 578 (1897); Lochner v. N.Y., 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
370. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). A statement in that case reflected
the Court's general attitude toward the plight of the recently emancipated Africans. In
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spite their losses, were instrumental in changing the Constitu-
tion .37 The Supreme Court was forced to grapple with difficult
questions which they would have preferred avoiding. The suc-
cessful petitioners37 2 clearly advanced the cause of human free-
dom by carving out different areas in this country's structure
where all human beings would be respected before the law.3 73
The Court was able in Plessy v. Ferguson374 to "postpone judg-
ment ' 3 " on many of the vital issues to another generation. 6
But in their sleight-of-hand maneuvering they exposed even
more the hypocrisy and contradictions within the American
creed. 3" These petitioners must be memorialized for their cour-
holding unconstitutional the Civil Rights Act of 1875, the Court stated:
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of beneficent legislation
has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state, there must be some
stage in the progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere citizen,
and ceases to be the special favorite of the laws ....
Id. at 25. This was a very clear message that Black people could not look to the Court to
safeguard those new rights which had been granted. This response, though absent the
white supremacy rhetoric, was as devastating as the message in Dred Scott.
371. The following is a list of some of the cases during this period wherein the Court
denied the Black petitioner's plea for relief and protection. See United States v. Cruik-
shank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883); James v. Bow-
man, 190 U.S. 127 (1903); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Even though the
Court did not rule correctly it was forced to grapple with these issues, and in some cases,
generated dissenting opinions which would one day become the majority opinion.
372. Some of the victories occurred in Strauder v. W.Va., 100 U.S. 303 (1880), and Ex
parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880) (The right of Black people to serve on juries was
established.); see also Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884), (Court denied a writ of
habeas corpus to whites who had violated a civil rights statute by intimidating Black
people who were attempting to vote); see also United States v. Waddell, 112 U.S. 76
(1884), and Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892).
373. Though even these small areas of legal recognition had to be repeatedly de-
fended in practice.
374. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). In this landmark decision the Court upheld the principle
and practice of "separate but unequal." Though the Court reasoned that it was enforcing
a statute that provided for "equal but separate" passenger cars on trains in Louisiana, it
was clear that none of the facilities that operated on this basis were truly equal. This
decision helped to ensure that the system of white domination would be preserved for
some time into the future.
375. This is part of William Lloyd Garrison's condemnation of the actions of the
Framers. See supra, text at note 145. The Court in Plessy was continuing the same pat-
tern inherited from the "founding fathers."
376. This postponement lasted until Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
377. Plessy, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). The development of the "Separate but Equal" doc-
trine is a good example of the hypocrisy. It was clear that this was a doctrine created to
uphold the status quo and not a fulfillment of the purpose behind the fourteenth amend-
ment. Even the Court's reasoning was very specious when it concluded that the inferi-
JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS [Vol. V
age in challenging this unjust state of affairs at a time when it
was very unpopular to do so. It is their spirit that we must com-
memorate during this bicentennial year.
Tremendous strides in the transformation of the American
Constitution emerged through the powerful litigation strategy of
the NAACP Legal Defense Fund. 7 These brilliant lawyers and
social activists set out to make Justice Harlan's dissenting opin-
ion in Plessy17 1 the law of the land. This protracted struggle
culminated in the landmark decision of Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation.380 The status of Black Americans, at least in form, was
raised to the level of White Americans. The Constitutional pro-
tection enshrined in the fourteenth amendment eighty-six years
earlier was finally enforced by the highest judicial body in the
country. This was a victory for America more than it would ever
be a victory for the Black plaintiffs who initiated the litigation,
or their successors."8 1 This landmark decision shortened the
wide gap between the Constitution's declaration of equality and
the country's practice of "separate but unequal." One of the
ority that Black people felt from segregation laws was due to their own subjective deter-
mination and not because of the law. Id. at 551. Though Justice Harlan in his dissenting
opinion argued that the segregation statute was unconstitutional because the Constitu-
tion was "color blind," he also exposed the contradiction in the American creed when he
stated, "[tihe white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And so it
is . . . [and] will continue to be for all time .... " Id. at 559. Although he made a
distinction between law and the other aspects of social life, this distinction is meaning-
less since one's ability to enjoy the benefits and protections of the law are so intimately
tied to one's economic, political and social status in the society.
378. See R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1977) for an excellent discussion of the people
and the strategy behind the NAACP Legal Defense Fund efforts; see also L. MILLER, THE
PETITIONERS (1966).
379. See supra note 374. Justice Harlan in his dissenting opinion declared that,
in view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior,
dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind,
and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens." Id. at 558.
380. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The Supreme Court in a unanimous decision held, "... that
in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place. There-
fore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated ... are ... deprived of the
equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 495.
381. None of the plaintiffs in the Brown litigation ever attended integrated schools.
This was due primarily to Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown II),
wherein the Court tempered the effects of the first decision by declaring that the trans-
formation should occur with "all deliberate speed." Id. at 301. The saga of integration
was an ugly and painful one for Black children, and it is still very questionable whether
the educational welfare of Black children has been completely addressed. See Hall &
Henderson, Thirty Years After Brown: Looking Ahead, 24 WASHBURN L.J. 227 (1985).
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most horrendous stigmas and obstacles of liberty and freedom
was being ushered out, through the courageous and brilliant ad-
vocacy of individuals like Thurgood Marshall, Howard Jenkins,
James N. Nabrit, Spotswood W. Robinson III, Frank Reeves,
Jack Greenberg, Louis Redding, U. Simpson Tate and George
E.C. Haynes,82 individuals383 who would not accept the cor-
rupted definition of equality which the Framers and their "pos-
terity" imposed upon Black people and the entire nation. This
breakthrough was the fruit of the immeasurable labor of individ-
uals like Charles Hamilton Houston, William Hastie, and so
many others who paved the way; those who trained and inspired
the lawyers who won the battle." 4
The victory was still far off. Brown did not completely
transform the Constitution or the nation as many envisioned. 85
The same Court which apparently closed the door on the long
history of racial oppression in America, left it cracked enough so
that the same practices could continue unabated for some time
to come. 6 The stage for the "transformation movement"
shifted from the courtroom to the streets. Protests, sit-ins, dem-
onstrations, boycotts, marches, and uncompromising will, be-
382. These are the lawyers who argued the case before the Supreme Court. See
Camper, The Quest For Liberty BLACK ENTERPRISE, July 1987, at 51, 54.
383. Tremendous credit must also be given to the plaintiffs in the Brown litigation
and others who were courageous enough to take a stand for equality and liberty. Their
names must be remembered. Oliver Brown, Mrs. Richard Lawton, Sadie Emanuel,
Charles and Kimberly Smith, Cordellia Mitchell, Connie Maxwell, Barbara Mitchell,
Arlene Jackson, Charlene Burkes, Carlesia and Cheryl Robinson, Rufus and Michelle
Kelly, John, Jackie, Johnny and Viola Davis, Ruby Davis, Inez Davis, Wesley Williams,
Mary Parker, Robert Faulkner, Margaret Butler, Harold Haynes, Francis Gebhart, Wil-
liam Homer, Spottswood Boiling, Arcadia Phillips, Walter Tobuner, et.al.
384. For an extensive analysis of the contributions of Charles Hamilton Houston
(Dean of Howard Law School/first Black lawyer representing the NAACP to have won
before the Supreme Court), William Hastie (first Black Federal Judge), and other early
attorneys in the period preceding Brown v. Board of Educ., see R. KLUGER, supra note
378, at 105-366.
385. Despite the Court's declaration that separate was inherently unequal in the field
of education, many of the nation's schools remained segregated. In addition, other as-
pects of life in America also remained on a segregated basis. Black people in America
were still viewed as second class citizens and the Constitution's promise of equality re-
mained unfulfilled in some of the most vital areas of life: voting, employment, housing
and even education.
386. The "all deliberate speed" formula of Brown II, 349 U.S. 294, allowed for South-
ern Courts and school officials to drag their feet. For an excellent overview of many of
the maneuvers that lower courts employed to avoid the mandate of Brown, see D, BELL,
supra note 13, at 381-82 n.16.
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came the new vehicles for Constitutional change.8 7 The Civil
Rights/Black Power Movement was a continuation of the strug-
gle for freedom, liberty and human dignity which began centu-
ries earlier when Africans refused to submit to their captors.
Rosa Parks,88 Fannie Lou Hamer, s9 Martin Luther King,"' and
Stokley Carmichael, 391 became the new American revolutionar-
387. The Montgomery Bus Boycott of 1955 is viewed as the beginning of this new
stage of the Civil Rights movement. The success and spirit of this victory spread like
wild fire. Other protests and boycotts sprang up across the country. Some of the notable
ones were: student lunch counter sit-in at Greensboro, North Carolina in February of
1960; student sit-in at Orangeburg, South Carolina in the same month; The Freedom
Rides of 1961 led by James Farmer, the Director of CORE (Congress of Racial Equality);
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) Voter Registration School in Mis-
sissippi in 1962-63; the marches to desegregate Birmingham, Alabama in 1963; the his-
toric march from Selma to Montgomery in 1965; the March on Washington; the riots in
Watts, Detroit, Newark, etc. For a general overview of these activities and others, see H.
SITKOFF, supra note 3; see also A. D. MORRIS, THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVE-
MENT (1984).
388. Rosa Parks initiated the Montgomery Bus Boycott when she refused to give up
her seat to a white person as it was customary and mandatory to do in Montgomery.
This silent courageous act changed the course of American law and history.
389. Fannie Lou Hamer was instrumental in the formation of the Mississippi Free-
dom Democratic Party, which attempted to be seated at the National Democratic Con-
vention in 1964. Since Blacks were not allowed to participate in the election of delegates
to the Democratic Convention, Ms. Hamer, along with others, held their own convention
wherein delegates were chosen to represent "all of the people" of the State of Mississippi
at the National Convention. The delegates were not officially seated at the Convention,
yet their presence forced the National Democratic Party to change their rules and poli-
cies concerning the elections of delegates. The personal history of Ms. Hamer in
Ruleville, Mississippi-especially her struggle to become a registered voter-is a dra-
matic triumph of the human will over the forces of white domination in America. She,
like so many others, paid a tremendous price for attempting to inject the true meaning of
liberty and equality into the Constitution. She was severely beaten on numerous occa-
sions for attempting to become a registered voter in Mississippi.
390. Dr. Martin Luther King was the symbol of this stage of the American Revolu-
tion. His deeds and contributions to the development of American society and constitu-
tional law are immeasurable. He was America's "savior," the true American Revolution-
ary. The movement which Dr. King inspired affected every aspect of life in America:
voting, housing, public accommodations, criminal justice, health and human welfare. It is
this movement which ushered in the "new meaning" in Constitutional interpretation.
See, e.g., S. B. OATES, LET THE TRUMPET SOUND, THE LIFE OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.
(1982).
391. Stokley Carmichael was one of the founders of SNCC (Student Non-Violent Co-
ordinating Committee). He is most famous for his popularization of the concept of Black
Power. Carmichael was symbolic of the militant aspect of the "American Revolution."
The pressure that his stance placed on the traditional Civil Rights leadership, and on
America, precipitated much progress in legal reform. The same could be said for Mal-
colm X, and Elijah Muhammad. Though these men were not involved in direct action
against the inequalities in society in the same manner as the Civil Rights movement,
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ies. They, along with countless others, tested the ability of the
nation to change, galvanized the masses to throw off the yoke of
oppression and gave new meaning to the American ideals. Dr.
King latched on to the ideals which the Framers had enshrined
into the Constitution and used them as a platform upon which
to build his appeal for justice. He eloquently stated at the fa-
mous March on Washington that:
When the architects of our republic wrote the magnifi-
cent words of the Constitution and the Declaration of In-
dependence, they were signing a promissory note to
which every American was to fall heir. This note was a
promise that all men-black men as well as white
men-would be guaranteed the unalienable rights of life,
liberty and pursuit of happiness. But it is obvious that
America has defaulted on this promissory note insofar as
her citizens of color are concerned. Instead of honoring
this sacred obligation, America has given the Negro peo-
ple a bad check ... We refuse to believe that the bank of
justice is bankrupt. We refuse to believe that there are
insufficient funds in the great vaults of opportunity in
this Nation ... Now is the time to make real the promise
of democracy ... Now is the time to make justice a real-
ity for all of God's children.392
It is clear that at the time King made this speech in 1963, that
justice, equality and liberty were not part of American society. If
the country denied them to a certain segment of its population
then it has denied the ideal entirely. The movement which King
was a part of was attempting to make these ideals a reality in
America. Through these protest efforts,393 coupled with judi-
they had a tremendous impact on the development of the consciousness and spirit of
Black people in America, which allowed the "river of change" to flow more freely. All of
the individuals in this category, though seldom recognized as contributors to the ad-
vancement of American society, were great "freedom fighters." They confronted the ine-
quality and injustice in America, and challenged the victims to transform the contradic-
tion by first transforming themselves.
392. Excerpts from Martin Luther King's famous "I Have a Dream" speech given at
the Lincoln Memorial during the historic "March on Washington," on August 28, 1963
(quoted in F. FREEDMAN, supra note 280, at 252).
393. See supra notes 387-91.
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cial 394 and legislative 95 enactments, social and constitutional
transformation began to occur."' 6 The most sacred element of
citizenship was finally given to Black people.9 Up to this point
democracy did not exist in America. This is the bicentennial of
the Constitution, but it is certainly not the bicentennial of the
principles of liberty, equality and democracy. It is inaccurate for
scholars to refer to the source of democracy in America as the
strength of the Constitution, when for one hundred and seventy
eight of this two-hundred year tradition, a significant number of
the population were virtually precluded from participating in
the political process. The Framers referred to this concept in
394. See, e.g., Boynton v. Va., 364 U.S. 454 (1960); Cox v. La., 379 U.S. 536 (1965);
Bell v. Md., 378 U.S. 226 (1964); Griffin v. Md., 378 U.S. 130 (1964); Garner v. La., 368
U.S. 157 (1961).
395. For a list of the various Civil Rights laws which were passed during this period,
see Civil Rights Acts of 1960s, supra note 281. For an analysis of the relationship be-
tween the passage of these laws and the "protest movement," see infra notes 400-14.
396. This point is very critical in understanding the meaning of the Constitution, and
this bicentennial celebration. The Black struggle for freedom is the central axis upon
which the "transformation" in American law and society has occurred. Without it there
would be very little, if anything, to celebrate this year. This idea is eloquently captured
by the historian Benjamin Quarles when he states:
[Wihat the overwhelming majority of Negroes wanted was their full rights
as American citizens...
* * . the vision of the founders of this republic was still a vital force. Ameri-
cans to the core, they believed that freedom and equality for all could be
achieved in their native land...
This belief had been one of their significant contributions to the making of
America. In enlarging the meaning of freedom and in giving it new expression,
the Negro had played a major role. He had been a watchman on the wall. More
fully than any other American, he knew that freedom was hard-won and could
be preserved only by continuous effort. The faith and work of the Negro over
the years had made it possible for the American creed to retain so much of its
deep appeal, so much of its moving power.
See B. QUARLES, THE NEGRO IN THE MAKING OF AMERICA 264-65 (1964) (emphasis added).
Quarles' statement is very eloquent, yet he understates the contribution of the "Black
Struggle" to American Constitutional law. The struggle did not "enlarge" the meaning of
freedom, it gave the correct meaning for the first time. The meanin0 of the Framers was
totally incorrect. Without this process the contradiction in American law would have
remained so glaring that there would be no "appeal" to its "creed."
397. After tremendous social upheaval in Alabama and throughout the South the
Voting Rights Act was passed by Congress in August 1965. This act eliminated many of
the barriers that Southerners constructed in order to prevent Black people from voting.
This law, more so than any other, provided them with a viable tool with which to secure
advancement in society. When the act was finally enforced the number of registered vot-
ers and Black elected official increased dramatically. See Civil Rights Acts of 1960s,
supra note 281.
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their declarations, but they prevented it from taking root by
their actions.1a This principle was added to the foundation a
couple of decades ago,399 and must still be nurtured.
It is amazing how a "bright line" can be drawn between spe-
cific historical events, and the enactment of various laws and ju-
dicial decisions. The efforts of Rosa Parks and the Montgomery
Improvement Association were directly responsible for the de-
segregation of public bus lines in Montgomery, Alabama. 00 The
"Sit-in" movement conducted by the Student Non-Violent Co-
ordinating Committee (SNCC) and various other individuals
and groups brought an end to segregation in lunch counters and
other public facilities throughout the South.""1 Although the Su-
preme Court had already decided that segregation in interstate
travel was unconstitutional in Boynton v. Virginia " it took the
courageous efforts of the "Freedom Riders" to make this an en-
forceable right.403 The historic March on Washington precipi-
tated the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 0 4 The Freedom
Summer of 1964,05 the tragic death of three civil rights work-
ers,40 6 coupled with the Selma to Montgomery March of 1965,407
398. Justice Thurgood Marshall supports this conclusion. He has stated:
I do not believe that the meaning of the Constitution was forever "fixed" at the
Philadelphia Convention. Nor do I find the wisdom, foresight and sense of jus-
tice exhibited by the Framers particularly profound. To the contrary, the gov-
ernment they devised was defective from the start, requiring several amend-
ments, a civil war and momentous social transformation to attain the system of
constitutional government, and its respect for the individual freedoms and
human rights we hold as fundamental today.
See Marshall's Speech, supra note 6.
399. These principles were added beginning with the Brown decision and culminating
in the passage of a series of Civil Rights Acts. Though these were not Constitutional
amendments, these cases and statutes substantively altered the meaning of the
Constitution.
400. See H. SITKOFF, supra note 3, at 41-68.
401. Id. at 69-96.
402. 364 U.S. 454 (1960).
403. See H. SITKOFF, supra note 3, at 97-114.
404. Id. at 165-66.
405. Id. at 168-97. This project sponsored by Student Non-Violent Coordinating
Committee and The Congress of Racial Equality, sent numerous individuals-mostly
students both black and white-into the South (Mississippi) in order to educate and
register Black people who were being denied the franchise by various legal maneuvers,
intimidation and violence.
406. Three students who were participating in the Freedom Summer project were
brutally murdered by white public officials in Philadelphia, Mississippi. Their bodies
were found after an extensive search that drew national media attention. The names
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were the catalyst for the passage of the Voting Rights Bill." "s
The assassination of Martin Luther King spurred the passage of
the Fair Housing Law.4 9 The urban riots of the mid-1960s pro-
duced various social reform programs,"10 and some4 ' link them
to the Court's invalidation of miscegenation statutes in Loving v.
Virginia.""1
President Lyndon Johnson recognized the deeper political
and historical meaning of these various human acts when he
compared the Selma March to the Revolutionary War battle at
"Lexington and Concord."41 In urging the passage of the Voting
Rights Bill he proclaimed that the "real hero of this struggle is
the American Negro. His action and protest, his courage to risk
safety, and even to risk life, have awakened the conscience of
this nation."4 1'
It was again the sacrifices of Black lives at the altar that
made change possible. Yet it was often the death of white
protesters or supporters of the movement which generated the
greatest public outcry and the swiftest response. 1 5 These are the
Chaney, Schwerner, and Goodman took on divine significance. They became the symbols
of the atrocities of white supremacy and hatred. H. SITKOFF, supra note 3, at 172-79.
407. Id. at 187-97. This march was part of the strategy of the Southern Christian
Leadership Council (SCLC) to force the federal government to pass a strong voting
rights bill. They chose a city, Selma, Alabama, which was notorious for its treatment of
Black people and its constant denial of their political rights. Defying an order from the
Governor of Alabama, Hosea Williams lead 500 protesters on a march from Selma to
Montgomery. At the Edmund Pettus Bridge, just outside of Selma, one of the most vio-
lent attacks by policemen on peaceful Black protesters occurred. Television cameras car-
ried these scenes into homes across America. Although the march was violently and ab-
ruptly terminated, it generated an outpouring of sympathy. The assault on three
Unitarian ministers and the death of one, who came to participate in the march, kindled
federal support for the demands of Black people. With protection from federalized Ala-
bama State Troopers, Dr. Martin Luther King led over five thousand marchers on the
now historic "Selma to Montgomery" march. The death of Viola Liuzzo, a White partici-
pant in the march, generated more public support in favor of the passage of a Voting
Rights Bill.
408. Voting Rights Act of 1965, supra note 281.
409. See H. SITKOFF, supra note 3, at 222; see also Civil Rights Act (Fair Housing
Title) of 1968, supra note 281.
410. See H. SITKOFF, supra note 3, at 199-217.
411. See D. BELL supra note 13, at 61.
412. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
413. See H. SITKOFF, supra note 3, at 193.
414. Id.
415. This pattern can be discerned by reviewing the events which lead to the passage
of various laws during this period. See supra notes 405-07. The deaths of President Ken-
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Constitutional heroes and heroines who must be memorialized
during this bicentennial year.4 16 American history is full of men
and women who insured this country's future. It is vital for this
nation to insure that people like Dred Scott, 17 the Scottsboro
boys,418 and the victims of the Grant Parish Massacre4 1 9 did not
nedy, the three Civil Rights workers in Mississippi (two of whom were White), Rev.
James Reeb (Unitarian minister at Selma), and Viola Liuzzo "shocked the conscience" of
America and provided the needed legitimacy for legal reform. This pattern is only more
evidence of how deep the threads of white supremacy run in this country. The deaths of
millions of Black people, who lost their lives in the freedom struggle and in their daily
existence, were not sufficient to justify reform. This de-valuation of Black life is one of
the most devastating aspects of the system of white supremacy which influences Ameri-
can law and policy.
416. The names are too numerous to mention, and so many never made it into the
history books. The following is just a few who represent the spirit of so many. Medgar
Evers, Emmitt Till, Jimmy Lee Jackson, Ralph Featherstone, Bobby Hutton, Fred
Hampton, Sammy Younge Jr., Rev. and Mrs. Moore, the four Black girls in a church in
Alabama, William Moore, Herbert Lee, William Franklin and the countless ones who lay
at the bottom of rivers, creeks and unmarked graves; Andrew Goodman, James Chaney,
Michael Schwerner, Malcolm X, Dr. Martin L. King, Viola Liuzzo, Rev. James Reeb; the
men of Attica and Soledad, the numerous ones who died in the gas chambers and electric
chairs by order of a court for crimes they didn't commit; Paul Robeson, Fannie Lou
Hamer, Elijah Muhammad, Ella Jo Baker, Marcus Garvey, those who stood up and chal-
lenged the contradictions regardless of the price; James Meredith, Ada Lois Sipuel
Fisher, the students in Little Rock, Arkansas, and the University of Alabama, the coura-
geous ones who went through the doors first so that the rest of us could follow; those
whose necks were placed in a noose and hung from a tree because their color was re-
sented and despised; Nat Turner, Denmark Vesey, Gabriel Prosser, John Brown, those
who loved liberty so much that they willingly and courageously faced their tyrants de-
spite overwhelming odds .... These are the heroines and heroes who through their lives
and sacrifices taught us the real meaning of 'liberty' and 'justice,' and thus made this
country great. It is their spirit that we must revere this bicentennial year.
417. This is the name of the petitioner who sought his freedom in the famous Dred
Scott v. Sandford decision.
418. In 1931 nine Black men were accused of rape in Scottsboro, Alabama. Despite
compelling evidence that they did not commit the crime, eight were sentenced to death.
After years of tremendous protest and litigation some were released, while others re-
mained in jail for over nineteen years. Two Supreme Court cases grew out of the litiga-
tion of the Scottsboro incident: Powell v. Ala., 287 U.S. 45 (1932), and Norris v. Ala., 294
U.S. 587 (1935). The first case established the right of counsel for criminal defendants,
and the second overturned the conviction of one of the defendants because of the sys-
tematic exclusion of Blacks from jury service. Both cases, especially Powell, were very
important in advancing the rights of all criminal defendants and transforming the Amer-
ican criminal justice system. Unfortunately, the defendants were retried and again con-
victed. During one stage of these lengthy proceedings, one of the white girls involved in
the case admitted that the alleged incident did not occur. This confession did not result
in an acquittal for any of the defendants. The last of the Scottsboro defendants, Andrew
Wright, was released by the Alabama State Pardon and Parole Board on June 9, 1950. A
compelling description of the events surrounding this famous case is found in a book co-
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live and die in vain. These individuals and so many other peti-
tioners and wrongfully accused defendants, who suffered under
the banner of the American legal system and its glorious Consti-
tution, should be canonized. They must not be remembered as
insignificant victims caught up in the processes of constitutional
development. As this country celebrates this year, it should also
celebrate the survival of people of color in a society where color
has been, and still is an invitation for abuse, denial and destruc-
tion. During slavery, and the many years following, African peo-
ple would take that which was discarded and turn it into some-
thing useful and divine. Through these same creative forces,
their descendants have taken the document which the "founding
fathers" held out to the world, with all its glaring weaknesses
and contradictions, and made it real. They did what was often
described in southern metaphors as "the impossible." They got
"blood from a turnip."
The river to freedom still flows. It bends and winds, some-
times flowing slowly, other times profusely, but it always flows.
It is this river which has enriched the soil of Constitutional law
in this country.20 The overflowing of its banks has made a na-
authored by one of the defendants. See H. PArrERSON & E. CONRAD, ScorrSBORo Boy
(1950).
419. This is the incident out of which one of the first Supreme Court interpretations
of the fourteenth amendment occurred, United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876);
Professor Derrick Bell describes this incident of white violence against Blacks in the
following manner:
In Louisiana during the election of 1872 there were numerous disputes over the
results of local elections. In the town of Colfax, where an election dispute over
the position of Sheriff and Judge had arisen, the Sheriff, on the Governor's or-
der, seized a building which was to be used as the Courthouse. The seizure was
made with the assistance of a posse of blacks. Rumors spread that the blacks
were about to attack local whites, and on April 15, 1873, the Courthouse was
burned down and the blacks were shot as they came out. The Governor took no
action, but the Department of Justice investigator secured evidence, and ninety-
six people were indicted under the Civil Rights Act of 1870 (now 18 U.S.C. Sec.
241). The Justice Department succeeded in arresting nine of them. They were
found not guilty of murders but guilty of conspiracy to prevent blacks from the
free exercise and enjoyment of rights and privileges granted and secured by the
Constitution, including the right to assemble peacefully for lawful purposes, to
bear arms, vote, and not be placed in fear of bodily harm for voting . . . The
Supreme Court reversed as to each count of the indictment.
See D. BELL, supra note 13, at 211-12 n.4 (emphasis added).
420. A most moving description of this "river" can be found in Vincent Harding's
book, There Is A River, The Black Struggle for Freedom in America. See V. HARDING
supra note 3.
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tion that was created to protect economic concerns into a place
where the battle for liberty, justice and the equality of people,
has been a constant drama. As the drama unfolds in a more so-
phisticated form, let those who understand the "transformation
of law," assume their appropriate places on the stage of human
history.
V1. PRESENT DILEMMAS, FUTURE CHALLENGES
Despite the tremendous transformation which has occurred
in the Constitution and in American society, serious inequities
still remain. The overt forms of discrimination have all but dis-
appeared, but the lasting consequences of centuries of subordi-
nation linger on.' 2 1 These consequences, coupled with more sub-
tle forms of discrimination, 22 create a tremendous challenge for
all of us during this bicentennial year.
One of the legal challenges which this country presently face
is the new crisis in constitutional construction and interpreta-
tion. The call for a return to the jurisprudence of original intent
is at the core of this crisis. This call is based on the premise that
the only way the Constitution can constrain judges, is for them
421. See supra notes 2 and 8.
422. Various legal scholars have commented on this new form of discrimination. John
Calmore, in describing how meritocracy has replaced overt discrimination writes,
"[b]eyond stereotypic characterizations blacks are seen simply as unable to compete
fairly for goods and services because so many of them, as individuals, are flawed: unedu-
cable, untrainable, immoral, violent, criminally inclined. They lack job experience; they
do not test highly; they live in slums. See Calmore, Exploring the Significance of Race
and Class in Representing the Black Poor, 61 OREGON L. REV. 201, 207 (1982); Professor
Derrick Bell states,
[wihile slavery and segregation rested on the need to exploit white as well as
black labor, wealth in this country is now produced through the exploitation of
technology. No longer needing their basic labor, the society feels free to offer
long disadvantaged blacks and poor whites, "equal access" to jobs, schools, hous-
ing, and public accommodations, that they are ill-prepared to accept or unable
to afford.
This statement is taken from a speech given by Professor Bell at Jackson State Univer-
sity, Jackson, Mississippi, November 1, 1984, entitled, No Hiding Place: A Traditional
Role for Black Colleges in a Still Hard World, at 7. Professor Alan Freeman writes,
[flor as surely as the law has outlawed racial discrimination, it has affirmed
that Black Americans can be without jobs, have their children in all-black,
poorly funded schools, have no opportunities for decent housing, and have very
little political power, without any violation of anti-discrimination law.
Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Anti-Discrimination Law: A
Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1050 (1978).
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to interpret the document according to the intentions of those
who drafted, proposed and ratified it and its various amend-
ments." 3 The earlier analysis in this article demonstrates the
danger and weaknesses in this method of judicial review. This
perspective ignores the tremendous transformation which has
occurred in the nature and spirit of the document. The change is
the product of the freedom movement which has been detailed
herein. Any valid form of constitutional interpretation must take
this movement and its consequences into consideration. It has
altered the focus of the Constitution so that human dignity is
now a valuable component of the text. Within the words handed
down by the Framers are additional values which they did not
totally understand. Nor did they intend for them to be placed
within the text.42 4 The "legitimate right of the majority to gov-
ern '"425 in a manner that destroys the fundamental rights of indi-
viduals has a deeper meaning than Madison imagined. This ap-
preciation emerged from the history of racial domination in this
country. If the Supreme Court was authorized to balance this
tension between individual freedom and the power of the major-
ity, then it cannot be limited by a vision that allowed the major-
423. This statement paraphrases portions of a speech given by Judge Robert H. Bork
before the University of San Diego Law School, November 18, 1985. THE GREAT DEBATE,
supra note 122, at 43-52.
424. Proof that there are values within the Constitution which the Framers did not
intend the document to ever possess is found in a speech given by C.C. Pinckney before
the South Carolina House of Representatives in 1788. While explaining to this body the
benefits and promises that the South received at the Convention, he stated:
We have a security that the general government can never emancipate them
[Africans], for no such authority is granted; and it is admitted, on all hands, that
the general government has no powers but what are expressly granted by the
Constitution, and that all rights not expressed were reserved by the several
states.
See 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 26, at 254. Pinckney reiterated these intentions in 1820
before the same legislative body.
He stated, it was an agreed point, a solemnly understood compact, that on the
Southern States consenting to shut their ports against the imrortation of Afri-
cans, no power was to be delegated to Congress, nor were they ever to be author-
ized to touch the question of slavery; that the property of the Southern States
was to be sacredly preserved, and protected to them, as any other kind of prop-
erty in the Eastern States were to be to their citizens.
Id. at 443. Therefore, the thirteenth amendment is in total contradiction to the original
intent of the Framers. How much of the original intent did this amendment carve away?
How much of the remaining original intent dampens the spirit of this amendment?
These questions are as elusive to the intentionalist as morality is to the expansionist.
425. THE GREAT DEBATE, supra note 122, at 44.
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ity to violate the natural rights of other human beings.4 26 Thus
greater safeguards than those envisioned must be incorporated
into these broad parameters that the Framers constructed. The
judge's search for these new safeguards are no more elusive than
his/her search for original intent.42 7 The spirit and philosophy of
the Constitution can be found in the tumultuous history of this
country, as well as it can be found in the journals of the Framers
and the Federalist papers. Neither search produces total cer-
tainty, yet the first, when conducted by individuals who are sen-
sitive to the complete function of law, can produce more equita-
ble results. It is a "Constitution that we are expounding," but in
order for it to fulfill its true mission, those who interpret it must
search for the best meaning of the ideals enshrined therein. If
the Cons~tution only provides us "with a premise "428 then the
minor premises which lead to a conclusion must incorporate his-
tory, humanity, and philosophy along the way. There is clearly a
danger in allowing nine men and women to make these types of
decisions for an entire nation. Yet there is also a danger in al-
lowing one hundred senators and four hundred and thirty-five
representatives to make decisions for a nation. The Framers did
not intend to construct a government that was free of dangers,
they only attempted to create certain "checks" on these powers.
History teaches that original intent provides no greater restraint
than an expanded jurisprudence. The jurisprudence of original
426. See discussion of Madison's majoritarian vision of law, supra notes 119-21 and
accompanying text.
427. Original intent is a very elusive search because even the manifested intent of
those who drafted, proposed, and ratified the Constitution or an amendment is so varied.
Whose intent governs? There are numerous sources which contain that intent: legislative
histories; state ratifying convention proceedings; the papers and writings of the Framers
or other legislators, etc. These sources are often in conflict and they don't always reflect
all of the discussions and sentiment which were embodied in a provision, but: never
placed in writing. Justice William J. Brennan, in a speech to the Text and Teaching
Symposium, Georgetown University on October 12, 1985, described the quest for a juris-
prudence of original intent as "arrogance cloaked as humility." THE GREAT DEBATE,
supra note 122, at 14.
428. THE GREAT DEBATE, supra note 423 at 46. Judge Bork, in defending his position
against claims that original intent does not aid in the resolution of contemporary
problems which the Framers did not contemplate, stated "the Constitution provides him
[the intentionalist] not with a conclusion but with a premise. The premise states a core
value that the framers intended to protect. The intentionalist judge must then supply
the minor premise in order to protect the constitutional freedom in circumstances the
framers could not foresee." Id.
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intent did not restrain the judges in Dred Scott, the Civil Rights
Cases, or Plessy. Original intent was the basis for these appal-
ling decisions against liberty and humanity. This new era of
original intent will likely produce similar results; results not as
offensive as the cases cited above, but results which circumvent
the movement for racial justice. The contribution that the Black
Freedom movement and others have made to the development
of Constitutional law and jurisprudence is too precious and im-
portant to be discarded for promises of certainty and
predictability.
This era in American constitutional law fits the description
of the time in Charles Dickens's Tale of Two Cities.429 For it is
"the best of times" for some and "the worst of times" for others.
It is the best of times for those who would prefer to forget the
past Constitutional injustices and their consequences, and it is
the worst of times for those who are forced to live every day
with those consequences.8 0 It is a time of celebration, but is also
a time of deep despair. It is a time for rejoicing over the liberties
that are enjoyed in this country, but it is also a time for a sober,
critical analysis of the Constitution's past and its future. In this
era of economic recovery, some see things as they are and like it,
knowing that for them it can only get better. Others see things
as they are and pray for change, for they know that things could
soon be worse. Therefore, how one views this bicentennial year,
this Constitution, depends entirely on which side of the coin
one's life, interests and aspirations lie. For there are many who
will examine this document and reach very different conclusions
than the one offered here."3 1 The purpose of the conference on
429. See C. DICKENS, A TALE OF Two CITIES (Bantam Books 4th ed. 1983). Dickens
describes the period of the French Revolution in the following manner.
It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it
was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredu-
lity, it was the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness, it was the spring
of hope, it was the winter of despair, we had everything before us, we had noth-
ing before us, we were all going direct to Heaven, we were all going direct the.
other way....
Id. at 1.
430. See supra notes 2 and 8.
431. See, e.g., Burger, Marking the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution,
16 SETON HALL L. REV. 462 (1986); C. COLLIER & J.L. COLLIER, DECISION IN PHILADELPHIA:
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (1986); R. BERNSTEIN, ARE WE To BE A NA-
TION? THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1987).
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"The Constitution and Race: A Critical Perspective," was to
make sure history records that there was a dissenting opinion.
We are living in a time where the Supreme Court upholds
an affirmative action plan that insures the promotion of Black
state troopers in Alabama,'32 yet fails to uphold the rights of a
teachers' union in Michigan to voluntarily correct racial imbal-
ances in the hiring and termination of teachers. 3" The Court has
recognized that peremptory challenges can be used by the prose-
cution to deny Black defendants a fair and impartial trial,'43' yet
it failed to recognize that the most severe penalty that the legal
system can impose is disproportionately applied to Blacks and
other people of color.'3 5 It appears that there are mixed
messages coming from the Court. A closer and deeper examina-
tion will reveal that these are the same messages. The message is
that the inherent contradiction that existed within the Constitu-
tion at its inception has not been totally resolved. The contra-
diction produces a little bitter and a little sweet. It is not until
the contradiction is finally resolved that the Court and this
Country will be able to rectify the crimes that have been in-
flicted upon people of color in this society in the name of the
Constitution. During this bicentennial year, we gathered at this
conference to propose resolutions 30 to the contradictions, and to
ponder our alternatives. This is the legacy of the "river;" this is
our challenge for the future.
432. See United States v. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. 1053 (1987).
433. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
434. See Batson v. Ky., 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
435. See McClesky v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 1756 (1987).
436. Resolutions were proposed and approved at the final Plenary session of the con-
ference in regards to the following areas: Reparations, Economic Rights, The Fourteenth
Amendment, Criminal Justice, and Political Representation.
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